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The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union (hereinafter FRA) is a recent in-
stitution within the EU institutional architecture. This Agency was created in 2007 and was 
entrusted to carry out monitoring activities with regards to fundamental rights. As such, the 
Agency was conceived as a fundamental element of a new engineering of fundamental 
rights protection at EU level. In fact, according to “Leading by Example: a human rights agenda 
for the year 2000”1 – the agenda drafted by a Comité des Sages comprising Antonio Cassese, 
Catherine Lalumière, Peter Leuprecht and Mary Robinson – the creation of a monitoring 
agency focused on human rights was considered able to trigger a more proactive and cen-
tral role of EU institutions in the protection of human rights.  
However, although the Agency has in few years produced 81 reports, 5 handbooks in 
cooperation with the Council of Europe, 23 working discussion papers, issued 15 opinions, 
worked on 43 research projects and promoted dissemination strategies of a culture of re-
spect for fundamental rights among the civil society, this institution is not very well known.  
A partial explanation for this lack of knowledge with regards to the FRA is due to the 
fact that the Agency has neither legal nor judicial nor political power. In fact, the FRA is an 
independent Agency responsible for gathering data and reliable information on fundamen-
tal rights issues within the EU. It carries out an advisory function that relies on highly qual-
ified experts in the field of human rights. It has no decision-making power and it cannot 
scrutinize the EU outgoing legislation. Therefore, at a first glance, it does not appear to be 
crystal clear what is the FRA effective weight concerning its role within the EU architec-
ture.  
In addition, the FRA is often seen as a new human rights institution that suddenly was 
embedded within the EU framework and, as a consequence, is trying to integrate itself 
within it.   
According to this view, it is certainly true that the FRA is something completely new 
within the EU and international system of protection of human rights, but it is also worth 
noting that the idea of its establishment came from a long process of reflection on the in-
tegration of fundamental rights in the context of the EU.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Comité des Sages, “Leading by Example: A Human Rights Agenda for the European Union for the 
Year 2000” (1998). 
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Therefore, the role of the Agency and its contribution cannot be fully understood if its 
very origin and its relation with other human rights instruments, as for instance the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which were part of the human rights reforming process 
that started in 2000, are not clarified.  
In light of these premises, the present thesis intends thereby to offer a complete account 
of the Agency with regards to its function and structure and concerning its role within the 
EU system. To this aim, the present thesis is organized in three chapters where the follow-
ing itinerary is elaborated. 
In the first chapter, the very origins of the Agency are understood. After a general over-
view of the evolution of the EU approach to human rights, the attention will be focused on 
five key moments which contributed to the creation of the Agency: the first is the intro-
duction of article 7 TEU in the contest of the EU’s enlargement and the particular concern 
of the European Community over minority groups; the second is the establishment of the 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (hereinafter EUMC); the third is 
the Austrian crisis and the three wise men report; the fourth is the proclamation of the EU 
Charter of fundamental rights; the last and most important is the institutional debate that 
occurred on occasion of the establishment of the EU monitoring Agency for fundamental 
rights.  
Through this itinerary, it will be shown that the idea of the FRA was born in the context 
of the EU enlargement that brought into light a new wave of phenomena concerning racial 
and ethnic discrimination. In order to monitor such emerging phenomena in the EU con-
text, the EUMC was created. As it will be seen, the Agency is built upon the EUMC and 
develops and extends its structure and its model. This partially explains the strong com-
mitment of the FRA with non-discrimination issues that remains one of the main areas of 
activities of the Agency. The other element characterizing the Agency’s birth is its relation 
with the new moment of reflection on human rights integration within the EU system. The 
Austrian crisis with the report of the three wise man, the idea of a EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights and, subsequently, the project of a Constitutional Treaty incorporating the 
Charter, have contributed to reinforce the need of a monitoring body in the field of fun-
damental rights that is able, by offering data and information assessments, to assist the EU 
main institutions when they are implementing policies in the field of fundamental rights. It 
will be finally shown how these expectations regarding the EU fundamental rights monitor-
ing body will be discussed during the legislative procedure set up in order to establish the 
new Agency. In this contest, it will be taken into consideration the different institutional 
	   6 
voices raised in this occasion and, in particular, the concerns expressed by the Council of 
Europe over the Commission’s proposal to establish the FRA. 
This historical overview on the debate prior to the establishment of the Agency will be 
particularly useful in order to take a further step in our itinerary. In fact, in the second 
chapter, given that the Agency’s final regulation is the result of a final compromise among 
the several institutional actors, it will be conducted a comparison between the original 
Commission’s proposal and the current FRA’s statute. This analysis will show that the cur-
rent founding regulation of the FRA has a rather limited mandate and apparently its rela-
tion with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights does not find great visibility in the text of 
the Regulation. The Agency deals with those fundamental rights, which are included in the 
nine thematic areas of the Multiannual Framework (hereinafter MAF), and cannot deal 
with matters covered by the former third pillar. In addition, it is excluded any form of its 
involvement within the art. 7 mechanisms. It will also be brought into light that even 
though the Charter has not great visibility in the text of the founding regulation, it signifi-
cantly influences the scope of the Agency’s activities. In fact, according to art. 3(3) of the 
Founding Regulation, “The Agency shall deal with fundamental-rights issues in the Euro-
pean Union and in its Member States when implementing Community law”2. With regards to 
Member States, the Agency has to carry out its activities in light of a concept of implemen-
tation that recalls the wording of art. 51(1) of the Charter, even if, in the case of the Agen-
cy, the formulation of art. 3(3) is even narrower than art 51(1), being limited to Community 
law. The use of the concept of implementation for determining the Agency’s activities re-
garding its Member States reveals the existence of a relevant link between the Charter and 
the Agency.  
It is indeed in light of the concept of implementation that the last part of our itinerary 
will be conducted. The use of the concept of implementation with reference to the Agen-
cy’s activities with regards to the member states reveals that the Agency’s activities should 
be carried out according to the same subsidiarity logic enshrined in art. 51(1) of the Char-
ter. However, the concept of implementation is not as crystal clear as it looks like. Given 
the importance that such concept has, as a criterion that guides and shapes the Agency’s 
work, the activities of the FRA in light of this concept will be analysed. After an overview 
focused on the undetermined nature of concept of implementation as laid down on the 
Charter, in its explanations and as interpreted in the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter ECJ or CJEU), some of the main products of the Agency’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
[2007] OJ L 53/1 (hereinafter FRA Founding Regulation). 
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activities, such as its reports and opinions, will be analysed. To the aim of our inquiry, the 
activities related to the Fundamental Rights Platform, as a network of civil society organi-
zation, will not be considered in here but should certainly be taken into consideration in a 
follow up of the present research. For the moment only the FRA’s publications will be ana-
lysed. As a result of our inquiry, it will be shown that the Agency’s reports are not clear re-
garding how to interpret the expression “when implementing Community law” and they 
seem to follow the uncertain attitude of the ECJ that swings between a functional and a 
strict interpretation of such concept. This means that the borders of the monitoring activity 
of the FRA with regards to the Member States will not be able to be determined. It is final-
ly argued that a possible solution to this uncertain status of the Agency’s scope could be 
clarified in the perspective of the EU accession to the ECHR. This accession would require 
a clear definition of the competences of the EU regarding the ECHR. As a consequence, 
among the other institutions, even the Agency would be involved in a process of clarifica-
tion of its competences and objectives that eventually could bring light to the contours of 
its activities.   
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As Armin von Bogdandy states “the creation of the Agency represents an institutional 
acknowledgement that the EU, at the dawn of the last century, has embarked on the journey 
of an EU-specific fundamental rights policy”.1 At the same time, the establishment of this new 
institution is the consequence of the on-going process of the integration of human rights in 
the constitutional framework of the European Union started after the Second World War – an 
attempt that had to tackle several challenges in the past decades2. In other words, since the 
‘50s the EU gradually started - not without challenges, especially in the beginning of this de-
veloping process - to shape its fundamental principles and values and by doing so to make 
more visible the aquis of the European Union in the area of fundamental rights. 
The present chapter intends to retrace briefly the process that led to the establishment of 
the Agency. After a general overview of the evolution of the EU approach to human rights, 
the attention will be focused on five key moments which contributed to the creation of the 
Agency: the first is the introduction of article 7 TEU and the particular concern of the Euro-
pean community over minority groups; the second is the establishment of the EUMC, the 
third is the Austrian crisis and the three wise men report; the fourth is the proclamation of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A. von Bogdandy, J. von Bernstoff, The EU Fundamental Rights Agency Within the European and International 
Human rights Architecture: The Legal Framework and Some Unsettled Issues in a New Field of Administrative Law, (2009) 46 
C.M.L.R., 1067.  
2 “The topic of human rights protection and promotion has come to occupy a significant place in EU law and 
policy over the past decade and half, and the EU unquestionably now has a constitutional framework of kinds 
concerning human rights protection”, G. De Burca, The Evolution of Human Rights Law, in P. Craig, G. De Burca 
(eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 2011). 
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EU Charter of fundamental rights; the last and most important is the institutional debate that 
occurred on the occasion of the establishment of the EU monitoring Agency for fundamental 
rights.  
This reconstructive overview aims to highlight the reasons behind the creation of a moni-
toring Agency and the complex framework that contributes to shape its structure and activi-
ties. Furthermore, by following the history of its establishment, it will bring into focus how 
the Agency structure and activities touches fundamental constitutional issues, which will be 
more extensively explored in the following chapters3. 
 
 
The European Union and human rights before the Agency’s establishment:  
a process of human rights constitutionalisation 
The European legal order was mainly created in order to set up a common and internal mar-
ket but then it gradually focused its attention on the protection of the individual’s fundamental 
rights4. As Joseph Weiler stated “Neither the Treaty of Paris nor the Treaty of Rome con-
tained any allusion to the protection of fundamental human rights”5. The post II World War 
starting project of a European community committed in human rights protection along with 
the Council of Europe and the European Convention was overshadowed by a pragmatic 
strategy focused on accomplishing a European common market6. In fact the wording of the 
Messina Declaration was crystal clear in announcing this approach7:  
“The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg and the Netherlands believe the time has come to take a new step on the road 
of European construction. They are of the opinion that this objective should be achieved 
first of all in the economic sphere. They believe that the establishment of a united Eu-
rope must be achieved through the development of common institutions, the progressive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A. von Bogdandy, J. Von Bernstoff, supra note 1 at 1059. 
4 See A. Chapman, Human Rights and the European Community: A Critical Overview (Nomos, Baden and Baden, 
1991).  
5 J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, “Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor? And Other Essays on European 
Integration (CUP, 1999) 107 et seq.  
6 “Following the European Coal an Steel Community Treaty, neither the Euratom Treaty nor the ECC Treaty 
of 1957 made any mention of a role for the EU in relation to human rights, and the earlier drafting attempts of 
the 1950s were consigned to history”. G. De Burca, supra note 2 at 466.  
7 “What we see by the time of the drafting of the Euratom and European Economic Community Treaties is 
that the vision of a new European system as one which would have a substantial political role involving the pro-
tection of human rights against abuse by or within the Member States or even on the part of its own new institu-
tions, and working alongside the Council of Europe and European Convention system in order to assure this, 
had disappeared. The ambitions of the new Communities were to be strictly determined by the common market 
mandate outlined the Messina Resolution, and the issue of human rights protection was remitted once again pri-
marily to the realm of the national constitutional systems”; ibid 476. 
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fusion of national economies, the creation of a common market, and the gradual harmo-
nization of their social policies”8.  
The idea of a strong European community with a strong role in the field of human rights - as 
was outlined by the Comite d’Etudes pour la Constituition Europenne (CECE) and in the European 
Political Community Treaty draft (1951-53) - was met with resistance from some national delega-
tions - in particular of the French delegation - during the Intergovernmental Conference 
19539. As a consequence of this reluctance to embrace the project of a European Community 
as was shaped in the treaty draft, on the 30th of August 1954 the French National Assembly 
refused to ratify the treaty. In conclusion, the curtain came down on the idea of a centralized 
commitment of the European community in the field of human rights and efforts were ex-
pended instead on the accomplishment of a common market10.  
Almost ten years later, it was the European Court of Justice that gradually started to shape 
an understanding of human rights as part of the general principles of the EC law in cases like 
the Stauder case (1969), the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case (1970) and the Nold case 
(1974)11. In these cases, the European Court of Justice took the opportunity to tackle the re-
luctance of the German Administrative Court to recognize the supremacy of the Community 
Law with regards to fundamental rights12. In the Stauder case, the Court of Justice underlined 
that “the fundamental human rights” are “enshrined in the general principles of Community 
law and protected by the Court”13. The Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case went further by stat-
ing that “the respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of 
law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the frame-
work of the structure and objectives of the Community”14. Finally, in the Nold case15 the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The Messina Declaration, Messina (Italy), 3 June 1955 in http://www.eurotreaties.com/messina.pdf. 
9 See R. Dwan, Jean Monnet and the European Defence Community, 1950-54, (2001) 1/3 Cold War History.  
10 A useful account of the evolution of the EU human rights approach is G. De Burca, The Road Not Taken, 
The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor (2011) 105/5 AJIL, 649. 
11 “the period of silence of the EC constitutional framework from 1957 until 1969, and the legal vacuum on 
the subject of human rights came to an end. From this time on, the terms of the debate had changed and the 
question shifted from whether the European Community should concern itself at all with fundamental human 
rights protection to what exactly its role should be in this regard”. DE BURCA, supra note 2 at 479. 
12 See J.M. Henckaerts, The Protection of Human Rights in the European Union, Overview and Bibliography (1994) 22 
Int'l. J. Legal Info., 228. 
13 Case C-29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419. 
14 “as the Court has already stated, fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, 
the observance of which it ensures. In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures, which are in-
compatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those States. Similarly, in-
ternational treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of 
which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community 
law”. Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
15 Case C-4/73 Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung [1974] ECR 491.  
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Court recognized that the inspiration to the international treaties is another yardstick, in addi-
tion to the common constitutional traditions, for its human rights hermeneutic16.  
It is no less relevant that in the same years after the inauguration of “European Political 
Cooperation” on foreign policy, the European Council drafted the first document on Europe-
an Identity17 - also called Copenhagen Declaration 1973 - where human rights were highlight-
ed as fundamental elements of European identity. Yet, in 1977, a Joint Declaration of the Eu-
ropean Parliament, Council and Commission outlined the importance of fundamental rights as 
general principles of EU law18.  
As a consequence of this renewed process addressed on human rights protection, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice notably increased the number of decisions concerning human rights 
compliance, and the institutions started to set up a range of initiatives in this field.  
However, the Union started to engage more proactively with human rights in focusing its 
attention on minority rights after the fall of the Berlin wall19. Once the division between the 
western block and the communist block was dissolved, the European Community had to tack-
le the challenge of its eastern enlargement. Consequently, this new perspective encouraged the 
European Community to progressively strengthen the setting of its fundamental principles 
and values and specify standards for its membership. It is in this new context that we observe 
a significant development of the EU constitutional approach to human rights.  
A first reference to human rights appeared in the Maastricht Treaty on the European Un-
ion (1992). The treaty recognizes human rights as part of the general principle of EU law by 
introducing art. F of the EU Treaty20 and establishing a general criterion for EU membership 
under art. 49 EC.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 According to Jean-Marie Henckerts: “The evolution after Nold is marked by an increasing reliance on in-
ternational treaties, more specifically the European Convention on Human Rights”; see J. M. Henckaerts, supra 
note 12 at 233.  
17 “The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, 
and to pre- serve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on 
a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to de-
fend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice - which is the ultimate goal of 
economic progress - and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European 
Identity”. Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity, 14 December 1973. 
18 “The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission stress the prime importance they attach to 
the protection of fundamental rights, as derived in particular from the constitutions of the Member States and 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”; see Joint Declara-
tion by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the protection of fundamental 
rights and the ECHR, Luxemburg, 5 April [1977], OJ C 103/1.  
19 See A. von Bogdandy, J. von Bernstorff, The EU Fundamental Rights Agency within The European and Interna-
tional Human Rights Architecture: The Legal Framework and Some Unsettled Issues in a New Field of Administrative Law 
(2009) 46 C.M.L.R, 46, 2009.  
20 Art. F of the Maastricht Treaty states: “The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general 
principles of Community law”. 
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An additional criteria of eligibility for EU membership was made at the European Council 
in Copenhagen (June 1993). According to the Copenhagen criteria: 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”21. 
However, it was the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) that “constitutionalised”22 and followed up the-
se criteria.  Firstly, the treaty strongly affirms the Union commitment to the principles of liber-
ty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom and the rule of law, princi-
ples which are common to the Member States. Secondly, a part of the Copenhagen criteria 
was incorporated in the treaty. Thirdly, the treaty has provided a new article 13 with the scope 
to strengthen the mechanism of protection against discrimination. Finally, under art. 7 TEU, a 
sanction mechanism has been set up against every member state, which is responsible for a se-
rious violation of human rights. The suspension mechanism is an innovation of the Amster-
dam Treaty: it was designed to bridge a gap in the EU legal order with regard to human rights 
protection and it certainly represents an “attempt to guarantee the future respect for the EU 
constitutional principles”23.  
Nevertheless, the “Haider affair” (1999) also brought to light the limits of this monitoring 
mechanism as a preventive instrument against human rights breaches.  As a consequence, the 
Treaty of Nice (2000) has reformed art. 7 TEU by providing the possibility for Member States 
to address recommendations to the state that is found to be responsible for a clear breach of 
EU fundamental values and to request the assistance of a “group of experts” for drafting re-
ports24. At the same time, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms was pro-
claimed by the presidents of the European institutions but without being incorporated in the 
Treaty of Nice. As we will see later, the main function of the Charter is to “strengthen the 
protection of fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and scien-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Copenhagen European Council (21, 22 June 1993), Presidency Conclusions.  
22 De Burca supra note 2. 
23 B. De Witte, G. Toggenburg, Human Rights and Membership of the European Union, in S. Peers, A. Wards (eds), 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing, 2004), 59. 
24 Art. 7 of the Treaty of Nice states: “On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the Eu-
ropean Parliament or by the Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four-fifths of its members after 
obtaining the assent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a 
Member State of principles mentioned in Article 6(1), and address appropriate recommendations to that State. 
Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question and, acting in accord-
ance with the same procedure, may call on independent persons to submit within a reasonable time limit a report 
on the situation in the Member State in question. The Council shall regularly verify that the grounds on which 
such a determination was made continue to apply”. 
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tific and technological developments by making those rights more visible”25. Even though the 
Charter was not legally binding, its political “impact was immediate on the practice of the Eu-
ropean Institutions”26. In fact it triggered a process of fundamental rights concern within the 
activities of the EU institutions, gradually shaping the work of the Parliament, the Commis-
sion and later also of the Council of the EU27. 
After the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and despite its undoubted political value, the 
Charter continued not to be a legally binding document until the entry into force of the Lis-
bon Treaty (2009) that also introduces an obligation for the EU to accede to the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  
In summary, from 2000 to 2009 we see to a period of “major constitutional change in the 
field of human rights”28. This period was characterized by several institutional innovations. 
Some of the most relevant are: the creation of a network of experts in the field of fundamen-
tal rights, the institution of a Personal Representative on Human Rights to advise the high 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and Council Secretary General and finally the 
establishment of the FRA. As De Burca affirmed: “These moves formally marked the consti-
tutional coming of age of human rights within the EU legal and constitutional framework”29. 
Therefore, given these premises and at this point of our inquiry, it becomes necessary to 
focus our attention on those crucial stages which have given a fundamental contribution to 




Constitutionalisation of a sanctioning mechanism in accession states 
A relevant contribution to strengthen the human rights discourse in the EU agenda and also 
to identify the need of a monitoring body committed with human rights matters, as the FRA 
will be, is certainly offered by the process that set up a sanctioning mechanism capable of in-
tervening breaches of human rights and also deeply connected to a renewed concern over mi-
norities’ protection issues.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), Recital 4, Preamble (hereinafter 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).  
26 P. Alston, O. De Shutter, Introduction: Addressing the Challenges Confronting the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, in 
P. Alston, O. De Shutter, Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU, The contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency, 
(Hart Publishing, 2005).  
27 See O. De Shutter, The Implementation of the Charter by the Institutions of the European Union, in S. Peers, T. K. 
Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a commentary (Hart Publishing, 2014). 
28 De Burca, supra note 2. 
29 ibid 481. 
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After the Second World War, it was clear the general concern for human rights and the in-
tention to build a community of States “based on shared and institutionally entrenched liberal-
democratic principles”30.  
However, as we have already seen, the community was built under the project of an eco-
nomic cooperation and integration that left aside the human rights discourse within the com-
munity framework31. In fact, “At the time of the Treaty of Rome, human rights were not of 
evident concern to the European Community. The original constituent treaties of the Europe-
an Community only contained such human rights that were important for the functioning of 
the Common Market, and did not provide for the Member States to question human rights 
compliance within the Community”32. As a matter of fact, since the very beginning among the 
other economic freedoms the Treaty of Rome incorporated, the general principle of prohibit-
ing discrimination on the ground of nationality are among the few fundamental economic 
freedoms that has been incorporated (art. 12 TEC). However, this principle was not fully im-
plemented until the ‘90s.   
At that time, an extensive human rights discourse was rather developed at an international 
level by the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
organizations33. Since 1949, the Council of Europe has developed a human rights monitoring 
system including conventions and multilateral agreements and a strict membership proce-
dure34. In 1989, after the disintegration of the eastern bloc, CSCE  (now OSCE) began to be 
another important international organization monitoring the compliance of its member states 
with human rights standards35.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 J. Batt, Minority Rights and EU Enlargement to the East, Report of the First Meeting of the Reflection Group on the 
Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement: the Nature of the New Border, http://www.eui.eu/documents/rscas/publi-
cations/workingpapers/9805p.pdf. 
31 “The need for such mechanism was not obvious in the earlier years of the European Community (EC) un-
til de mid-1990s. This is mainly for two sets of reasons. First, the perceived nature of the EC as a primarily 
common economic market made it unnecessary to build into the organization any specific precaution against 
breaches of rights in Member States. Rights, in the minds of the European integration planners, could been safely 
entrusted to the Council of Europe, with the European Convention of Human Rights as its foundational docu-
ment…It was only the evolution of the European Community toward a more political and constitutional entity, 
symbolically encapsulated by the adoption of the name of the European Union in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), 
that eventually placed rights and democracy on the Union’s agenda… Second,… It was only the ever more likely 
prospect of the eastward enlargement of the Union, an inevitable consequence of the fall of Communism and the 
removal of a fundamental division of the Continent, which drove the movement towards the institutionalization 
of sanctions for breaches of human rights” W. Sarduski, Adding a Bite to a Bark? A Story of Article 7, the EU En-
largement, and Jörg Haider, (January 4, 2010). Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 10/01. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531393. 
32K. Shoraka, Human Rights and Minority Rights in the European Union, (Routlege, 2010), 11-67. 
33  See G. N. Toggenburg, A Remaining Share or a New Part? The Union’s Role vis à vis Minorieties After the Enlarge-
ment Decade, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2006/15.  
34 See V. V. Stoyanova, The Council of Europe's Monitoring Mechanisms and Their Relation to Eastern European Mem-
ber States' Noncompliance, (2005) 45 S. Cal. L. Rev., 739. 
35 See J. Hughes, G. Sasse, Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the 
CEECs, (2003) 1 JEMIE, 1. 
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The opportunity for the EU to reconsider human rights discourse and, particularly, to 
think about the importance of setting up a sanctioning mechanism for human rights threats 
was offered by the end of the iron curtain, when the European Union had to face the Central-
Eastern European States’ requests to become its members. In fact the end of the Berlin wall 
created a new scenario for the EU. The European Union had to tackle the consequences of its 
enlargement. Several ex-communist countries intended to join the European Union and con-
sequently the Union perceived for the first time the need to establish a set of standards to 
which these countries had to be conformed. In fact, as Joseph Weiler and Philip Alston stated:  
“With enlargement, the Union will be importing new set of unresolved minority issues 
as well as additional human rights challenges, whose solutions will test the strength of 
many Community policies”36. 
In summary, the dissolution of the division between the eastern and western world and thus 
the will of many of the eastern countries to be part of the European Community generated 
two sets of related issues.  
On the one hand, the Community had to make more visible its fundamental principles and 
values to the new aspiring Member States and in doing so it had to set up a monitoring mech-
anism strictly linked with them.  
On the other hand, the history of the post-communist states brought to light a number of 
minority issues never seen before within the western bloc.  In fact, the birth of new states 
from the dissolution of the USSR was characterized by the emergence of national majorities 
and by the development of several tensions with the corresponding minorities. The breaking 
down of Yugoslavia with its ethnic civil war was another dramatic example of what the EU 
had to tackle37.  
Of course, some of the first steps for a new human rights approach of the EU were already 
taken with the Copenhagen criteria which established political standards for EU membership, 
including among them minority protection38, and with the Maastricht Treaty. By doing so the 
EU started to set up a membership procedure by borrowing the fundamental elements of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 P. Alston, J.H.H. Weiler, An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights policy: The European Union and Hu-
man Rights, in P. Alson (ed.), the EU and Human Rights, (OUP, 1999).  
37 “After 1989 most of the post-communist countries prioritized the strengthening of central state capacity 
and the position of the titular nationality, thereby running the risk of discriminating against, alienating and politi-
cizing minority groups. The violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and a number of intractable post-
Soviet conflicts as well as a perception of further conflict potential in view of sizeable minorities in many East 
European countries informed the EU’s approach”. J. Hughes, G. Sasse, supra note 35. 
38 “Minority protection has a significant historical resonance for many CEECs. Minority management, 
whether by genocide, expulsion, coercion or accommodation is intrinsic to the historical emergence and devel-
opment of many of these states, whose foundation was Wilsonian selective self-determination in the period after 
the peace treaties ending World War One in 1919-20”. ibid. 
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Council of Europe and OSCE monitoring mechanism39, especially the Council of Europe, 
which was believed to represent “the antechambers of the EU membership”40. However, it 
was the Amsterdam Treaty which represented a substantial departure towards a new human 
rights approach and therefore, for shaping a monitoring mechanism, an approach which we 
can trace back to the works of the Reflection Group and thereafter in the Inter-governmental 
Conference 1996.   
The European Council at its Corfu Summit (24-25 June 1994) decided to establish a Re-
flection Group in preparation of the Inter-Governmental Conference (1996). The Reflection 
Group drafted a report that was submitted to the European Council in Brussels on the 5th De-
cember 1995. In the first part of the report, at the paragraph entitled “The Challenge”, the re-
flection group made clear the need to reinforce and renewed the common European project 
in light of the future Community integration: 
“Men and women of Europe today, more than ever, feel the need for a common pro-
ject. And yet, for a growing number of Europeans, the rationale for Community integra-
tion is not self-evident. This paradox is a first challenge. 
When the European Communities were established some forty years ago, the need for 
a common design was clear because of the awareness of Europe's failure over the first 
half of this century. 
Now, almost half a century later, the successive enlargements of the Union, the ex-
pansion of its tasks, the very complexity of its nature and the magnitude of the problems 
of our times, make it very difficult to grasp the true significance of, and the continuing 
need for, European integration”41. 
The Report suggests three areas, which should be developed against this unstable background: 
making Europe more relevant to its citizens; enabling the Union to work better and preparing 
it for enlargement; giving the Union greater capacity for external action.  
In particular, it is not a coincidence that under the paragraph entitled “The citizen and the 
Union”, the Reflection Group affirms:  
“The Union is not and does not want to be a super-state. Yet it is far more than a 
market. It is a unique design based on common values. We should strengthen these val-
ues, which all applicants for membership also wish to share”42.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 G. Sasse, EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion into Policy, EUI working pa-
pers, RSCAS n. 16/2005, in www.iue.it/RSCAS/Publications/. See also P. Alston, O. De Shutter, supra note 26 
at 66. 
40 J. Hughes, G. Sasse, supra note 35. 
41 Reflection Group’s Report, Messina 2 June 1995, Brussels 5 December 1995 Part 1. Available on the web-
stite of the European Parliament at http://www.europarl.europa.eu.  
42 ibid.  
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Therefore, it has to be noticed that the challenge of a new enlargement had encouraged the 
EU to reinforce and strengthen its principles and values and how to protect them. Among 
these principles, the reflection group clearly recognizes human rights but also underlines the 
necessity to make more visible their protection through the EU accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  It also mentions the idea of an 
EU bill of Rights and, most importantly, the report remarks on the necessity of “a provision 
allowing for the possibility of sanctions or even suspending Union membership in the case of 
any State seriously violating human rights and democracy”43. Such a sanctioning mechanism is 
indeed part of a general strategy aiming at reducing citizens’ disaffection with the EU making 
visible and effective its principles and also is clearly connected with the prospect of EU en-
largement44.  
However, the creation of a treaty provision that regulates such a sanctioning procedure 
wasn’t without difficulties. In fact, whereas the Presidency conclusions at the Madrid Europe-
an Council (15-16 December 1995) recognized the Reflection Group’s Report as “a sound ba-
sis for the work of the Inter-Governmental Conference”45 in the final event, only four States 
at the ICG saw the need to establish a sanction mechanism (Italy, Austria, Belgium and Spain) 
and even among them there wasn’t a common approach for drafting the future art. 7. Spain 
and Belgium46 simply supported the general conclusion laid down by the Reflection’s Group 
Report.  
Austria and Italy suggested a more radical solution formulated in the view of a Union bet-
ter integrated and capable to count on a clear system of constitutional principles. According to 
this view, Austria remarked that at stake is the respect for fundamental rights at the heart of 
the common heritage of the EU Member States and regarding them as an essential aspect of 
European identity. Therefore the Austrian - Italian proposal suggested the insertion of a sanc-
tion mechanism in the EU Treaty and to insert it after the article on the accession conditions. 
In doing so, “the very structure of the drafting would clearly underline the sanctions-
enlargement connection”47. They also suggested conferring the EU Parliament over a more 
relevant role within the sanctioning procedure. The EU Parliament should have been equally 
authorised to propose sanctions and the voting requirement for the determination of a threat 
of human rights should have been less demanding.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 J. Hughes, G. Sasse, supra note 35 
44 K. Shoraka, supra note 32. 
45  European Council, Madrid (15 and 16 December 1995), Presidency Conclusions. Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-c.en5.htm.  
46 White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Volume II, Summary of Positions of the Member 
States of the European Union with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.  
47 K. Shoraka, supra note 32. 
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However, as we will often see in the journey that leads to the Agency establishment, the 
other Member States weren’t confident in respect of the establishment of such a sanction 
mechanism able to threaten their sovereignty: 
“…the scheme of the sanction mechanism as it arises from the IGC discussions till 
June 1996 also constitutes another illustration of the reluctance of the Member States to 
submit themselves to a constraining legal mechanism which could go partly at least, be-
yond their full control. And it was probably the last time that an idea of formally involv-
ing the Court of Justice was openly entertained. This idea, as we know, turned out to be a 
non-starter, and eventually the Article 7 mechanism became thoroughly political, with no 
traces of a legal or judicial character in the procedure”48. 
Therefore, the Irish Presidency of the European Council offered the decisive contribution ar-
ticle 7 as was laid down in the Treaty of Amsterdam. A contribution that was strongly affected 
by the Member States concerns:  
“the mechanism of establishing the grave and persistent violation of article F princi-
ples, with the Council acting unanimously, at the proposal by the Parliament, the Com-
mission or the on third of the Member States, with the state concerned being able to pre-
sent its observation but without its vote being counted, with the actual measures being 
decided by the Council by qualified majority, at the recommendation of the Commission 
and after consultation with the European Parliament”49.  
In fact, the Member States’ main concern was not to have control over the procedure and 
they were also reluctant to recognize a prominent role of the Parliament for initiating the 
whole procedure. As a consequence, at the time that art. 7 being adopted, “the idea that the 
Union should be equipped with a more routine and regular mechanism of monitoring the re-
spect of the principle of non-discrimination had disappeared and had been placed outside the 
EU Treaty analysis”.  
Yet, with regards to minority protection, even though the EU institutions, in particular the 
EU Parliament since its early stage, seriously engaged with this issue50, the Amsterdam Treaty 
seems to be silent even if it accomplished the first step toward the constitutionalisation of the 
political accession criteria51. In fact, article 6(1) TEU does not contain any explicit reference to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibi. 
49 Conférence des représentants des gouvernements des Etats membres, Approche suggérée par la Pré-
sidence, Object: droits fondamentaux, Bruxelles, le 8 octobre, CONF 3945/96. 
50 “The EU has become a visible player in the field of minority protection with the expansion of the enlarge-
ment perspective at the beginning of the 90s. This, however, does not mean that the Union has not addressed the 
topic before”. See G. Toggenburg, The EU’s evolving policies vis-a-vis minorities: a play in four parts and an 
open end, August 2008 in http://www.eurac.edu. 
51 C. Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria and their Progeny, in C. Hillion (eds), EU Enlargement: a legal approach, (Hart 
publishing, 2004), 1-23. 
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the protection of minorities. We shall wait for the Nice Treaty to see the minority protection 
incorporated in an act of primary law.  However, it is a matter of fact that the EU enlargement 
triggered a process of constitutionalisation not just of human rights but also of the principle 
of non-discrimination and minority protection. As we will see, the Agency will engage with all 
these issues, which in different ways shape its activities.  
 
The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia 
Another consequence of the end of the iron curtain is the renewed concern over phenomena 
of racism and xenophobia which is another element characterizing the Agency’s work. 
The first time that the necessity to set a mechanism for fighting every act and form of dis-
crimination was stressed was in the Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia which was 
adopted by the European Parliament, the Council, the Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States of the European Communities and the European Commission on 11 June 
198652. The Declaration recognized “the existence and growth of xenophobic attitudes, 
movements and acts of violence in the Community which are often directed against immi-
grants”53 and stressed “the importance of adequate and objective information and of making 
all citizens aware of the dangers of racism and xenophobia, and the need to ensure that all acts 
or forms of discrimination are prevented or curbed”54. As we have already observed, the end 
of the iron curtain and the establishment of new national states, especially in Eastern Europe, 
has led to the exacerbation of a growing number of ethnic conflicts.  
Following these facts, the European Council of Korfu on 24/25 June 199455 condemned, 
in the Presidency conclusions, “the continuing manifestations of intolerance, racism and xen-
ophobia”56 and expressed “its determination to step up the fight against these phenomena”57. 
To this aim it has welcomed the joint Franco-German initiative against racism and xenopho-
bia consisting in the creation and thus the establishment of the Consultative Commission on 
Racism and Xenophobia (also called Kahan committee). More specifically, France and Ger-
many proposed to:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission against racism and xeno-
phobia, 11 June [1986], OJ C 158. 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
55 European Council at Corfù, (24-25 June 1994), Presidency Conclusions, in the European Council: Conclu-
sions of the Presidency 1995 (European Commission, Directorate General for Information, 1995), 13-14. 
56 ibid. 
57 ibid. 
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“constitute a Consultative Commission composed of eminent personalities charged 
with making recommendations on the cooperation between governments and the various 
social bodies in favour of encouraging tolerance and understanding of foreigners; develop 
a global strategy at EU level aimed at combating acts of racist and xenophobic violence 
and set up training efforts for officials in those parts of the national administrations most 
concerned by these phenomena”58.  
One year later, the Heads of States and Governments, which held a meeting in Cannes wel-
comed “the work carried on by the various Council bodies and the Consultative Commis-
sion”59 and requested the Consultative Commission “to extend its work in order to study, in 
close cooperation with the Council of Europe, the feasibility of a European Monitoring Cen-
tre on Racism and Xenophobia”60.  
On the 21st and 22nd of June 1996, the European Council of Florence approved the estab-
lishment of a Monitoring Centre by stating:  
“The European Council reaffirms the Union's determination to combat racism and 
xenophobia with the utmost resolve; it approves the principle underlying the establish-
ment of a European Monitoring Centre. It asks the Council to examine the legal and 
budgetary conditions of the future Monitoring Centre as well as the links between the lat-
ter and the Council of Europe and to mandate the Consultative Commission on Racism 
and Xenophobia to continue its work until the Monitoring Centre is set up”61.  
The two main tasks of the Consultative Commission can be summarized as follows: the initia-
tion of the European Monitoring Centre, the inclusion of a provision in the treaties to combat 
racism and xenophobia. In fact, in its final report, the Consultative Commission pointed out 
two priorities for the strategy against racial and ethnic discrimination:  
“The explicit and unequivocal recognition of the European Community's competence 
to combat racism and xenophobia, which we have recommended and which could be 
achieved by an amendment of the Treaty on European Union following the 1996 Inter-
governmental Conference, will be the basis on which the Community should subsequent-
ly adopt concrete measures in this area. This applies to both substantive and institutional 
measures. Regarding institutional measures in particular, the Consultative Commission 
has recommended the establishment of a European Observatory on Racism and Xeno-
phobia. In light of the long experience gained from setting up new Institutions under the 
aegis of the Community, in our view the Observatory should be established as an inde-
pendent body attached to the European Commission”62.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 ibid. 
59 European Council at Cannes (26 and 27 June 1995), Presidency Conclusions. 
60 ibid. 
61 European Council at Florence (21 and 22 June 1996), Presidency Conclusions. 
62 European Council Consultative Commission (1995) "Final Report" Ref. 6906/1/95 Rev 1 Limite RAXEN 
24. 
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As a consequence, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) included several references against Racism 
and Ethnic discrimination: art. 29 TEU includes the commitment to fight racial discrimination 
within the area of freedom, security and justice; art. 13 created the competences of the Coun-
cil to make adequate dispositions to, amongst other things, combat discrimination on the 
grounds of race or ethnic origin. The insertion of provisions against racial discrimination of-
fered the opportunity to adopt three acts of secondary law: the Directive 2000/43/EC (im-
plementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin)63; the Directive 2000/78/EC (establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation)64; and, the Council Decision 2000/750/EC (establishing a 
Community action program to combat discrimination 2001-2006) 65 . Finally, the Non-
Discrimination principle on the ground of racism was included in the EU-Fundamental Rights 
Charter66. 
Furthermore, on the 8th February 1998, the Consultative Advisory Commission initiated in 
Utrecht a Charter of European Parties for a non-racist Society, which was brought forward to 
be signed on. The main aim of the “Charter of European Parties for a non-racist Society”: to 
prohibit “cooperating with any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or eth-
nic prejudices and racial hatred”. 
In the meantime, the EUMC was established on the basis of the Kahn Commission pro-
posal by the Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 of 2 June 1997. The EUMC was based in 
Vienna. Although the EUMC started its mandate in 1998, it officially took place on 7 and 8 
April 2000 at the Hofburg Congress Centre in Vienna during the course of the Vienna Forum 
– a conference on politics and racism. The event was linked by the media companies to the 
decision by the 14 EU Member States to impose bilateral measures against Austria following 
the formation of the coalition government including the FPÖ, as we will see in the next para-
graph.  
The EUMC used a network of national (RAXEN-Network) contact points in the respec-
tive Member States to carry out its duties and to encourage the cooperation between academ-
ic, non-governmental and also governmental organizations.  
According to its regulation, its structure consisted of a Management Board, an Executive 
board and a Director. The Management Board was formed by independent members appoint-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. 
64 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment 
in employment and occupation. 
65 Council Decision 2000/750/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a Community action program to com-
bat discrimination 2001-2006. 
66 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 21(1). 
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ed by each Member State, by the European Parliament and by the Council of Europe as well 
as a representative of the Commission. The Executive board included the Chair of the Man-
agement Board, the Vice-Chair and a maximum of three other members of the Managing 
board, including the person appointed by the Council of Europe and the Commission repre-
sentative. The decisions of the boards had to be approved by a 2/3 majority. Furthermore, the 
EUMC had a staff of 37 people who report to the Director of the Centre. The Centre was 
able to recruit further researchers in order to increase its analysis capability and it could count 
on an annual budget of € 8,2 Million. According to art. 16 of its Council Regulation67, the 
EUMC shall forward to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “a progress report on the Centre’s activi-
ties, together with proposals, if appropriate, to modify or extend its tasks, taking into account, 
in particular, the development of Community powers in the field of racism and xenophobia”68. 
On 6 October 2000, the Commission forwarded a first Report to the Community institutions: 
given that the Centre had not been able to begin its activities in earnest until 1999 and that 
was not fully staffed until 2000, it was too early for a comprehensive assessment of the pro-
gress made by the EUMC.  
Between Sept. 2001 and March 2002 the external evaluation of the British Centre for Strat-
egy and Evaluation Services drafted its final report, which focused on EUMC activities and 
was subsequently presented to the European Commission in July 2002 before being published 
on the “Server Europa”. The report suggested that the tasks of the EUMC should have been 
divided into three distinct groups of activities: collecting and studying data; securing the con-
tribution of civil society in all its forms; using the information to support the Community and 
the Member States and the wider public. From 1998 to 2006 the EUMC drafted 38 reports, 
where 5 are thematic reports, 4 comparative reports, and 12 annual reports, it delivered two 
opinions and two factsheets. Notably, the Centre offered the structural and geographic basis 
on which creating the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. As we will see, the basic elements 
of this institution will be resumed and developed in the founding regulation of FRA as well as 
the task to combating phenomena of racism and xenophobia.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Council Regulation (EC) No 1035/97 of 2 June 1997 establishing a European Monitoring Centre on Rac-
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68 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
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The Austrian crisis 
An opportunity to further strengthen the monitoring mechanism was offered by the so-called 
Austrian crisis or the Haider Affair69. At the elections of the low chamber of the Austrian Par-
liament, on the 3rd October 1999, Social Democrats won but the result was surprising, as the 
extreme right - wing, the Austrian Freedom Party, became the second political party in the 
country. After the numerous failures, which the chancellor Klima had to tackle in the attempt 
to form a government by creating a coalition between the largest party, Social Democrats, and 
the People’s Party, on 1 February 2000 a coalition was eventually formed between the People’s 
Party and the Freedom Party with President Klestil’s approval. The Freedom Party obtained 
important seats in the government as well as the post of the deputy chancellor. 
This political change in favour of the Austrian right wing party raised European Communi-
ty concern over it, especially because of the political convictions of the Freedom Party Leader, 
Jorg Haider, against the enlargement of the European Union to the Central European States. 
Before the Freedom Party could become part of the government, he expressed on more than 
one occasion nationalistic statements, which referred to the negative consequences of the EU 
enlargement: immigration, crime and labour problems.  
On January 2000, the Presidency of the EU issued its declaration. The statement was not 
the result of the EU initiative but it was issued on behalf of 14 Member States. In fact, it is 
worth noting that neither the European Commission nor the European Parliament were con-
sulted for taking this action. The declaration listed three measures to take against the Austrian 
government: first, the Governments of XIV Member States would have not promoted or ac-
cepted any bilateral official at political level with an Austrian Government integrating the 
FPÖ; second, there would have been no support in favour of Austrian candidates seeking po-
sitions in international organizations; finally, Austrian Ambassadors in EU capitals would only 
have been received at a technical level70. These sanctioning measures were applied when the 
new coalition had the approval of the Austrian president to start its mandate. Nevertheless, 
given these premises and their proper bilateral character, the sanctions were lifted very soon 
or really not fully implemented. What remains is the symbolic importance of this initiative 
aimed at strengthening the political identity of the EU. In the meantime, the European Com-
mission called a meeting on 1 February 2000 to tackle the 14 Member States decision. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See M. Merlingen, C. Mudde, U. Sedelmeier, Constitutional Politics and the ‘Embedded Acquis Communautaire’: 
The Case of the EU Fourteen Against the Austrian Government, ConWEB No. 4/2000. Available at http://les1.-
man.ac.uk/conweb/.   
70 Statement by the Portuguese Presidency of the EU on behalf of 14 Member States (31 January 2000). 
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Commission declared its commitment to monitor Austrian events under the framework of the 
treaty. In other words, the Commission underlined that the 14 States acted outside the EU 
constitutional framework and in particular not considering the monitoring mechanism set up 
by art. 7 and 6 TEU. Therefore, “the Commission has to act on the basis of values and law 
and not on the basis of instinct”71. The Austrian crisis brought to light the lack of a multilat-
eral mechanism of protection of human rights and at the same time the limited margin of ac-
tion of art. 7 TEU, which allows the Council to impose sanctions when a member state is 
found responsible of a persistent breach of the principles of the European Union.  
On 29 June 2000, the 14 Member States in accordance with the Portuguese Presidency ap-
pointed a committee of “three wise men”. The committee was charged with the task to draft a 
report focused on Austria’s compliance with the “common European values”. At the same 
time the report offered specific recommendations about the art. 7 mechanism. They proposed 
the introduction of “preventive and monitoring procedures into art. 7 of the EU Treaty, so 
that a situation similar to the current situation in Austria would be dealt with within the EU 
from the very start. This would underline the fundamental commitment of the EU to com-
mon European Values. Such a mechanism would also allow from the beginning an open and 
confrontational dialogue with the Member States concerned”72. The report also pointed out 
the need to reinforce the link between policies and institutional arrangements such as “the 
creation of a Human Rights office within the Council reporting to the European Council; the 
appointment within the Commission of a Commissioner responsible for human rights issues; 
and, particularly the extension of the activities, budget and status of the existing EU Observa-
tory on racism and xenophobia”73. Such institutional measures had already been suggested by 
Joseph Weiler and Philip Alston74 in their report drafted for the Comité des Sages which was re-
sponsible for Leading by Example: A Human Rights Agenda for the European Union for the 
Year 2000 (1998)75. 
The recommendations presented in the report were the object of discussion in the Nice 
IGC and led to reform of art. 7 in the Nice Treaty. In particular, art. 7 was equipped with a 
new paragraph 1 establishing a preventive mechanism prior to the breach determination pro-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 European Commission, Austria : Declaration by the Commission, Brussels, 1 February 2000, IP/00/93. 
72 Ahtisaari, Martti, Jochen Frowein and Marcelino Oreja (2000). ‘Report’ (‘Wise Men Report’). Adopted in 
Paris, 8 September 2000. 
73 Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein, Marcelino Oreja, General conclusions of the Report covering the Austrian govern-
ment's commitment to the common European values and the evolution of the political nature of the FPÖ (Paris, 8 September 
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74 J. Weiler, P. Alston, An 'Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy, (1998) 9 EJZL, 658. 
75 The Comite ́ des Sages consisted of Judge Antonio Cassese, Catherine Lalumiere, Peter Leuprecht, and 
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cedure. In fact, the Council, acting by a majority of four-fifths of its members and after ob-
taining the assent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a se-
rious breach of the EU principles mentioned in Article 6(1) by a Member State and address 
appropriate recommendations to that State on a reasoned proposal by one third of the Mem-
ber States, by the European Parliament or by the Commission.  
Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the Member State in question 
and, acting in accordance with the same procedure, may call on independent persons to sub-
mit within a reasonable time limit a report on the situation in the Member State in question. 
This passage of the provision seems to resemble what the Comité des Sages pointed out in its 
report. In other words, they underlined the importance to call upon independent experts who 




The need of a bill of rights of the European Union 
The idea of a Charter of fundamental Rights of the European Union arose from the demand 
of making the aquis of the European Union more visible in the area of fundamental rights. 
Until the Cologne European Council 1999, where it was decided to prepare the Charter, the 
ECJ detained the primary role in the protection of fundamental rights in EU by considering 
them as part of the general principles of EU law76. Furthermore, in its Opinion 2/9477 the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice also affirmed that the EC Treaty did not confer competence to the 
European Community to accede to the European Convention of Human Rights. In light of 
the difficulties faced by the European Community to succeed in the accession, the German 
Presidency of the EU proposed the creation of a EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by stat-
ing in the Cologne European Council that the “protection of fundamental rights is a founding 
principle of the Union and an indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy…There appears to 
be a need, at the present stage of the Union’s prerequisite for her legitimacy… There appears 
to be a need, at the present stage of the Union’s development, to establish a Charter of fun-
damental rights in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more visible to 
the Union’s citizens”78. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See D. Anderson Q.C., C.C. Murphy, The Charter of Fundamental Rights: History and Prospects in Post-Lisbon Eu-
rope, EUI Working Papers LAW 2011/08. Available at www.eui.eu; S. PEERS, A. WARD (eds), The European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, (Hart Publishing 2004). 
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It is worth noting that scholars such as Joseph Weiler, U. Haltern and Antje Wiener ex-
pressed scepticism as regard to the adoption of an EU bill of rights79. In particular, Weiler’s 
concern seems to have been more focused on issues of implementation of human rights 
through a proactive system of policy-making rather than on reinforcing a mechanism of justi-
ciability of fundamental rights already fully functional. To this aim, they suggested among oth-
ers institutional reforms the creation of a monitoring body responsible to offer to the EU in-
stitutions reliable data on human rights compliance in the Member States.  
At the same time, the Charter was also welcomed as an important instrument to reinforce 
human rights protection. The Charter was especially understood as a key element within the 
framework of a constitutionalised Union. According to this perspective, the EU shall become 
a federal state with its own bill of rights and thus with a human rights protection mechanism 
that could replace the proper mechanism of the Council of Europe. 
It is also not so marginal considering the UK government observations on the initiative to 
have a EU Charter of fundamental rights. The UK Prime Minister stated that the Charter 
“should take the form of a political statement, rather than a legal text to be incorporated in the 
Treaties”80.  
These different considerations about the value of the Charter can be found within the 
“body” called “Convention” that was set up to draft the Charter.  In particular, on one side 
the EU institutions as the European Commission, the European Parliament intended to draft 
a legally binding document, on the other side the Member States endorsed the idea to lay 
down a declaratory text that couldn’t be more than a political declaration. 
Of course the final result was a compromise between these two polarities. The Charter was 
solemnly proclaimed at Nice on 7 December 2000 by the European Parliament, Council of 
Ministers and European Commission (but not the Member States) rather than being incorpo-
rated within the treaties. At the same time the Convention drafted the Charter “as if” it might 
become legally binding. 
However, the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights itself, since it was proclaimed in 2000, 
having only the political value to reinforce and make more visible the EU commitment with 
fundamental rights, it was also able to trigger a process of fundamental rights concern in the 	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work of the EU institutions beyond the judicial process itself81. Indeed, since it still wasn’t a 
legally binding document, the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights gradually shaped the work 
of the Parliament, the Commission and later also of the Council of the EU82.  
At the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, the Charter was a matter of debate within the 
larger discussion for drafting a Constitutional Treaty. As a consequence, the Laeken declara-
tion mandated the Convention on the Future of Europe where they considered whether or 
not the Charter of fundamental rights should be included in the basic treaty83. In the final re-
port the working group invited to consider the incorporation of the Charter in the Treaty “in a 
form which would make the Charter legally binding and give it constitutional status”84. There-
fore the Constitutional Treaty contained the full Charter as Part II of the three-part text. 
However, after the Constitutional Treaty was rejected, as part of the recodification of the trea-
ty, the Charter was removed from the text and a reference to the Charter was inserted in Arti-
cle 6 of the revisited treaty.  
By rejecting the Constitutional Treaty, it was clear that “the Member States fear of inad-
vertently attributing greater power and competences to the Union via the Charter”85. In other 
words, granting legal status to the Charter was perceived as linked to questions concerning the 
delimitation of competences within the Union. The Charter was proclaimed once again in 
2007 and become legally binding with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009).  
The fate of the Charter and the Fundamental Rights Agency are deeply connected. In fact, 
it will be shown below how the itinerary that led to the Agency’s establishment has met the 
same difficulties faced by the Charter. Furthermore according to the Constitutional Treaty, the 
Agency was conceived as a monitoring body whose principle source had to be the Charter it-
self. However, it will be seen that the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the elements 
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Toward the establishment of the Agency:  
how the European Union institutions shaped the legal structure of the Agency 
At the European Council in Cologne the idea to create a EU Human Rights Agency also 
emerged. The Presidency Conclusion in fact stated that “The European Council takes note of 
the Presidency's interim report on human rights. It suggests that the question of the advisabil-
ity of setting up a Union Agency for human rights and democracy should be considered”86.  
The European Parliament was supportive of this initiative in a number of resolutions. In 
particular, it should be considered among the others the European Parliament Resolution on the 
annual report on respect for human rights in the European Union (16 March 2000), the Resolution on In-
ternational Human Rights and European Human Rights Policy (16 March 2000), the Resolution on the 
Human Rights situation in the European Union (15 January 2003) and the Resolution on the Communi-
cation from Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the European Union’s role in pro-
moting human rights and democratization in third countries (April 2002).  
However, a decision to establish such an institution wasn’t taken until 13 December 2003, 
on the occasion of the Representatives of the Member States meeting at the Brussels Europe-
an Council:  
“the Representatives of the Member States meeting within the European Council, 
stressing the importance of human rights data collection and analysis with a view to de-
fining Union policy in this field, agreed to build upon the existing European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia and to extend its mandate to make it a Human Rights 
Agency to that effect. The Commission also agreed and indicated its intention of submit-
ting a proposal to amend Council Regulation 1035/97 of 2 June 1997 in that respect”87.  
As a consequence, the European Commission welcomed this initiative and showed its inten-
tion to submit a proposal to amend the Council Regulation establishing the EUMC88. 
On 4-5 November 2004, the idea to establish a Human Rights Agency was also inserted in 
the Hague Programme Strengthening Freedom. Security and Justice in the European Union. In particular, 
the programme related the need of a Human Rights Agency to two relevant steps to be taken: 
the incorporation of the Charter in the Constitutional Treaty and also the EU access to the 
European Convention. Both of these steps were seen contributing to strengthen the EU’s 
commitment to protecting human rights. In fact, from this perspective the EU and its institu-
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tions would be placed “under a legal obligation to ensure that in all its areas of activity, fun-
damental rights are not only respected but also actively promoted”89.  
Therefore, in this context, the Council of the European Union, recalling its firm commit-
ment to oppose any form of racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia as expressed in December 
2003, expressed its appreciation of the Commission's communication on the extension of the 
mandate of the EUMC towards a Human Rights Agency90.  
Yet, on 16-17 December 2004, the European Council of Brussels “called for further im-
plementation of the agreement by the representatives of the Member States meeting within 
the European Council of December 2003 to establish an EU Human Rights Agency which 
will play a major role in enhancing the coherence and consistency of the EU Human Rights poli-
cy”91.  
The Strategic Objectives 2005-2009. Europe 2010: A partnership for European Renewal Prosperity. 
Solidarity and Security adopted by the Commission on 26 January 2005, underlined that  
“the protection of fundamental rights and fight against discrimination must be put at 
the forefront of European action with new initiatives on anti-discrimination and estab-
lishing a European Agency of Fundamental Rights. Ensuring equal rights to all citizens 
and fighting against discrimination, including gender equality, should be mainstreamed in-
to all European action. Europe should be the point of reference worldwide for the practi-
cal application of fundamental rights. A particular priority must be effective protection of 
the rights of children, both against economic exploitation and all forms of abuse, with the 
Union acting as a beacon to the rest of the world”92.  
 
1. The First Commission’s communication 
On October 2004 the Commission launched a public consultation on the Agency remit, tasks, 
structure, rights and thematic areas by issuing a Communication on the Fundamental Rights 
Agency93.  
In its communication, the Commission reveals its awareness that the creation of the Agen-
cy raises delicate questions such as how to determinate its legal basis. In fact, since the very 
beginning of the communication, the Commission decides to adopt a prudent approach and 	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to carefully examine the impact of the Community's limited powers in the area of fundamental 
rights when drafting its proposal for a regulation setting up the Agency. The Commission also 
intends to examine other delicate issues such as the financial resources and the definition of its 
field of action, its mission and tasks and the relations with the Council of Europe and other 
international institutions. Finally, it tackles the problems related to the adaptation of the 
EUMC existing structure to ensure that the Agency is effective. 
In doing so, different and crucial players in the field of human rights, such as the EU insti-
tutions, the Member States and civil society, should be taken into account. They are encour-
aged to work synergistically with the Agency in order to make fundamental rights visible to 
“citizens and all those within the EU”94.  
The Agency should resemble the model of the national institutions for protection and 
promotion of human rights according to UN principles95. However, “given the specificity of 
the EU”96, such an institution should avoid being simply a duplication of these examples. Ac-
cording to the UN principles, such institutions have consultative, informative and monitoring 
functions and in particular, are able to formulate opinions and draft studies and reports and 
education and information schemes.  
Given these premises, the Commission, even though many national institutions have also 
quasi-judicial powers, does not intend to confer those powers to the Agency. The treaty in fact 
confers such powers to the relevant EU institutions. Therefore the Commission, as supervisor 
of the proper application of the Community law, wants that its role must be respected and 
that the tasks of the Agency must not invade the powers conferred on the EU institutions by 
the Treaties. The Agency in fact should be a European public-law entity, separate from the 
Community institutions and with its own legal personality. It should carry out highly specific 
technical, scientific or administrative tasks defined in the instrument setting it up and will have 
no decision-making powers. It should provide support for the institutions, the Member States, 
the members of civil society and individuals in constant dialogue with the different interna-
tional actors in the field of fundamental rights. 
According to the Commission proposal, the Agency’s field of action should be art. 6 of the 
Treaty of European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights with due regard for the 	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principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union 
Law (see art. 51 of the Charter). The Agency’s field of action should also cover art. 7 and its 
broad scope. To this aim, the Agency is required to monitor fundamental rights “by area” and 
not to prepare reports by country. However, the consideration of art. 7 as further field of ac-
tion of the Agency raises the problem of how the Agency’s field of action should be defined. 
The Commission identifies two approaches to the problem. 
First, if the Agency’s remit was limited to the scope of Community law, its role would be to 
help ensure compliance with fundamental rights of both Community law and policies and im-
plementation of the latter by Member States. According to this perspective, the Agency would 
complement the Community system of protecting and promoting existing fundamental rights 
and would avoid a duplication of the work of the other bodies operating at international and 
national levels. However, this solution would mean that the Agency could not be asked to col-
lect and process the information needed to analyse a given situation in which Article 7 TEU 
proceedings were to be taken, if the situation had no connection with Union law or extended 
beyond the fundamental rights field.  
Second, if the Agency’s remit covered art. 7 of the Union Treaty, the article would allow 
the Union to act outside the field of EU law, in areas where Member States act autonomously. 
Furthermore, the procedure is not confined to failure to respect fundamental rights, as Article 
7 refers to all the principles listed in Article 6(1). Therefore the Agency should in any event be 
required only to provide institutions with the expertise that allows them to base their decisions 
on reliable and objective data. The first problem that this approach raises is whether such an 
extensive remit, covering every situation in a Member State, can be reconciled with the aim of 
an effective Agency. Secondly, this could lead to overlap with work carried out by the Council 
of Europe and national human rights bodies at their respective levels. Therefore, the Agency 
should engage in continuous dialogue in order to identify the methods of cooperation that 
would place their expertise at its disposal. 
The Commission in the attempt to define the field of action of the Agency does not limit it 
to the rights listed in the Charter of fundamental rights as such but the activities of the Agency 
must cover rights and thematic areas. Even in this case the Commission suggests two different 
approaches: according to the first the Agency should monitor all the rights protected by 
Community law and included in the Charter giving the Agency a broad field of action; the se-
cond approach would be to focus the Agency’s work on thematic areas having a special con-
nection with Community policies or the Union (immigration, asylum, non-discrimination, eth-
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ical questions, guarantee of criminal proceedings, violence, etc.). Among these, racism and 
xenophobia would continue to be given priority by the Agency. 
The Agency’s geographic scope is confined to the Union. This gives clear importance to 
fundamental rights in the Union and also is a means of placing responsibility on its institutions 
in the field of fundamental rights.  
Regarding its tasks, the Agency should collect data on fundamental rights to enable the Un-
ion to take fundamental rights fully into account when drafting and implementing its policies. 
This means focusing the Agency's tasks on two areas: data collection and analysis and the 
drafting of opinions. The Agency’s main tasks should be the collection and analysis of objec-
tive, reliable and comparable data at European level by playing an active part in networking 
with other bodies.  
The Agency should collaborate with NGOs, the social partners, universities and other 
partners involved in fundamental rights, as well as with the specialist bodies dealing with the 
protection of fundamental rights in the field of personal data and privacy.  
A close cooperation must be established, like that between the Centre and the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which provides for the participation of 
the Council of Europe. 
Specific forms of cooperation with the Council of Europe must be defined bilaterally. The 
Agency should also develop close relations with, for instance, the Commissioner for Human 
Rights to ensure that their respective areas of competence complement each other. Special at-
tention should be paid to the links, which the Agency could develop with national bodies, no-
tably with a view to determining respective work programmes. A network could be set up be-
tween the Agency and the national agencies or equivalent bodies in the Member States. 
With regards to the Agency’s structure, the Agency must be independent. To this purpose 
its tasks should be conformed to an appropriate system of responsibility liability (political, fi-
nancial, administrative, and legal) that should be clearly established. Furthermore, given the 
relevance of its role within the EU framework, the European commission, the European par-
liament, the Member states and the EU Council should appoint their representatives in its 
management bodies. To ensure that it is effective, the Agency’s management bodies must: 
have the necessary expertise to define the Agency’s work programme and also administer it; 
optimise the influence of the Agency on decision-makers in the Member States and the EU 
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institutions. Finally, the Commission considers advisable to add a scientific committee to the 
structures of the Centre (Management Board, Executive Board, Director)97.  
 
2. The Parliament’s Resolution 
On 26 May 2005, the Parliament adopted a Resolution on promotion and protection of fundamental 
rights: the role of National and European Institutions, Including the Fundamental Rights Agency98. On the 
basis of this act the Parliament calls on the Commission to undertake and to present, in con-
junction with its position on this Agency, a detailed study on the need for a similar structure 
(inside or outside the Commission) dealing with the provision of relevant information on hu-
man rights and democracy concerns in countries which are not covered by this Agency.  
The Parliament believes that the Agency should make a contribution to further enhancing 
mutual confidence between Member States and constitute a guarantee of continued ob-
servance of the principles set out in Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on European Union and 
considers that the Agency should provide all the information required to develop the Union's 
legislative activity, monitoring role and policy on awareness raising for fundamental rights.  
According to the European Parliament, the Agency must have a strong mandate and the 
power to follow the development of the implementation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights within the European Union and accession countries. It should also be able to cover 
third countries when they are involved in human rights issues affecting the Union and it 
should have special standing among EU agencies. Therefore, the Agency should operate as an 
umbrella organisation covering all human rights issues, so as to avoid having different struc-
tures doing the same work. 
The Agency’s structure should be multi-layered, a "network of networks", a specialised 
body with horizontal competences, in which each of the layers must play a role and contribute 
to the development of a fundamental rights culture in the Union. The Agency should gather 
all relevant information, analysis and experience available in European and national institu-
tions, national Parliaments, governments and human rights bodies, Supreme/Constitutional 
Courts, NGOs and existing networks and especially the expertise of the EUMC and its infor-
mation network, RAXEN.  
With regards to its fields of action, the Agency should be structured on the basis of areas of 
concern of the Charter of Fundamental Rights - as a complement to the EUMC's remit to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 COM (2004) 693 final.  
98 European Parliament, Resolution on promotion and protection of fundamental rights: the role of National 
and European Institutions, Including the Fundamental Rights Agency, 2005/2007 (INI), 26 May 2005.  
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fight against racism and xenophobia. In fact, the Parliament affirms that in an enlarged EU the 
protection of national minorities is a major issue and it will not be achieved simply by fighting 
xenophobia and discrimination: “This complex problem must also be addressed from other 
angles and that the question of the protection of ethnic and national minorities should be one 
of the Agency's specific tasks”99.  
 
 
3. The Commission’s second proposal 
On June 30 2005, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Council regulation es-
tablishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and a proposal for a Council 
Decision empowering the European Union Agency for Fundamental rights to pursue the Ac-
tivities in Areas referred to in Title VI of the Treaty of the European Union. One proposal 
was a Regulation under the Treaty establishing the European community (TEC) as appropri-
ate legal instrument for establishing a Community Agency and the second one was a decision 
under the Treaty of the European Union (TEU)100. “A Regulation is considered the appropri-
ate legal instrument for establishing a Community Agency. Rather the most appropriate legal 
instrument to empower the Agency to pursue activities in the areas referred to in Title VI of 
the TEU is a Council Decision”101. 
 
a. The Explanatory memorandum 
At first glance, it is worth noting that in the Explanatory memorandum, that precedes the ef-
fective proposal for a Council regulation, the Commission highlights the peculiar role of the 
Agency with regards to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by stating that “establishing an 
Agency for Fundamental Rights would have made the Charter more tangible, and the close 
relation to the Charter is reflected in the Agency’s name”102. This is also evident with regard to 
the new legislation presented in the proposals. In fact, the proposals extend the scope from 
racism and xenophobia to cover all areas of fundamental rights referred to in the Charter. 
It is also remarked that the decision to extend the mandate of the EUMC to become a 
FRA is in line with the specific commitments of the Union to respect and strengthen funda-
mental rights, as laid down in Articles 2, 6 and 7 of the Treaty on European Union. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 ibid. 
100 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final.  
101 ibid. 
102 ibid. 
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Under the paragraph entitled “the Consultation of interested parties and impact assessment”103, it is 
reported that the principle of establishing an Agency was welcomed as well as its independ-
ence and the principle of working in synergy with the other bodies.  
Once again, the Commission observes that during the public consultation a broad consen-
sus was given to the idea that the Charter should have been the point of reference for the 
mandate of the Agency. Rather, the issue of the possible competence of the Agency with re-
spect to Article 7 TEU created divergences.  On one hand, the Member States were in general, 
very prudent on this issue; on the other hand NGOs wanted the Agency to play a stronger 
role in this respect.  
Furthermore, regarding the impact assessment the consultation created two options. It 
considered creating a focus observation Agency that gathers information on fundamental 
rights in a limited number of thematic areas having strongest links to EU policies, whose remit 
would have been “technical assistance”. It also summed up the idea of establishing a general 
Observation Agency similar to the first but covering more thematic areas. The first option was 
preferred as an effective option to achieve objectives but that entails only a medium financial 
cost and has a considerable degree of political acceptability. According this option, “the Agen-
cy’s mandate would be open to collecting and analysing data on fundamental rights with refer-
ence to, in principle, all rights listed in the Charter, but the thematic areas within the scope of 
Union law would periodically be defined for the Agency’s actions”104. 
The legal basis for the Agency is Article 308 TEC. The Commission explains it by stating: 
“according to the treaty, it is a general objective of the Community to ensure that its own ac-
tion fully respects fundamental rights. The Agency's establishment will further that objective, 
without there being specific powers provided for in the treaty to that end”105.  
At the same time, the appropriate legal basis for the proposal for a Council Decision en-
trusting the Agency with tasks in the area referred to in Title VI TEU is articles 30, 31 and 34 
TEU. 
According to the Commission, the proposal complies to both the subsidiarity principle and 
the proportionality principle. The subsidiarity principle applies insofar as the proposal does 
not fall under the exclusive competence of the Community. In fact, the Agency's main activi-
ties should be “the Union wide collection and analysis of information, opinions and the dis-
semination of information, helping the Union itself to fully respect fundamental rights in its 
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action”106. Therefore as a consequence of the genuinely European dimension of these tasks, 
the objectives of the Agency cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States. Communi-
ty action would better achieve the objectives of the proposal for the following reasons: “the 
Agency should have to apply a uniform system governing the collection and analysis of infor-
mation that ensures the compatibility and comparability of that data and thus allows a meth-
odologically sound comparative scrutiny of the situation in European level”107. This can be 
achieved successfully only by action at EU level. By acting at European level, the Agency is 
designed to provide information, which enable the effectiveness of policies within and be-
tween the Member States to be assessed and thus adds value in terms of devising and targeting 
policies. With regard to the proportionality principle it is affirmed that “building upon the ex-
isting body will make it possible to exploit existing expertise and experience and thus achieve 
the objectives in the most proportionate way”108.  
Finally, considering that the EUMC has an annual budget of €8.2 million and a staff of 37, 
the Commission proposes that the Agency becomes operational on 1 January 2007, with a 
mandate that is extended considerably. Furthermore, the establishment of an Agency takes be-
tween two and three years, and it is expected that a major extension will require the same pe-
riod of time. Therefore the Agency will have a growing budget for the period 2007-13 in order 
to take into account the inevitable transition period109.  
 
b. The proposal for a Council Regulation 
In light of these premises the proposal for a Council regulation establishing a European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights assumed the following shape.  
Since the very beginning of the proposed regulation the fundamental principles of the Un-
ion and the value of the Charter are highlighted as points of reference for the respect of fun-
damental rights. 
“(1) The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, which are common val-
ues to the Member States. 
(2) The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reaffirms the rights as 




109 The indicative financial planning is as follows: Budget 2007: €16 million; 2008: €20 million; 2009: €21 mil-
lion; 2010: €23 million; 2011: €26 million; 2012: €28 million; 2013: €29 million. Total staffing of 100 is proposed. 
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common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms6, the social charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and 
the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the European 
Court of Human Rights”110.  
Notably, such commitment with fundamental rights as enshrined in the Treaty and in the 
Charter is restated when the proposed regulation delineates the scope of the Agency activities. 
In fact according to the Commission’s proposal the Agency is carrying out its activities it 
should refer to “fundamental rights as defined in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Un-
ion and as set out in particular in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
as proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 2000”111. Furthermore, as regard the scope of the 
Agency, in pursuing its activities, the Agency should deal with “the situation of fundamental 
rights in the European Union and in its Member States when implementing Community 
law”112. The Agency activity has also to meet the “objectives set in Article 2 within the compe-
tencies of the Community as laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Communi-
ty”113. Finally, upon request of the European commission the Agency can provide “infor-
mation and analysis on fundamental rights issues identified in the request as regards third 
countries with which the Community has concluded association agreements or agreements 
containing provisions on respect of human rights, or has opened or is planning to open nego-
tiations for such agreements, in particular countries covered by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy”114. 
In light of such a scope for the Agency’s work, the Commission’s proposal provides the 
Agency with several tasks. 
 Firstly, the Agency should “collect, record analyse and disseminate relevant, objective, reli-
able and comparable information and data including results from research and monitoring”115. 
The data should be provided by different institutions: Member States, Union institutions, 
Community agencies, research centres, the national bodies, non-governmental organisations, 
relevant third countries and international organisations. 
Secondly, It should also “develop methods to improve the comparability, objectivity and 
reliability of data at European level, in cooperation with the Commission and the Member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Preamble. 
111 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 3(2). 
112 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 3(3). 
113SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 3(1). 
114SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 3(4). 
115 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 4.1(a). 
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States”116, “carry out, cooperate with or encourage scientific research and surveys, preparatory 
studies and feasibility studies”117 and “organize meetings of experts and, whenever necessary, 
set up ad hoc working parties”118.  
Thirdly, the Agency has the right to formulate opinions to the Union institutions and to the 
Member States when implementing Community law, either on its own initiative or at the re-
quest of the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, without interference with 
the legislative and judicial procedures established in the Treaty119.  
The Council should have the possibility of requesting the Agency’s technical expertise in 
the context of proceedings commenced under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. 
The Council should also have the possibility of adopting a Decision pursuant to Title VI of 
the Treaty on European Union to empower the Agency to pursue its activities also with re-
spect to areas covered by that Title (third pillar)120.  
 The Agency should publish “an annual report on the situation of fundamental rights, also 
highlighting examples of good practice, thematic reports based on its analysis, research and 
surveys, an annual report on its activities”121. 
 Of particular significance is FRA cooperation with civil society, including non-go-
vernmental organisations, the social partners, research centres and representatives of compe-
tent public authorities and other persons or bodies involved with fundamental rights matters. 
It should promote dialogue at European level and participate in discussions or meetings at na-
tional level. To this purpose the Agency should organise, with relevant stakeholders, confer-
ences, campaigns, round tables, seminars and meetings at European level to promote and dis-
seminate its work122.  
Finally, it should raise awareness of the general public on fundamental rights issues by de-
veloping a communication strategy which would consist in set up documentation resources 
accessible to the public and prepare educational material, promoting cooperation and avoiding 
duplication with other sources of information123. 
The Agency activities should be implemented within the limits of the thematic areas as de-
fined in the MAF. The MAF should be adopted by the European Commission and it should 
cover five areas determining the thematic areas of the Agency’s activity. Such thematic areas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 4.1(b). 
117 ibid. 
118 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 4.1(c) 
119 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 4.1(d) 
120 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 4.1(e) 
121 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 4.1(f)(g)(h). 
122 SEC (2005)849; COM(2005) 280 final. Art. 4.1(i)(j). 
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must always include “the fight against racism and xenophobia”124. It also should be in line with 
the Union priorities as defined in the Commission’s strategic objectives and avoiding thematic 
overlap with the remit of other Community bodies, offices and agencies. At the same time, the 
Agency will be allowed to work outside these thematic areas to respond to requests from the 
European Parliament, the Council or the Commission.  
The Agency should also carry out its activities in light of its Annual Work Programme, 
which must be in line with the Commission’s annual work programme125.  
The Commission’s proposal provides also that the Agency sets up and coordinates an in-
formation network126. Such task would ensure the provision of objective, reliable and compa-
rable information, drawing on the expertise of a variety of organizations and bodies in each 
Member State and taking account of the need to involve national authorities in the collection 
of data. To this purpose, the Agency shall cooperate with governmental and non - govern-
mental organisations and bodies competent in the field of fundamental rights at the Member 
State or at European level127.  
The Agency should also coordinate its activities with those of the Council of Europe and 
in particular with regard to its Annual Work Programme128. Therefore, the Community should 
enter into an agreement with the Council of Europe for the purpose of establishing close co-
operation between the two institutions. Such agreement should provide the obligation of the 
Council of Europe to appoint an independent person to sit on the Agency’s Management 
Board. 
The Agency structure should include a Management Board, an executive board and a director.  
The Management Board is composed by an independent expert appointed by each the 
Member States, one appointed by the European Parliament; one appointed by the Council of 
Europe; and two representatives of the Commission. The Management Board elects its Chair-
person and Vice-Chairperson and ensures that the Agency performs the tasks entrusted to it. 
It should be the Agency’s planning and monitoring body. In particular, the Management 
Board should: 
1. “adopt the Agency's Annual Work Programme on the basis of a draft submitted by 
the Agency’s Director after the Commission has delivered an opinion. The Annual 
Work Programme shall be transmitted to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission; 
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2. adopt the annual reports comparing, in particular, the results achieved with the objec-
tives of the annual work programme; these reports shall be transmitted not later than 
15 June to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Au-
ditors, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions; 
3. appoint and, if necessary, dismiss the Agency’s Director; 
4. adopt the Agency’s annual draft and final budgets; 
5. exercise disciplinary authority over the Director; 
6. draw up an annual estimate of expenditure and revenue for the Agency and send it to 
the Commission; 
7. adopt the Agency’s rules of procedure on the basis of a draft submitted by the Direc-
tor after the Commission has delivered an opinion;  
8. adopt the financial rules applicable to the Agency on the basis of a draft submitted by 
the Director after the Commission has delivered an opinion; 
9. adopt the necessary measures to implement the Staff Regulations of Officials of the 
European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the 
European Communities; 
10. adopt the procedures for applying Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001129 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council”130. 
The Management Board can delegate any of its responsibilities to the Executive Board, except 
the adoption of the annual work program, the annual reports, the appointment or demission 
of the Agency director, the adoption of the annual draft and financial report, the adoption of 
the internal rule of procedures and of the financial rules. Decisions by the Management Board 
should be taken by a simple majority of the vote’s cast, except decisions concerning the adop-
tion of the annual work program, the annual report and the appointment of demission of the 
director. The Chairperson has the casting vote. Notably, the person appointed by the Council 
of Europe to sit in the Management Board has the right to vote on decisions concerning the 
adoption of the annual work program and the annual reports.  
The Director of the European Institute for Gender Equality and the Directors of other rel-
evant Community agencies and Union bodies can attend as observers the meeting of the 
Management Board when invited by the Executive Board131. 
The role of the Executive Board is to assist the Management Board. The Executive Board 
should be made up of the Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson of the Management Board 	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public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. 
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and two Commission representatives. The Executive Board should be convened by the Chair-
person to prepare the decisions of the Management Board and to assist and advise the Direc-
tor. It adopts its decisions by simple majority and the Agency’s Director should participate in 
the meetings of the Executive Board, without voting rights132. 
Finally the Director is appointed by the Management Board on the basis of a list of candi-
dates proposed by the Commission. 
Article 14 of the proposed regulation deals with the Agency’s responsibility to set up a 
Fundamental Rights Forum133. The Forum should be composed of representatives of non-
governmental organizations committed to the field of fundamental rights and to fight against 
racism, xenophobia and Anti-Semitism, trade unions and employer’s organizations, relevant 
social and professional organizations, churches, religious, philosophical and non-confessional 
organisations, universities and qualified experts and European and international bodies and 
organisations.  
The Forum should be a mechanism for the exchange of information in relation to funda-
mental rights issues and the dissemination of knowledge. It makes possible a close coopera-
tion between the Agency and relevant stakeholders. The Forum plays also a relevant role as 
regards the Annual Work Programme by making suggestions before being adopted. It also 
gives feedback and suggests follow up on the basis of the annual report on the situation re-
garding fundamental rights adopted. The Forum should be chaired by the Director and its 
meetings are convened annually or at the request of the Management Board.  
4. The Council of Europe reaction 
As a reaction to the Commission’s proposal for establishing the FRA134 and considering the 
McNamara report prepared within the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights135 the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (hereinafter PACE) adopted a Resolution 
1427 (2005) on 18 March 2005136. 
At the very beginning of the resolution the Assembly considers positively that  
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“the creation of a Fundamental Rights Agency within the EU could make a helpful 
contribution, provided that a useful role and field of action is defined for it and that the 
Agency therefore genuinely “fills a gap” and presents irrefutable added value and com-
plementarity in terms of promoting respect for human rights. However, defining such a 
role presupposes careful reflection within the EU about the aims, content, scope, limits, 
and instruments of its own internal human rights policy”137.  
As the Assembly pointed out  
“a multiplication of European institutions in the field of human rights will not neces-
sarily mean better protection of those rights. Conversely, there is no point in reinventing 
the wheel by giving the agency a role which is already performed by existing human rights 
institutions and mechanisms in Europe. That would simply be a waste of taxpayers’ mon-
ey”138. 
The Council of Europe indeed shows its concern over the creation of institutions whose 
mandates overlap the activities and the tasks of institutions already existing and functional, 
and in particular those who duplicate its work in the human rights area. These initiatives are 
seen as weakening the individual authority of these institutions and consequently may provoke 
a dilution of human rights protection. 
In fact, in the view of the PACE, instituting a duplicate mechanism of human protection 
would jeopardize the ideal of European system without dividing lines, especially in the area of 
human rights. It is particularly this area that demands, “Europe should be united by the same 
common standards and values”139. Therefore, it sees necessary to give the EU Agency “a well-
defined, focused and complementary role”140: 
 “The Agency should be an independent institution for the promotion and protection 
of human rights within the legal order of the EU, along the lines of similar national insti-
tutions that exist in several Member States. The Agency should collect and provide the 
EU institutions with information about fundamental rights that is relevant to their activi-
ties, and thus contribute to mainstreaming human rights standards in the EU decision-
making processes”141. 
According to the PACE, this understanding of the Agency’s role has relevant implications.  
First, the Agency should have a mandate whose scope corresponds to that of EC/EU law. 
In fact, its role should be to promote compliance with fundamental rights in both Community 
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law and policies, and when the EU Member States implement them. The Agency should not 
extend its remit outside EC/EU competence, where Member States act autonomously and are 
supervised by the European human rights bodies set up by the Council of Europe. In other 
words, whereas the EU mechanism of human rights protection has a broader extension142, the 
Agency should not be allowed to deal with fundamental rights in general but only when the 
Member States implement the EU/EC law. We will show in the following chapters how the 
decision to shape the scope of the Agency according to this restrictive approach raises further 
difficulties. 
Second, the Agency should not assess general human rights situations in specific coun-
tries143. Its work should be focused on specific thematic areas involving fundamental rights 
and having a special connection with EC/EU policies. In doing so the Agency would avoid to 
perform tasks and to present assessments, which can compete with those of the bodies of the 
Council of Europe. As a consequence the Agency will address its thematic reports only to the 
relevant institutions of the EU (Commission, Council and Parliament) and not to the Member 
States144.  
Third, the Agency should include among its reference instruments not only the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the ECHR but also the European Social Charter, the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.  
In order to avoid a duplication of the activities of the Council of Europe, the PACE rec-
ommends providing the Agency’s regulation with provisions concerning cooperation and co-
ordination of its activities with those of the Council of Europe. In particular the Agency’s reg-
ulation shall include: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 As De Shutter explains, “articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on European Union define human rights, along 
with democracy and the rule of law, as part of the values on which the Union if founded; and they give the 
Council the possibility both of adopting sanctions against a State which, according to the determination made by 
the Council, has seriously and persistently breached the principles mentioned in Article 6(1) EU (see Article 7(2) 
to (4) EU and, for the implementation of these sanctions in the framework of the EC Treaty, Article 309 EC), 
and – since the entry into force of the Nice Treaty on 1 February 2003 (OJ C 180, of 10.3.2001) – of determining 
that there exists a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the common values on which the Union is 
based and addressing recommendations on that basis to the Member State concerned. In addition, a number of 
instruments adopted in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters contain a human rights clause”. See 
De Shutter, supra note 81 at n.2. 
143 PACE Recommendation 1744 (2006), Follow-up to the 3rd Summit: the Council of Europe and the pro-
posed fundamental rights agency of the European Union, adopted on 13 April 2006 on the basis of the report 
prepared within the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (doc. 10894, rapp. Mr Jurgens) 
144 The Council of Europe bodies are already accountable for monitoring the EU Member States actions at 
the national level in areas within the scope of EU law and their findings are addressed directly to those Member 
States. 
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“a. esplict provisions establishing the rule of non-duplication with the role, functions 
and activities of the institutions and mechanisms of the Council of Europe and undertake 
a duty of co-operation and co-ordination with the Council of Europe, especially as re-
gards the drawing up and implementation of the Agency’s programme of activities; 
b. a mandatory provision for the full participation of the Council of Europe in the 
management structures of the Agency; 
c. a guarantee that the Community enters into an agreement with the Council of Eu-
rope for the purpose of establishing close co-operation between the Organisation and the 
Agency”145. 
 
In its reply the Committee of Ministers agrees with the PACE by stating that  
“the Agency’s mandate should focus on human rights issues within the framework of 
the European Union, address its advice to the EU institutions and ensure that unneces-
sary duplication with the Council of Europe is avoided”146. 
Also the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe147expressed 
concern over the proposal for a Council Regulation of the European Commission establishing 
a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and a Council decision empowering the 
Agency to pursue its activities in areas referred to in Title VI of the Treaty on European union 
of 30 June 2005. According to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe, PACE should only accept an Agency whose mandate complies with the 
following issues: 
 
i. Notwithstanding the EU Member States are bound by the main Council of Europe Hu-
man Rights Instruments148, the Agency should not make reference to them in its work. How-
ever, its mandate should mention these Council of Europe instruments.  
 
ii. The Agency’s mandate should not include third countries with which the EU has, is ne-
gotiating or is planning to negotiate agreements containing human rights clauses. This would 
duplicate activities of the Council of Europe risking double standards and “drawing new di-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 PACE Resolution 1427 (2005) on 18 March 2005. 
146 In this context, it is recalled that “the existing arrangements for co-operation between the Council of Eu-
rope and the European Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia have worked to the full satisfaction of both or-
ganisations and wishes to see a similar arrangement for the Council of Europe’s participation in the Agency’s 
bodies”. PACE Doc. 10729 on 20 October 2005. 
147 PACE Doc. 10894 on11 April 2006. 
148 Also The European Court of Justice have ruled that the ECHR forma part of the general principles of 
Community law. 
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viding lines in Europe”149. The Agency could play only a role related to the activities of candi-
date countries in fulfilling the accession criteria150. 
 
iii. The Agency should not be allowed to assess the human rights performance of specific 
states and address its conclusions and opinions to them. The advisory support of the Agency 
should be only addressed to the EU institutions, within the EU legal framework. 
 
iv. As regards the setting up of a Fundamental Rights Forum through which outside actors 
would make suggestions for the Agency’s annual work programme and make proposals on the 
basis of the annual report. Given that the annual report would be very wide-ranging, this 
could duplicate the activities of the Council of Europe. In particular, the Agency’ engagement 
with civil society associations active in the field of human would duplicate the activities of the 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 
 
v. The Agency’s mandate should explicitly require to avoid any possible duplication of the 
activities of the Council of Europe and clearly show the added value of the Agency’s work to 
the overall European human rights protection system. 
 
vi. According to the proposal presented by the European Commission the Council of Eu-
rope would be less effectively represented on the Agency’s management structures than it is 
on those of the current EUMC. In particular, the proposal does not provide a place for the 
Council of Europe’s representative on the Executive Board and limit her or his voting rights 
on the Management Board and as regards the Agency’s work.  
Finally, the PACE also mentions the specific contribution of the European Parliament as 
regards the Agency’s establishment. The European Parliament had a total of five rapporteurs 
responding to the Commission’s proposals151. All the rapporteurs produced drafts and pro-
posed a total of 131 amendments to the Commission’s proposals. Three additional documents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 PACE Resolution 1427 (2005) on 18 March 2005. 
150 This issue was suggested by Sub-committee E of the UK House of Lords EU Committee. See HOUSE 
OF LORDS European Union Committee 29th Report of Session 2005–06 Human rights protection in Europe: 
the Fundamental Rights Agency Report with Evidence 4 April 2006. 
151 Mrs Kinga Gál (Hungary, EPP/ED) and Mrs Magda Kósáné Kovács (Hungary, SOC), who reported on 
the proposal for a regulation and on the proposal for a decision, respectively, on behalf of the Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE); Mr Cem Özdemir (Germany, Greens/ EFA) who prepared an 
opinion on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET); Mr Ignasi Guardans Cambó (Spain, SOC), who 
prepared an opinion for the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO); and Ms Emine Bozkurt (Netherlands, 
SOC), who prepared an opinion on behalf of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). 
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containing some 200 amendments were submitted. Considering them the PACE concludes 
rising alarm on them:  
“the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe ex-
presses his alarm at the extremely ambitious nature of some of these, which suggest either 
ignorance of or wilful blindness to the concerns – even the very existence – of the Coun-
cil of Europe”152. 
a. Juncker’s Report 
The PACE resolution also mentions the outcomes of the Juncker’s report. On 11 April 2006, 
Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg Prime Minister, presented to the PACE a report on rela-
tions between the Council of Europe and the European Union. The report was drawn up at 
the request of the Heads of State or Government of the 46 Member States of the Council of 
Europe, meeting at the Warsaw Summit on 16 and 17 May 2005, sets out recommendations 
for the improvement of cooperation and coordination between the two organisations153. 
Among the European Union institutions considered, the report dedicates a specific section to 
the Agency’s establishment and lays down the following recommendations:  
I. “The Council of Europe must remain the benchmark for human rights in Europe. 
The EU must, therefore, draw more systematically on its expertise; this applies 
equally to EU Member States, candidate countries and non-Member States that are 
members of the Council of Europe, in respect of the EU’s bilateral relations, neigh-
bourhood policy, association agreements and the stabilisation and association pro-
cess. 
II. The Council of Europe must remain responsible for monitoring its Member States 
and ensuring that they respect human rights. It should make regular evaluations in 
each of its Member States, on a country-by-country basis. The reference value of its 
thematic reports must be strengthened. 
III. The Agency must be strictly complementary to the Council of Europe. It is essen-
tial, therefore, that its mandate be limited to human rights issues that arise in con-
nection with the implementation of Community law, i.e. strictly within the EU’s in-
ternal legal system. 
IV. The Agency’s mandate should explicitly mention the ECHR and other key Council 
of Europe instruments as reference texts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 PACE Doc. 10894 on11 April 2006. 
153 ‘A sole ambition for the European continent’, report prepared by Jean-Claude Juncker to the attention of 
the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the Council of Europe, 11 April 2006 (hereafter re-
ferred to as the ‘Juncker report’). 
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V. The Council of Europe should be represented on the Agency’s management bod-
ies”154. 
The report is clearly another expression of the Council of Europe fear to be marginalized by 
the incumbent process of integration of the EU. In fact, as Juncker states:  
“Although each has enriched the other, the two organisations remain at best a shaky 
team. Although each has borrowed from the other, they have never been able to make 
themselves permanently complementary”155.  
Therefore the report recommends that the Agency mandate should be necessarily restricted to 
deal with human rights issues concerning the implementation of EU law. At the same time, it 
restates the primacy of the Council of Europe in the field of human rights as regards its mem-
ber states and invites the EU to not go beyond its boundaries156.  
b. Limited role of national Parliaments in the Consultation procedure 
The PACE also points out that the national Parliaments played a limited role in the Commis-
sion’s proceedings. In fact, during the consultation procedure several countries raised con-
cerns similar to those of the PACE but these inputs did not seem to be seriously considered 
by EU institutions.  
Notably, after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty supporters of the Agency started to 
claim for the establishment of a strong and extensive Agency.   However, according to PACE 
reasoning the entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty would have provided the national 
Parliaments with a greater role within the EU’s legislative processes. Therefore, the PACE 
concludes that the proposals concerning the Agency would have been “more realistic” and 
“acceptable”157 if the concerns expressed by national Parliaments158 would have been taking 
into account by the EU’s institutions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 ibi.  
155 Ibi. 
156 See O. De Shutter, The division of tasks between the Council of Europe and the European Union in the promotion of 
Human Rights in Europe: Conflict, Competition and Complementarity, Working paper series : REFGOV-FR-11. Available 
at http://cridho.uclouvain.be/documents/Working.Papers/. M. Kolb, The European Union and the Council of 
Europe (Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
157 PACE Doc. 10894 on11 April 2006. 
158 See particularly the UK position regarding the FRA’s establishment: “Respect for fundamental rights has 
been for many years a general principle of the Community, and the Agency should look first at those human 
rights which thereby form part of Community law. In this context, the Charter of Fundamental Rights could also 
be used as a starting point, as a statement of rights, freedoms and principles applicable at Union level, bearing in 
mind its horizontal Articles and the official explanations. In addition, although it should not play a policy or op-
erational role on human rights issues in third countries, it is for consideration whether the Agency should be 
available to provide assistance to countries interested in EU best practice, for example as part of the accession 
process or European Neighbourhood Policy. The UK believes that an Agency established with such a remit 
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In addition PACE affirms that issues such as “the Agency’s legal basis, subsidiarity and 
proportionality”159, “the fate of the EU Constitutional Treaty”160 in connection with regards to 
the EU accession to the ECHR and the legal status of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
“the role of national Parliaments”161 and “the eventual agreement between the Agency and the 
Council of Europe”162 should be further developed.  
As regards the Agency’s legal basis, the Commission considers article 308 TEC as the ap-
propriate legal basis for the FRA. Such provision allows for decisions intended to further the 
objectives of the Community. However, PACE underlines that considering the objectives in-
cluded in Article 2 TEC “equality between men and women” seems to be the only one of po-
tential relevance to a human rights body. As a consequence this would imply that the EU has 
no competence to establish an Agency.  
Furthermore, PACE also points out that during the consultation procedure, the French 
Assemblée nationale, the Czech Senate and the Sub-committee E of the UK House of Lords 
EU Committee expressed similar doubts about the validity of art. 308.  
Therefore it concludes that “it would be absolutely inappropriate for a human rights pro-
tection body to be established by a decision that was wholly or partially ultra vires”163 and it in-
vites the institutions to provide further explanations.  
 
 
c. Subsidiarity Principle 
Interestingly PACE raises further concerns as regards the EU’s application of the principle of 
Subsidiarity. According to its view the EU definition of the principle of Subsidiarity is limited. 
In fact it does not seem to include any reference to the relationship between EU action and 
the activities of other international organizations such as the Council of Europe. Such lack of 
any reference to international organizations would clearly have a certain impact on the Agen-
cy’s establishment. Indeed, according to PACE “in determining whether an act at community 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would be able to focus on tasks of greatest priority to citizens throughout the EU. Any role for the FRA based 
upon Articles 6 and 7 TEU would compromise its effectiveness and run the risk of overload. It would also lead 
to unwelcome and inefficient duplication with other established or developing institutions in the Council of Eu-
rope, within the Union itself, and within Member States – in the case of the latter also compromising the princi-
ple of subsidiarity”. Summary of the UK position regarding the establishment of the European Fundamental 
rights Agency. Available at http://ec.europa.eu. 
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level has clear advantages, it should be compared also to the acts of EU Member States acting 
in other international fora.”164 
Furthermore, by referring to Protocol No. 30 on the application of the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality, annexed in 1997 to the Treaty establishing the European Com-
munity (TEC)165, PACE critics the reasons are used for justifying the Agency’s compliance 
with the principle of Subsidiarity in the Explanatory Memorandum to Commission’s Proposal. 
Such reasons are considered too general and cursory: 
“These reasons, however, relate only to a very general definition of the Agency’s activi-
ties: for instance, there is no mention of the possibility of country-specific monitoring or 
of the Agency’s role in non-EU Member States that are members of the Council of Eu-
rope. Furthermore, they do not address the question of whether Member States, acting in 
other international fora, can satisfactorily achieve some, or all, of the objectives proposed 
for the Agency”166. 
 
Notably, it is also pointed out that although Rule 34 (now Rule 42) of the European Parlia-
ment’s Rules of Procedure requires it “to pay particular attention to whether a legislative act is 
in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity”. None of the five rapporteurs makes any 
mention of subsidiarity in the respective reports. 
PACE further mentions the opinions expressed on this issue by national parliaments. The 
German Bundesrat stated that the account of the scope of the Agency does not comply with 
the principle of Subsidiarity. The French Senat reised doubts on the utility of the Agency and 
that its establishment was a priority the EU. Finally, the French Assemblée nationale agreed 
with these conclusions and regretted the lack of no prior evaluation of the necessity of creat-
ing such an Agency167. 
Therefore, in light of these considerations PACE concludes that the European Commis-
sion’s proposal does not sufficiently satisfy the test of subsidiarity.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 ibid. 
165 “[i]n exercising the powers conferred on it, each institution shall ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is 
complied with… For any proposed Community legislation, the reasons on which it is based shall be stated with a 
view to justifying its compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; the reasons for conclud-
ing that a Community objective can be better achieved by the Community must be substantiated by qualitative 
or, wherever possible, quantitative indicators… For Community action to be justified, both aspects of the subsid-
iarity principle shall be met…” Protocol No. 30 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and propor-
tionality, annexed in 1997 to the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). 
166 PACE Doc. 10894 on 11 April 2006. 
167 On the objections of the House of Lords, the German Bundesrat, the French Senate and Assemblée, see 
the notes in W. Hummer, The European Fundamental Rights Agency, in A. Reinisch & U. Kriebaum (eds), The 
law of international relations – Liber Amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold (Eleven International Publishing, 2007), 
117–144. 
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d. Principle of proportionality 
According to PACE, the Commission’s proposal does not give as much attention to the prin-
ciple of proportionality as to the principle of Subsidiarity. The principle of proportionality 
provides that “the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties”168. However, “the objectives of the relevant treaty ap-
pear to have little relevance to the activities proposed for the Agency”169. 
By drawing upon the same argument used for the principle of subsidiarity, PACE states 
that “most of the activities proposed for the Agency do not correspond to activities set out in 
the relevant treaty”. This imply that the Commission’s proposal do not satisfy the test of pro-
portionality.  
Furthermore, once again none of the five rapporteurs of the European Parliament refers to 
the principle of proportionality, despite the Rules of Procedure of the European parliament 
requiring particular attention to be paid to it. 
Therefore PACE invites the EU institutions to further consider the compliance of the 
Commission’s proposal with the test of proportionality. Indeed, even in this case  
“given the extremely limited reference to human rights objectives in the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community, the increasingly ambitious scope of the various pro-
posals and amendments for the Agency’s mandate would appear to be going further and 
further beyond what is required to achieve these objectives”170.  
 
e. Failure of the Constitutional Treaty 
PACE also considered that  
“All of the most significant decisions concerning creation of the Agency were taken 
during the optimistic period between completion of the draft Treaty and the negative 
French and Dutch referenda”171. 
Indeed, in July 2003, the Convention on the Future of Europe completed work on the draft 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which was signed by the EU Member States 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Art.5 TEU. 
169 PACE Doc. 10894 on 11 April 2006. 
170 ibid.  
171 ibid. 
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and candidate countries in October 2004. However, in May and June 2005 France and Neth-
erlands voted against ratification.  
In light of theses events Mrs Gál, principal rapporteur for the European Parliament’s LIBE 
committee, considers that “in view of the actually suspended constitution-making process of 
the European Union (EU), the rapporteur considers that it is the right moment for Europe to 
flag the protection and promotion of fundamental human rights”172.  
At the same time the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty means that “the anticipated 
legal environment within which the Agency would have begun operating does not yet exist”173.  
Indeed, with the entry into force of the treaty, the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights 
would have become legally binding on the EU institutions and on Member States when im-
plementing EU law and would have been one of the Agency’s main reference texts as was in-
tended to be.  
Furthermore, the treaty would also have provided the EU to access to the ECHR, thus  
“ensuring that all sources of political, legal and administrative authority over European 
citizens were bound by the same basic human rights standards and supervisory mecha-
nisms. Without the Court having subsidiarity jurisdiction over the human rights compli-
ance of EU acts, the Agency will lack an ultimate reference point for ensuring that its 
own activities in the context of the EU are consistent with the wider European human 
rights protection system”174. 
In consideration of these inevitable difficulties PACE agrees with the UK Parliament’s Joint 
Committee on Human Rights when it states in its contribution to the consultation procedure 
that 
“we are in a period in which it is not clear whether the significance of fundamental 
rights within the EU legal order will be radically changed by the coming into force of the 
new constitutional treaty”175.  
Therefore the PACE concludes that it necessary to postponed the establishment of the Agen-
cy with the purpose to further clarify its powers and its functions. In fact, until the fate of the 
Constitutional Treaty and of the Charter is not defined, it will be difficult to determine the 
Agency’s mandate.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 European Parliament, Draft Report on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing a European Un-
ion Agency for Fundamental Rights 2005/0124(CNS). Rapporteur: Kinga Gál. 
173 PACE Doc. 10894 on11 April 2006. 
174 ibid. 
175 UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, European Fundamental Rights Agency 
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According to PACE another difficulty raised from the failure of the Constitutional Treaty 
is that national Parliaments have no formal role in scrutinising draft legislation. Rather the 
Constitutional Treaty would have provided the national Parliaments with a greater role within 
the EU legislative process. It is not negligible, indeed, the fact that several national Parliaments 
have expressed doubts on the Agency’s establishment in the stage of the Consultation proce-
dure176.  
Therefore PACE asks to the EU institutions not to create the Agency until all national Par-
liaments have the opportunity to deliver their opinion on the matter. It states that  
“Since the Agency is being justified by reference to the EU Constitutional Treaty, de-
spite that treaty not yet having come into force, it seems only proper in this instance that 
other relevant intentions of the Treaty, which was agreed as a package of measures, 
should also be given effect”177. 
Furthermore PACE does not think it is opportune to finalize any cooperation agreement 
between a future Agency and the Council of Europe. Indeed, the Agency mandate has to be 
determined before assessing the content of the procedures for a possible cooperation.  
In conclusion, the PACE thereby remarks the position of the heads of state and govern-
ment at the Warsaw Summit. They reaffirmed the prominence of the role of the Council of 
Europe in promoting and protecting human rights and decided to create a new framework for 




5. The Final act 
In 2005 the Austrian Presidency at EU Council invites the EU general affairs and External Re-
lations Council at its meeting in Luxemburg on 12 June 2006 to take a final decision. 
“The negotiations on the mandate for the new European Union Agency for Funda-
mental Rights are to be concluded in 2006. This Agency will follow on from the former 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia and will, similarly, have its 
headquarters in Vienna. The Fundamental Rights Agency is due to begin work on 1 Janu-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 These include the Dutch Senate, the German Bundesrat, the French Senat and Assembée nationale, the 
Czech Senate, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Parliaments and the Polish Sejm, and the UK Joint Commit-
tee on Human Rights.  
177 PACE Doc. 10894 on11 April 2006. 
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ary 2007 and will be a centre of expertise for fundamental rights issues at the EU lev-
el”178. 
To this end, the EU Council’s working party on Fundamental rights and Citizenship was es-
tablished. However, the Council was not able to come to a final decision and the dossier con-
cerning the Agency’s establishment was transferred to the Permanent Reprasentatives Com-
mittee (COREPER II). 
Notably, the Vice President of the Commission Franco Frattini and the Member of the 
European Parliament Kinga Gal expressed their disappointment for the delay in the attempt 
to find a solution.  
Therefore, in the concluding statements of the European Council in Brussels on 15 and 16 
June 2006 was remarked:  
“taking note of the progress achieved on the setting up of the European Union Agen-
cy for Fundamental Rights, the European Council calls for the necessary steps to be tak-
en as soon as possible, so that the Agency is up and running as from 1 January 2007”179.  
In the European Council, several Member States (Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands 
and Slovakia) raised concerns over the expansion of the competencies of the Agency in the 
areas covered by the former third pillar and its monitoring function as regards the infringe-
ment of important basic values according to article 7 TEU. Despite that, the Council adopted 
the final regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on 15 
February 2007.  
 
The Agency establishment is the result of a long itinerary that has concerned the integra-
tion of a human rights discourse into European Union architecture. Phenomena such as EU 
enlargement, the recrudescence of racism and xenophobia, the project of a Constitutional 
Treaty and its failure as long as the drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights have 
contributed to raise the need of a new body designed to assist the EU institutions catalysing 
information and data on fundamental rights issues. However, the creation of the Agency was 
not completed without difficulties. The Agency and its monitoring function arose the con-
cerns of several Member States and of the Council of Europe, which were alarmed by attrib-
uting a broad mandate to the Agency. The result of this debate is expressed in the final found-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 See The Austrian Presidency, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23 November 2005. Available at http://-
www.eurosfaire.prd.fr/7pc/doc/1134635746_presidence_autrichienne_2006.pdf. 
179 European Council of 15-16 June 2006, Doc. 10633/06 16 June 2006, Presidency Conclusions, par. 11. 
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ing regulation of the Agency. The Regulation is a compromise between the different positions, 
which emerged during the debate 2003-2007. In the next Chapter, the final regulation will be 
analysed in comparison with the Commission’s proposal. In doing so, it will be detected the 
fundamental elements of the compromise that was reached on February 2007 and it will be 
bring into light its final guise.   
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CHAPTER II 
The Final Compromise: The Council Regulation 2007 
 
Introduction – The Preamble – 1. Setting up a monitoring agency for fundamental rights: four essential 
elements – 2. A restrictive remit for the Agency – 3. Three main tasks – 4. From the multilevel cooper-
ation to the Agency’s legal basis – Objective, Scope, Tasks and Areas of Activity – Working, methods 




The Founding Regulation of the European FRA was finally adopted by the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union on 15 February 2007 and its definitive shape was radically affected by several 
concerns that arose during its drafting process. As already seen, the Member States (such as 
Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Slovakia) and the Council of Europe were the 
main opponents to the project of establishing an Agency with full monitoring functions in the 
field of fundamental rights.  The failure of the Constitutional Treaty also did not contribute to 
create an Agency for fundamental rights with a broad mandate. Without a consolidated consti-
tutional framework, the role of the Agency and its activities were considered properly unfit in 
relationship to the main institutions of the European Union. Therefore, the Agency began its 
mandate with a considerable limited remit and without having a legally binding point of refer-
ence to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the meantime, even if the Charter had still 
not entered in force when the Agency was officially established, it is also interesting to note 
that the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 20071 and the Charter was proclaimed for the second 
time. Therefore, even though the Agency was created in absence of a legal basis that linked its 
remit to the Charter, it is also not a coincidence that in the same year essential steps were tak-
en to ensure the entry of the Charter into force, along with a new treaty with amendments in-
spired by the abandoned Constitutional Treaty2. It is also true that the Agency started its man-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Charter was solemnly proclaimed in Strasburg one day before the signing of the Lisbon Treaty (13 De-
cember 2007) by the European Parliament, the EU Council and the European Commission. 
2 The Treaty of Lisbon includes most of the institutional and policy reforms which were provided in the Con-
stitutional treaty. However, if the Constitutional Treaty was intended to repeal the founding Treaties of the EU 
and recast them in a single text, the Lisbon Treaty only amends the founding Treaties. Consequently, the idea of 
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date before these two instruments were legally binding3 and, as it will be seen, its regulation is 
the result of this intermediate status. Given these premises in the current chapter the Agency’s 
founding regulation will be analysed, with particular attention to highlight its differences and 
similarities in comparison to the previews in the Commission proposal (2005)4. In here, the 
implications of the entry in force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter that arose for the 
FRA’s founding regulation and activities will not be tackled. Rather, they will be better ad-
dressed in the next Chapter. In the present chapter, the FRA’s statute will be discussed in light 
of the pre-Lisbon constitutional framework in which it was established. The analysis will be 
conducted following the structure of the regulation from its Preamble to the Final Provisions. 
On one hand, the result will be a complete account of the framework in which the Agency is 
called to carry out its work and, on the other hand, it will bring into light some elements of the 




Before focusing the attention on the text of the Preamble of the current funding regulation, it 
seems necessary to briefly outline how the regulation is structured. The Council’s Regulation 
2007 establishing the FRA consists of 34 articles organized in 7 chapters, which are articulated 
according to the following order: Subject Matter, Objective, Scope, Tasks and Areas of Activi-
ty (Chapter 1), Working Method and Cooperation (Chapter 2), Organization (Chapter 3), Op-
eration (Chapter 4), Financial Provisions (Chapter 5), General Provisions (Chapter 6) and Fi-
nal Provisions (Chapter 7). It follows the same structure as the Commission proposal for a 
Council Regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2005. 
However, the current regulation is the interesting result achieved in light of a debate - involv-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a European Constitution was abandoned and European law is still established by international Treaties: the Trea-
ty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community that was renamed as “Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU”. For a more detailed analysis of the relation between the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Treaty of Lisbon, see P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law Politic and Treaty Reform, (OUP 2010), 20,31. S. Griller, J. 
Ziller (eds), The Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008) 21,56. G. Tsebelis, 
Thinking about the Recent Past and Future of the EU, (2008) 265 J.C.M.S., B. Nascimbene, A. Lang, Il trattato di Lis-
bona: l’Unione Europea ad una svolta?, Il corriere giuridico, 2007. Available at http://www.forumcostituzionale.it. A. 
Lucarelli, A. Patroni Griffi (eds), Dal Trattato costituzionale al Trattato di Lisbona. Nuovi studi sulla Costituzione europea 
(Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2009).  
3 As already seen, the Agency was established on 15 February 2007 with the adoption of the Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 168/ establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights whereas the Treaty of Lisbon 
and also the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding on 1 December 2009.  
4 Commission ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights and ‘Proposal for a Council Decision empowering the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
to pursue its activities in areas referred to in Title VI of the Treaty on European Union’ COM (2005) 280 final 
(hereinafter Commission Proposal 2005). 
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1. Setting up a monitoring agency for fundamental rights: four essential elements 
Starting from the very beginning of the regulation, it has been noticed that from the first to 
the seventh Recital, the final regulation retraces the wording and the content of the Commis-
sion’s proposal 2005. In fact, following the spirit of the proposal, the Preamble highlights four 
elements deeply related to the institution of the Agency.  
The first element is art. 6(1) TEU. The Agency is conceived in light of the European Union 
founding principles, which are liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, which are common values to the Member States5. Recital (1) 
aligns the institution of the Agency with the spirit of art 6(1) TEU that was drafted – since the 
Amsterdam Treaty - in order to trigger a proactive mechanism of protection and promotion 
of fundamental rights.  Indeed, the Agency is clearly seen within the EU framework as an in-
strument designed to better achieve this purpose. 
The second element is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that is mentioned as a doc-
ument which  
“reflects the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and 
international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, 
the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, the social charters adopted by the Community and by the 
Council of Europe and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties and of the European Court of Human Rights” (Recital (2))6. 
Given the wording of the second Recital, it can be supposed, at a first glance, that the Charter 
should be the main reference point of the work and activities of the Agency. However, since 
at the time of the adoption of the FRA’s regulation the Charter did not have legally binding 
status, when the Agency was established this reference was merely declamatory. As already 
seen, such reference was likely inserted considering the future steps of the Constitutional 
Framework of the Union, which the signature of the Treaty of Lisbon and the second proc-
lamation of the Charter in 2007 foresaw. It also must be said that before being legally binding, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This is an explicit reference to article 6.1 TEU as laid down in the Consolidate version of the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union [2002] OJ C 325/7.  
6 FRA Founding Regulation, Recital (2), Preamble. 
	   58 
the Charter had been already playing a relevant role for the EU institutions, which includes 
the Agency7. In fact, the Agency used the Charter as a reference point of its activities and 
work, even before it was entered into force8.   
The third element concerns the Agency’s functions and structure. What kind of contribu-
tion can offer a monitoring Agency to the Community and the Member States when they are 
dealing with fundamental rights issues? A monitoring Agency for fundamental rights provides 
“information and data on fundamental rights matters”, ensures “full respect of fundamental 
rights” and broadens their knowledge and awareness in accordance with one of the common 
values of the international and European communities which is “the development of effective 
institutions for the protection and promotion of human right”9 (Recital (4)). In fact, according 
to the Commission proposals 2005, the Agency structure was conceived as inspired by two 
different models from the national human rights institutions and the EU agencies10. On one 
hand, the Agency was supposed to combine the model of a National Human Rights Institu-
tion (hereinafter NHRI) for the EU with a forum in which collaboration among the existing 
NHRIs is fostered with the purpose to make more effective the fundamental rights protec-
tion in the Union. The Agency, in fact, should have been an independent institution whose 
Management Board was composed of independent persons “with high level of responsibili-
ties in the management of an independent national human rights institution or with thorough 
expertise in the field of fundamental rights”11. This feature shows also that the Management 
Board was conceived as a network of NHRIs and other similar institutions at national level, 
thus guaranteeing both independence and pluralism. However, according to the principle of 
enumerated powers, the EU primary law does not consent to create a body empowered of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 O. De Shutter, The Implementation of the Charter by the Institutions of the European Union, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. 
Kenner, A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart Publishing 2014), 1627, 1684. 
8 See for instance FRA Opinion on proposal for a Council Framework decision on the use of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data for law enforcement purposes (28/10/2008). Available at http://fra.europa.eu/en. 
9 The governments of member states should “consider, taking account of the specific requirements of each 
member state, the possibility of establishing effective national human rights institutions, in particular human 
rights commissions which are pluralist in their membership, ombudsmen or comparable institutions; [they 
should] draw, as appropriate, on the experience acquired by existing national human rights commissions and oth-
er national human rights institutions, having regard to the principles set out in Resolution 48/134 of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations and in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted in 1993, as 
well as on the experience acquired by ombudsmen, having regard to Recommendation No. R (85) 13 of the 
Committee of Ministers; [they should] promote co-operation, in particular through exchange of information and 
experience, between national human rights institutions and between these institutions and the Council of Eu-
rope, in accordance with Resolution (97) 11 of the Committee of Ministers; [they should] ensure that this rec-
ommendation is distributed in civil society, in particular among non-governmental organisations”. Recommenda-
tion No R (97) 14 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of 30 September 1997.  
10 See O. De Shutter, The EU Fundamental Rights Agency: Genesis and Potential, in K. Boyle, New Institutions for 
Human Rights Protection (OUP 2009), 93, 136. 
11 Commission Proposal 2005, art. 11(1).  
	   59 
judicial competencies, as in the case of some NHRIs12. Therefore, within the Community 
framework it was decided to establish an Agency resembling the model of a regulatory agen-
cy13. In particular, FRA appears as a simple regulatory agency that “does not dispose of any 
powers to issue (binding or otherwise legally relevant) legal acts. …[In fact] the FRA’ s main 
function is to provide the EU institutions and Member States with reliable and comparable 
data on fundamental rights”14.  
The fourth and last element is the continuity between the Agency and the previous EUMC 
(Recital (5)). The Agency is not merely build upon the EUMC but its mandate is an extension 
of the EUMC’s mandate – characterized by information-gathering tasks. As a consequence, it 
will seen below that, along with its commitment with fundamental rights as laid down in the 
Charter and other human rights international instruments, the Agency also devotes part of its 
monitoring activities to phenomena such as racism and xenophobia according to the EUMC’s 
previous mandate.  
 
 
2. A restrictive remit for the Agency 
One of the results of the compromissory logic characterizing the current founding regulation 
is the disappearance of the other separate legal act that was included in the Commission pro-
posal - the Council Decision empowering the FRA to pursue its activities in areas referred to 
in Title VI TEU – enabling the Agency to work also in the area covered by the former Third 
Pillar. The main opponents to the implementation of this part of the proposal were the EU 
Council15, Germany, Great Britain and The Netherlands, due to concerns such as the exten-
sion of the FRA’s mandate. Therefore, in Recital (8), the Preamble clearly limits the scope of 
the application of the Agency’s work within the field of Community law excluding from its 
target the situation from the former Third Pillar. As a consequence, the Agency’s field of ac-
tion is quite narrow.  
Furthermore, the strict contours of the Agency’s remit are remarked in other two Recitals 
of the Preamble - the 7th and the 13th - by using a different wording. In these Recitals it is af-
firmed that the Agency’s work and activities are circumscribed to the situations concerning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See, J. Wouters, K. Meuwissen, A. S. de Barros, The European Union and National Human Rights Institutions, 
(July 1, 2013). KU Leuven - Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper No. 112. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2302576 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2302576. 
13 See Commission draft institutional agreement on the operating framework for establishing regulatory agen-
cies COM (2005)59 final. 
14 See A. Orator, The competence entanglements of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, in O. Kammerlander (ed.), 
Expertenforum SpringerRecht.at (Springer-Verlag 2011), 124. 
15 Opinion of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union, Doc. 13588/05. 
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fundamental rights issues in which the relevant institutions and authorities of the Community 
and its Member States are implementing Community law. The expression “when implement-
ing Community law” - that appears in another passage of the regulation16 - recalls the wording 
of art. 51 of the EU Charter of fundamental Rights, even if the Agency’s field of application is 
narrower, being limited exclusively to Community Law. In the next Chapter, this analogy be-
tween the scope of the Agency and the scope of the Charter as laid down in art. 51 will be re-
flected upon, and some important reflections as regards the interpretation of the expression 
“when implementing Community Law”17 will be conducted. For the moment, it may suffice to 
say that even though a link between the Charter and the FRA can be certainly seen in those 
provisions of the regulation determining the Agency’s scope by using the same wording of art. 
51 of the Charter and in those where the Charter is explicitly mentioned, the relevant role 
played by the Charter in the Commission’s proposal 2005 has been softened in the Council 
Regulation 2007. The final regulation retraces the Commission proposal 2005 when states that 
the name of the Agency shall reflect the “close connection” with the Charter. On the contrary, 
with regards to the legal basis of the Agency’s activities, in Recital (9) the reference to the 
Charter in the meaning of Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union is moved to the 
background, by including another relevant legal instrument such as the Convention on Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This is likely the consequence of two factors such as 
the failure of the Constitutional Treaty that was supposed to include the Charter and the con-
cerns expressed by the Council of Europe with regards to the Agency’s establishment. As al-
ready seen above, the Charter could not be a legal basis for the Agency due to its non-legally 
binding status. At the same time, the PACE had strongly recommended to include among the 
reference instruments of the founding regulation not only the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
but also the European Convention of Human Rights, along with other international human 
rights instruments18.  
Another relevant feature characterizing the Agency’s mandate is that it was also conceived 
as continuing the previous EUMC. The Agency indeed does not merely extend the mandate 
of the existing EUMC but has to be built upon it. This means that among its tasks, it is mainly 
important that the Agency continues to cover the phenomena of racism, xenophobia and anti-
Semitism, which were previously monitored by the EUMC (see Recital No 10). Comparing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 FRA Founding Regulation, art. 3 (1). 
17 See A Bogdandy, J. Bernstorff, The EU Fundamental Rights Agency within the European and International Human 
Rights Architecture: The Legal Framework and some Unsettled Issues in a New Field of Administrative Law, (2009) 46 
C.M.L.R., 1064. 
18 PACE Resolution 1427 (2005) Plans to set up a fundamental rights agency of the European Union, adopt-
ed 18 March 2005. 
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formulation of the tenth Recital of the Founding Regulation to the respective one laid down 
in the Commission proposal (see the Recital No 7 of the Commission proposal 2005), if the 
latter mentioned a general commitment of the Agency in assisting the relevant institutions of 
the Community in the field of fundamental rights protection, the final version of the Preamble 
is more specific about which phenomena the work of the Agency should cover. In fact, the 
Agency has to carry out the EUMC’s commitment with the phenomena of “racism, xenopho-
bia and anti-Semitism, the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities, as well 
as gender equality, by considering them essential elements for the protection of fundamental rights”19. 
Therefore, if the centrality of the Charter as a reference instrument for the activities of the 
Agency is decreased in the Preamble of the final Regulation, at the same time it is specified 
and remarked the Agency’s commitment is with all form of discriminations, as it is expressed 
in the tenth Recital. As it will be seen, a considerable part of the FRA’s activities are focused on 
these phenomena and intersect those activities properly devoted to the rights included in the 
Charter.  
The limits of the Agency’s work are also specified in the thematic areas laid down in the 
MAF20. The MAF, that is the other relevant element of the Agency’s legal framework, was on-
ly generally mentioned in the Preamble of the Commission Proposal 2005. In fact, if a full Re-
cital - the 11th - of the Preamble of the current founding regulation is devoted to the FRA’s 
MAF, the Commission proposal 2005 mentioned the MAF in the same paragraph where Art. 
6(2) of the Treaty on European Union and the Charter of Fundamental Rights were addressed 
as sources for the Agency’s work. The final version of the FRA’s Preamble specifies that the 
MAF needs to be adopted by the European Council after consulting the European Parliament 
on the basis of a Commission proposal. This engagement of the EU relevant institutions in 
the MAF’s adoption procedure clearly shows, since the very beginning of the Regulation, the 
political importance of this legal basis for the Agency’s activities21.  
 
 
3. Three main tasks 
After having taken into account the Agency’s framework and remit, the Preamble mentions 
the main tasks of the Agency’s work. Firstly, the Agency “collects objective, reliable and com-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 FRA Founding Regulation, Recital (10), Preamble.  
20 In fact, “The thematic areas of activity will be defined through a Multiannual Framework determined by an 
implementing regulation involving the politically accountable Community institutions, thus setting limits for the 
Agency’s work”. COM (2005) 280 final. 
21 An analysis of the MAF will be conduct in the next chapter.  
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parable information on the situation of fundamental rights, analyses information in terms of 
causes of disrespect, consequences and effects and examines examples of good practice in 
dealing with these matters” (Recital (12)). Secondly, the Agency can deliver opinions to the Un-
ion’s institutions and to the Member States “when implementing Community law”. As point-
ed out above and analysed in the next chapter, this Recital (the 13th) is another passage of the 
regulation where a relationship with the field of application of the EU Charter of fundamental 
rights as expressed in art. 51. can be recognized. Furthermore, the Agency can formulate opin-
ions “on its own initiative or at request of the European Parliament, the Council or the Com-
mission, without interference with the legislative and judicial procedures established in the 
Treaty”22. However, the institutions can request opinions on their legislative proposals or posi-
tions in the course of the legislative procedures when they are dealing with fundamental rights 
matters. It has also to be noticed that the Council regulation 2007 no longer includes the Recit-
al, providing the possibility for the EU Council to request the Agency’s technical expertise “in 
the context of proceedings commenced under article 7 of the Treaty on European Union”23. 
The extension of the Agency’s mandate also to the field of application of article 7, would have 
meant that the Agency could monitor the compliance of Member States with fundamental 
rights and others EU values, as drawn up in art. 6 TEU, without restrictions to EC or EU 
laws24. Therefore, it is comprehensible why this provision gave rise to a lot of concerns among 
the EU Member States25, of the Legal Service of the Council of the Union26 and within the 
Council Ad hoc Working Party on Fundamental Rights and Citizenship27. Especially since this 
provision would have attributed to the Agency a role that could go beyond the EC/EU com-
petencies. As a consequence, the final regulation 2007 omits the provision concerning the role 
of the Agency with regards to art. 7 TEU but also annexes a Declaration of the Council, leav-
ing open the possibility for itself to rely on the Agency’s expertise in cases covered by art. 7 
TEU28. The Preamble continues by introducing other tasks of the Agency as the collection of 
an annual report on fundamental rights issues covered by the areas of the Agency’s activity 
and including examples of good practice and the thematic reports on topics of particular im-
portance to the Union’s policies (Recital (14)).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See FRA Founding Regulation, Recital (13), Preamble. 
23 See Commission proposal 2005, Recital (12), Preamble. 
24 COM (2005)59 final. 
25 See the explanatory memorandum annexed to the Commission proposal 2005.  
26 Doc. 13588/05JUR 425 JAI 363 COHOM 36 (26 October 2005). 
27 Doc. 15033/06 LIMITE JAI 578 CATS 165 COHOM 162 COEST 311 (10 November 2006). 
28 “The Council considers that neither the Treaties nor the Regulation establishing the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights preclude the possibility for the Council to seek assistance of the future European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights when deciding to obtain from independent persons a report on the situa-
tion in a Member State within the meaning of Article 7 TEU when the Council decides that the conditions of Ar-
ticle 7 TEU are met”. Doc. 6166/07 LIMITE JAI 67 CATS 12 COHOM 15 COEST 39 (12 February 2007). 
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Last but not least, the Agency - in accordance with the model of NHRIs with consultative 
and advisory functions29 - is called to carry out the task to raise awareness of the general public 
about their fundamental rights, and about the possibilities and different mechanisms for en-
forcing them in general. However, this commitment does not mean that the Agency should 
deal itself with individual complaints (Recital (15)). As shortly outlined above, these three fun-
damental tasks of the FRA correspond to the respective tasks characterizing the model of 
simple regulatory agencies or information agencies, which have no power to issue legal acts30. 
However, in the next chapter it will be seen whether or not the opinions of FRA are capable 
of influencing the European decision-making process. 
  
 
4. From the multilevel cooperation to the Agency’s legal basis 
At this point of the Preamble, from Recital (16) onwards the focus of the regulation concerns 
the Agency’s multilevel cooperation and collaboration. Therefore, the Agency should “closely 
work with all relevant institutions as well as the bodies, offices and agencies of the Communi-
ty and the Union in order to avoid duplication, in particular regarding the future European In-
stitute for Gender and Equality”. Secondly, in order to achieve a better cooperation between 
the Agency and the Member States, the 17th Recital provides that each Member State should 
nominate National Liaison officers who are informed by the Agency with regards to its re-
ports and other documents. This Recital was absent in the Commission proposal 2005 and is 
likely the result of the Member States’ concern as regards to the role they played within the 
commission proposal. Thirdly, and perfectly aligned with the recommendations made by the 
PACE in the Resolution 1427 (2005), the Agency has also to carry out a close collaboration 
with the Council of Europe in order to avoid any overlap between the activities of the Agency 
and those of the Council of Europe. This could be better achieved by “elaborating mecha-
nisms to ensure complementarity and added value, such as the conclusion of a bilateral coop-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 “Consultative commissions tend to have a very broad membership, with participation from many segments 
of society. While they have the authority to both protect and promote human rights, not all may investigate indi-
vidual complaints. Consultative commissions tend to focus on advising the Government on major human rights 
issues and reporting on particularly significant problems. They can only make recommendations and tend to have 
broad research and advisory mandates across the full range of human rights recognized by the State, but do not 
generally have the authority to entertain or investigate individual complaints”. See National Human Rights Institu-
tions, History, Principle, Roles and Responsabilities, United Nations, New York and Geneva 2010. Available at http://-
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PTS-4Rev1-NHRI_en.pdf. 
30 See the taxonomy in A. Orator, Empowering European Agencies: Perspectives and limits of European democratic legiti-
macy, in H. Eberhard et al. (eds), Perspectives and Limits of Democracy, Proceedings of the 3rd Vienna Workshop on Interna-
tional Constitutional Law (Nomos Facultas 2008), 23. 
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eration agreement”31 and by ensuring the participation of an independent person appointed by 
the Council of Europe in the Management Board of the Agency with voting rights (Recital 
(18)). Finally, a further step to ensure good cooperation at different levels is the promotion of 
a dialogue with the civil society and working closely with non-governmental organisations and 
with institutions of civil society committed to fundamental rights matters. To this purpose, the 
Agency has to set up a cooperation network called the “Fundamental Rights Platform” fa-
vouring a structured and fruitful dialogue and close cooperation with all relevant stakeholders 
(Recital (19)). 
With regards to the structure of the Agency, the Preamble mentions only the Management 
Board composed by independent experts who are appointed by each Member State according 
to the criteria drawn up in the Paris Principles32 and in the Scientific Committee setup, in or-
der to ensure the high level work of the Agency (Recitals (20) (21)).  
Always in light of the Paris principles, the Recital (23), recognizing the importance of role 
performed by the European Parliament’s in the field of fundamental rights, calls for the in-
volvement of such institutions in the activities of the Agency, in the adoption of the Agency’s 
MAF and in the selection of the candidates proposed as Director of the Agency33. However, 
the Commission Proposal 2005 envisaged that the Parliament could also appoint an inde-
pendent person as a member of the Management Board of the Agency. This provision is 
omitted in the current regulation that attributes more relevance to the presence of an inde-
pendent person appointed by the Council of Europe and of two representatives of the Euro-
pean Commission in the Management Board.  
The Agency must have, indeed, a legal personality and succeed the EUMC with regards to 
not only its activities and work but also to all legal obligations, financial commitments or lia-
bilities carried out by the Centre or agreements made by the Centre, as well as the employ-
ment contracts with the staff of the Centre. It also envisages the participation of Candidate 
countries and countries where a Stabilisation and Association agreement has been concluded. 
This opportunity offers these countries to be supported in their efforts towards European in-
tegration. Especially “facilitating a gradual alignment of their legislation with Community law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 FRA Founding Regulation, Recital (18), Preamble. 
32 See Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles) Adopted by General As-
sembly resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993. Available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalIn-
terest/Pages/StatusOfNationalInstitutions.aspx. 
33 The FRA is one of the 13 Agencies, which were established without an involvement of the European Par-
liament as co-legislator. According to art. 308 TEC, the European Parliament had played only a consultative role 
in the founding procedure. However, it is worthy to note that among these 13 Agencies, exceptionally FRA is 
one of the four Agencies whose founding regulation provides parliamentary hearings for candidates proposed as 
its Director. This is probably due to the prominent role played by the European Parliament in the field of fun-
damental rights protection. See M. Scholten, The Political Accountability of EU and US Independent Regulatory Agencies, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014), 72, 74. 
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as well as the transfer of know-how and good practice” 34. 
Interestingly, Recitals (30) and (31) are identical to the respective Recitals laid down in the 
Commission proposal with regards to the legal basis for establishing the Agency and the sub-
sidiarity-proportionality test. In doing so, the regulation remains silent with regards to the crit-
icisms that the Council of Europe arose upon these provisions. In fact, alike the Commission 
proposal, the current regulation chooses as legal basis for the creation of the Agency the art. 
308 TEC that follows as 
“If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the 
appropriate measures”35. 
As a consequence, Recital (31) states that 
“The contribution made by the Agency to ensuring full respect of fundamental rights 
in the framework of Community law is likely to help achieve the Community's objectives. 
With regard to the adoption of this Regulation, the Treaty does not provide for powers 
other than those set out in Article 308”36. 
However, at the time of the adoption of this regulation fundamental rights were not consid-
ered among the objectives of the European Community37 and both the Commission proposal 
and the current regulation do not provide explanations with respect to what the treaty objec-
tives of the Agency should have fostered.  
Even the subsidiarity and proportionality principles are subjected to the same treatment.  
The regulation justifies its compliance with the principle of subsidiarity by explaining: “the 
provision of comparable and reliable information and data at European level cannot be fully 
achieved by the Member States”38. Effectively, at the time of the establishment of the Agency 
not all the Member States had set up NHRIs able to assist them in protecting fundamental 
rights at national level. However, all the EU Member States were already engaged with fun-
damental rights within the system of the Council of Europe and by participating in the activi-
ties of other international organizations. Therefore, at the time of the Commission proposal 
the Council of Europe and some Member States considered such argument as lacking in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 FRA Founding Regulation, Recital (28), Preamble. 
35 Art. 308 TEC (now 352 TFEU), 
36 FRA Founding Regulation, Recital (31), Preamble. 
37 See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996], E.C.R. I-01759.  
38 FRA Founding Regulation, Recital (30), Preamble. 
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transparency and clarity as the proportionality argument39. Furthermore, it certainly has to be 
seen how this framework has reacted to the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty and the Char-
ter, with new distributions of competences and the fundamental rights among the objectives, 
which the Union has to pursue, but this matter will not be tackled in this chapter.   
 
 
Objective, Scope, Tasks and Areas of Activity 
The primary mission of the Agency is to assist the relevant European Union institutions, of-
fices, bodies and agencies and Member States “when implementing Community Law” by of-
fering advisory and expertise support in the field of fundamental rights protection. 
This objective has to be achieved by setting up specific measures within the competences 
of the Community (according to the Treaty establishing the European Community). In doing 
so, the Agency has to drive attention to fundamental rights as laid down in the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union (see art. 6(2) TEU).  
FRA’s scope of application is defined in article 3 of the current founding regulation by stat-
ing that: 
“1. The Agency shall carry out its tasks for the purpose of meeting the objective set in 
Article 2 within the competencies of the Community as laid down in the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community. 
2. The Agency shall refer in carrying out its tasks to fundamental rights as defined in 
Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union. 
3. The Agency shall deal with fundamental-rights issues in the European Union and in 
its Member States when implementing Community law”40. 
As it can noticed the final version of art. 3 does not present any reference to the EU Charter 
of fundamental rights as the Commission proposal 2005 clearly does. This is likely due to the 
ambiguous status of the Charter at the time of the establishment of the Agency. As already 
seen, the Charter was a political document until 2009 when it became legally binding along 
with the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, it might be seen as inappropriate to 
make a reference to a political source rather than a legal one in the part of the Founding Regu-
lation devoted to determine the legal basis of the Agency’s work. Furthermore, at the time of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See W. Hummer, The European Fundamental Rights Agency, in A. Reinich, U. Kriebaum (eds), The law of in-
ternational relations – Liber amicorum Hanspeter Neuhold (Eleven International Publishing 2007). D. Geradin and N. 
Petit, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform, in P. Eeck-
hout and T. Tridimas (eds), Yearbook of European law, (2005 OUP), 137,197.  
40 FRA Founding Regulation, art. 3.  
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the Commission proposal 2005, it was criticized that the draft regulation, by making reference 
to the Charter concerning the scope of the Agency’s activity, was anticipating a legal basis that 
was yet not legally binding. The European Commission’s decision to word the paragraph in 
the following way - “the Agency shall refer in carrying out its tasks to fundamental rights as 
defined in Article 6(2) of the Treaty of the European Union and as set out in particular in the 
Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union as proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 
2000” - was seen as a political signal of the Charter’s appreciation41.  
Another passage of this article presents difficulties of interpretation that are not negligible. 
The expression “when implementing Community law” in paragraph 3 does not permit a clear 
understanding of its “exact legal contours”42. Gabriel Toggenburg points out the narrow scope 
of FRA’s mandate by stating that this expression means that “any action on the part of States 
which are not related to implementing EC law are outside the Agency’s remit”. Such re-
striction is strongly related to the wording of art. 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
regarding its scope of application. However, if on one hand the Charter had not legally bind-
ing status at the time of the adoption of the FRA’s founding regulation, even after the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, as it will be seen in the next chapter, the interpretation of art. 
51 made by the European Court of Justice and by its commentators is controversial. Accord-
ingly, it is not clear if also the contours of art. 3(3) of the Agency’s regulation are as strict as 
they look. This lack of specificity certainly corresponds to a lack of certainty with regards to 
the scope of FRA’s mandate.  
Consequently, also the Agency’s tasks, as they have been defined in art. 4 of the 2007 
Council Regulation are determined in light of the same compromised logic shaping its field of 
application. This clearly appears evident when we compare the wording of art 4 in the Agen-
cy’s current founding regulation with art. 4 as drafted in the Commission proposal 2005. 
There are three major differences: the insertion of the Council of Europe among the institu-
tions which communicate to the Agency the results of their monitoring and research activities; 
the restriction of the subject matter of the Agency’s opinions and conclusions to specific the-
matic topics; the disappearance of the paragraph concerning art. 7 of the Treaty on European 
Union. In other words, the Agency retraces the model of a simple regulatory43 Agency without 
any power to issue legal acts. It is in fact responsible to “collect, record and disseminate rele-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 J.M. Schlichting and J. Pietsch, Die Europäische Grundrechte-agentur. Aufgaben – Organisation – Un-
ionskompetenz, (2005) 19 EuZW, 587, 589. 
42 COM (2005) 59 final. 
43 See A. Orator, Empowering European Agencies: Perspectives and limits of European democratic legitimacy, in H. Eber-
hard et al. (eds), Perspectives and Limits of Democracy, Proceedings of the 3rd ViennaWorkshop on International 
Constitutional Law (Schriften zum Internationalen und Vergleichenden Öffentlichen Recht, Band 4), (Nomos 
Facultas 2008), 23,40. 
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vant, objective, reliable, and comparable information and data”44. It has also to “develop 
methods and standards to improve the comparability, objectivity and reliability of data at Eu-
ropean level, in cooperation with the Commission and the Member States”45. It is responsible 
to “carry out, cooperate and encouraging scientific research and surveys, preparatory studies 
and feasibility studies, including, where appropriate and compatible with its priorities and its 
annual work programme, at the request of the European Parliament, the Council or the 
Commission”46 and “formulate and publish conclusions and opinions on specific thematic 
topics, for the Union institutions and the Member States when implementing Community law 
either on its own initiative or at request of the European parliament, the Council or the 
Commission”47. Once again the regulation uses the expression “when implementing Commu-
nity law”. The task to deliver opinions and conclusions for the relevant EU institutions and 
the Member States, as Andreas Orator has clarified, does not mean that the FRA holds “genu-
ine decision-making power”48. However, it remains uncertain the limit of the scope of the 
Agency’s activities and also it has to be established whether or not the Agency is really not in-
volved in the decision making process in its work.  
Furthermore, every year the Agency publishes an “annual report on fundamental-rights is-
sues covered by the areas of the Agency’s activity, also highlighting examples of good prac-
tice”49 as well as a number of thematic reports based on its analysis, research and surveys. Fi-
nally, the Agency is also responsible to draft and publish an annual report on its activities and 
to develop a communication strategy and promote dialogue with civil society.  
The borders of the Agency’s activity are further determined in paragraph 2 of article 4. It 
specifies that the conclusions, opinions and reports delivered by the Agency may concern 
proposals from the Commission (under 250 TEC) or positions taken by the institutions in the 
course of legislative procedures only where a request by the respective institution has been 
made. However, FRA does not deal either with the judicial review of the relevant EU institu-
tions’ acts (art. 230 TEC) or with the emergency protection measures concerning Member 
States within the meaning of article 226 (TEC).  
FRA’s areas of activity are determined in the MAF, which the Council adopts after consid-
ering the Commission’s proposal and also after consulting the EU Parliament. During the 
drafting process of the framework the Commission also has to consult the Agency’s Manage-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 FRA Founding Regulation, art. 4(a). 
45 FRA Founding Regulation, art. 4(b). 
46 FRA Founding Regulation, art. 4(c). 
47 FRA Founding Regulation, art. 4(d). 
48 A. Orator, supra note 14.  
49 FRA Founding Regulation, art. 4(e). 
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ment Board.  
The framework covers five years and defines the thematic areas of FRA’s work. Among its 
thematic areas FRA must have the fight against racism, xenophobia and related intolerance. 
The Commission’s proposal 2005 committed the Agency’s activity only with the fight against 
racism and xenophobia. By extending this area also to “related intolerance”, it is clear that the 
FRA’s margin of action is wider.   
It also has to be aligned with the EU Council and the EU Parliament’s orientations con-
cerning fundamental rights as it is expressed respectively in their resolutions and conclusions.  
The framework concerns the Agency’s financial and human resources and includes provi-
sions aimed to avoid an overlap with the remit of other community bodies, offices and Agen-
cies and with the Council of Europe – consistently with its claims and criticisms – and other 
international organizations active in the field of human rights.  
Therefore the Agency is called to implement its tasks within the thematic areas as they are 
defined in the MAF.  However, at request of the three relevant EU institutions, FRA's work 
may go beyond the thematic areas as determined in the MAF but always within EU compe-
tence50.  
Finally, the Agency has to carry out its activities according to the financial and human re-
sources available in light of its annual work program, which is the annual further implementa-
tion of the Agency’s mandate.  
  
 
Working, methods and cooperation 
How can the Agency ensure the provision of objective, reliable and comparable information? 
Certainly the FRA has to rely on the expertise of several organizations and bodies in each 
Member State and also it needs to involve national authorities in the collection of data. To this 
aim it is called to set up and coordinate information networks and use existing networks, or-
ganize meetings of external experts and set up ad hoc working parties whenever necessary.  
In doing so, the Agency has to work complementarily with the other organizations. Origi-
nally, the Commission proposal 2005 mentioned only Community and Member States’ institu-
tions, bodies, offices and agencies and the Council of Europe as well as international organiza-
tions. The final regulation is more specific. Regarding the Council of Europe, the Agency in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 G. N. Toggenburg, Fundamental Rights and the European Union: how does and how should the EU Agency for Fun-
damental Rights relate to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights? (December 2013). EUI Department of Law Research 
Paper No. 13. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368194 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2368194. See 
also G. N. Toggenburg, Exploring the Fundament of a New Agent in the Field of Rights Protection: The F(undamental) 
R(ights) A(gency) in Vienna, (2007) 8/7 EYMI, 624, 626.  
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particular has to consider the findings and activities of the Council’s of Europe monitoring 
mechanism and of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. Furthermore, 
among the international organisations, the regulation makes an explicit reference to the Or-
ganization for security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations.  
The Agency can also make contractual and sub-contractual agreements with other organi-
zations for the purpose of carrying out its tasks and can award grants to implement coopera-
tion among national, European and international organizations.  
In terms of relationships with the relevant Community bodies, offices and agencies, the 
FRA has to ensure appropriate coordination by laying down memoranda of understanding.  
Then, the final regulation modulates the Agency’s cooperation activity on three levels.  
The first is the cooperation with organizations at Member States and international level. A 
close cooperation with each member state should be granted by nominating a National Liai-
son Officer who is a government official appointed by the Member State. The National Liai-
son Officer is the main contact point for the Agency in the Member State and this Officer can 
submit opinions on the draft Annual Work Programme to the Director prior to its submission 
to the Management Board. At the same time, the Agency has to communicate to the National 
Liaison Officers all documents that have been drafted. More generally, the Agency has to co-
operate with governmental organizations and public bodies in the field of fundamental rights 
in the Member States including national human rights institutions. Finally, among the other 
international organizations it is explicitly mentioned the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE), especially the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR), the United Nations and other international organizations. These administra-
tive arrangements have to comply with Community law and have to be adopted by the Man-
agement Board on the base of the draft submitted by the Agency’s Director after the Com-
mission has delivered an opinion. If the Commission expresses its disagreement with these ar-
rangements the Management Board shall re-examine and adopt them by a two-thirds majority 
of all members.  
The second level is the cooperation with the Council of Europe. As already seen the Agen-
cy has to cooperate in its activities with the Council of Europe and in particular with regards 
to the Annual Work Programme and to the cooperation with civil society. The cooperation 
between the Agency and the Council of Europe is regulated by an agreement established by 
the Community under Article 300 TEC procedure. The agreement has to include the ap-
pointment of an independent person by the Council of Europe in the Management Board of 
the Agency and its executive Board. In the final regulation, the presence of the Council of Eu-
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rope representatives in the FRA’s internal bodies is reinforced and remarked by comparison 
with the Commission Proposal 2005. It is clear the role-played by the Council of Europe after 
the European Commission presented the proposal for a Council Regulation establishing the 
FRA influenced and shaped its final version.  
Finally, the third level is the cooperation with civil society. The cooperation with civil soci-
ety was not really developed in the Commission proposal 2005. Rather, in the current regula-
tion the cooperation with civil society and the establishment of a Fundamental Rights Plat-
form, it is more articulated and defined. In other words, the Agency has to cooperate with 
non-governmental organizations and with institutions of the civil society working in the field 
of fundamental rights and combating racism and xenophobia at national, European or interna-
tional level. To this aim, the FRA is responsible to set up a cooperation network under the au-
thority of the Director – Fundamental Rights Platform (hereinafter FR Platform) – composed 
of non-governmental organizations dealing with human rights, trade unions and employer’s 
organizations, relevant social and professional organizations, churches, religious, philosophical 
and non-confessional organizations, universities and other qualified experts of European and 
international bodies and organizations. The FR Platform is a mechanism for exchanging in-
formation and sharing knowledge and ensures cooperation between the Agency and the 
stakeholders. All interested and qualified stakeholders dealing with fundamental rights can 
participate in the Platform. The Agency can request the FR Platform to make a suggestion to 
the Management Board on the Annual Work Programme to be adopted; to give feedback and 
suggest follow up to the Management Board on the annual report; to communicate outcomes 
and recommendations of conferences, seminars and meetings relevant to the work of the 




The Agency’s structure is organized in four bodies: the Management Board, the executive 
board, the scientific committee and the Director. In the Commission proposal 2005, the scien-
tific committee was not included among the Agency’s bodies. Rather the Fundamental Rights 
Forum (now Fundamental Rights Platform) was considered as an Agency’s body. As seen 
previously in the final regulation, the Fundamental Rights Platform is the mechanism set up to 
implement the third level of the FRA’s cooperation activities between the Agency and the civil 
society.  
The Management Board is composed of highly qualified persons in the field of fundamental 
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rights and the management of public or private sector organizations. The Management Board 
is composed of 28 independent persons appointed by each Member State, one independent 
person appointed by the Council of Europe and two representatives of the Commission. 
Once again, in the final regulation there is no reference of an independent person appointed 
by the European Parliament as it was in the Commission proposal 2005. Each member of the 
Management Board has an alternate member as its representative appointed by the same pro-
cedure. 
The term of their office last five years and is not renewable. Their office can end before 
five years only if the members resign or if they do not meet the criteria of independence51.  
Among its functions, the Management Board is responsible to elect the Chairperson and 
the Vice-Chairperson and the other two members of the executive Board among its members. 
It also should be the Agency’s planning and monitoring body accountable for:  
1. Adopting the Agency’s Annual Work Programme in accordance with the MAF. The 
Agency’s Director submits to the Management Board a draft of the Annual Work Pro-
gramme after the Commission and the Scientific Committee have delivered an opinion on 
it. The Annual Work program also has to be transmitted to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission;  
2. Adopting annual reports and comparing them with the objectives of the Annual Work 
Programme. The Scientific committee has to be consulted before adopting the annual re-
port on fundamental-rights issues. Finally, the reports have to be transmitted not later 
than 15 June to the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Court of 
Auditors, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
gions;   
3.  Appointing and dismissing the Agency’s Director in case of necessity; 
4.  Adopting the annual draft and final budgets of the Agency; 
5. Exercising the powers conferred on appointing authority by the Staff Regulations of offi-
cials of the European Communities and on the authority entitled to conclude contracts by 
the Conditions of Employment according to Article 24(2) of the Founding Regulation in 
respect of Director and disciplinary authority over the Director; 
6.  Drafting an annual estimate of expenditure and revenue for the Agency and deliver it to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 In the second case, the member of the Management Board has the duty to inform the Commission and the 
Director of the Agency. Then “The party concerned shall appoint a new member or a new alternate member for 
the remaining term of office. The party concerned shall also appoint a new member or a new alternate member 
for the remaining term of office, if the Management Board has established, based on a proposal of one third of 
its members or of the Commission, that the respective member or alternate member no longer meets the criteria 
of independence. Where the remaining term of office is less than two years, the mandate of the new member or 
alternate member may be extended for a full term of five years”. FRA Founding Regulation 2007, art 12 (4).  
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the Commission; 
7. Adopting the Agency's rules of procedure on the basis of the draft submitted by the Di-
rector after the Commission, the Scientific Committee and the independent appointed by 
the Council of Europe have delivered an opinion; 
8.  Adopting the financial rules applicable to the Agency on the basis of the draft submitted 
by the Director after the Commission has delivered an opinion; 
9. Adopting the necessary measures to implement the Staff Regulations of officials of the 
European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other servants of the Eu-
ropean Communities; 
10. Adopting the arrangements on transparency and access to documents; 
11. Appointing and revoking the members of the Scientific Committee; 
12. Establishing that a member or an alternate member of the Management Board no longer 
meets the criteria of independence. 
13. The Management Board may delegate its responsibilities to the Executive Board only 
concerning the preparation of the annual estimate of expenditure and revenue for the 
Agency, the adoption of the necessary measures to implement the staff regulation of offi-
cials of the European Communities and the Condition of Employment of other servants 
of the European communities and of the arrangements on transparency and access to 
documents. 
14. Decisions by the Management Board are taken by a simple majority of the votes cast on-
ly regarding the preparation of the annual estimate of expenditure and revenue for the 
Agency, the adoption of the final rules applicable to the Agency on the basis of the draft 
submitted by the Director, the adoption of the necessary measures to implement the staff 
regulation of officials of the European Communities and the Condition of Employment 
of other servants of the European communities and of the arrangements on transparency 
and access to documents. With regards to other matters, the Management Board requires 
two-thirds majority of its members vote. Furthermore, the decisions related to which in-
ternal language has to be adopted require the voting unanimity of the Management 
Board. Each member of the Management Board, or in his or her absence his or her alter-
nate, have one vote. The Chairperson has the casting vote. With regards to the person 
appointed by the Council of Europe, he or she may vote on decisions referred to the 
adoption of the Annual Work Program, the annual reports and the appointment and the 
revocation of the members of the Scientific Committee.  
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The Chairperson convenes the Management Board twice a year. In case of extraordinary 
meetings, the Chairperson convenes them on his or her own initiative or at the request of at 
least one third of the members of the Management Board. 
The meetings of the Management Board are also open to specific observers as the Chair-
person or Vice-Chairperson of the Scientific Committee and the Director of the European In-
stitute for Gender Equality. The Executive Board can also invite to attend the meeting the Di-
rectors of other relevant Community agencies and Union bodies as well as of other interna-
tional bodies mentioned in the regulation. 
The Chairperson, the Vice-Chairperson and two members of the Management Board elect-
ed by the Management Board and one of the two representatives of the Commission in the 
Management Board compose the Executive Board. It is also worth noting that the person ap-
pointed by the Council of Europe in the Management Board can participate in the meetings of 
the Executive Board. This is another addition, which shows how the concerns expressed by 
the Council of Europe affected the final version of the Regulation. The Executive Board sup-
ports the Management Board activities and has been convened by the Chairperson whenever 
necessary to prepare the decisions of the Management Board and to assist and advise the Di-
rector.  
The scientific committee was not properly regulated in the commission proposal 2005. Rather, 
the current founding regulation devotes to it art. 14. This Agency’s body should guarantee the 
scientific quality of the Agency’s work. It is composed of eleven independent persons highly 
qualified in the field of fundamental rights. The Management Board appoints them, after hav-
ing consulted a committee of the EU Parliament throughout a procedure consisted of a call 
for applications and a selection process. However, the Members of the Management Board 
cannot be members of the scientific committee. The scientific committee is formed ensuring a 
balanced geographical representation. The term of the office of its members is five years and 
it is not renewable. The members of the scientific committee can be replaced only on their 
own request and in case they are not anymore able to fulfil their duties. In case a member of 
the scientific committee does not meet the criteria of independence, he or she has to inform 
the Commission and the Director of the Agency. Otherwise, one third of the Members of the 
Commission or of the Management Board can revoke one of the members of the scientific 
committee by declaring a lack of independence. In this case the Management Board has to re-
appoint a new member of the committee. The scientific committee elects its Chairperson and 
Vice-chairperson for a term of office of one year.  The Director involves the scientific com-
mittee in the preparation of documents concerning the collection and analysis of reliable and 
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comparable information data, the development of methods and standards of analysis and 
comparability, carrying out and cooperating with and encouraging scientific research, surveys, 
preparatory studies and feasibility studies, the formulation and publication of conclusions and 
opinions on specific thematic topics, the publication of the annual reports, the thematic re-
ports, the development of a communication strategy and the promotion of a dialogue with the 
civil society. The scientific committee pronounces itself by a two third majority and the Chair-
person convenes it four times per year. The Chairperson launches a written procedure or con-
venes extraordinary meetings on his or her own initiative or at request of at least four mem-
bers of the Scientific Committee. 
The Agency’s director is appointed for a term of office of five years by the Management 
Board on the basis of its experiences and merits in the field of fundamental rights and his or 
her administrative and management skills. The Director is selected on the basis of a list draft-
ed by the Commission after a call for candidates. Before making the appointment the candi-
dates must address the Council and the competent European Parliament Committee. Then 
the EU Parliament and the Council of the EU deliver their opinion and their preference. Fi-
nally, the Management Board appoints the Director taking into account these opinions. 
Nine months before the end of the Director’s office, the Commission evaluates the per-
formance of the Director and the Agency’s duties and requirements in the coming years. The 
Management Board, on the proposal of the Commission and taking into account the evalua-
tion report, can extend the term of office of the Director once and not for more than three 
years. It also has to inform the European parliament and the Council about its intention to ex-
tend the Director’s mandate. This is the case of the current Director of the FRA, Morten 
Kjaerum, who was appointed in 2008 after having been the founding Director of the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, Denmark’s national human rights institution. After five years of 
mandate, his office was extended for other three years by decision of the Management Board 
and it will end in June 2015.  
The Director’s accountability concerns the preparation and publication of documents in 
accordance to art. 4 of the regulation, the preparation and implementation of the Agency’s 
annual work program, all staff matters, administrative matters, the implementation of the 
Agency’s budget, the implementation of the effective monitoring and evaluation procedure re-
lating to the performance of the Agency (the Director shall report annually to the Manage-
ment Board regarding the findings of this monitoring system), the cooperation with the Na-
tional Liaison Officers, the cooperation with civil society, including coordination of the Fun-
damental Rights Platform. The Director performs his or her tasks independently and he or 
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she can be convened by the Parliament or by the Council to attend a hearing on any matter 
linked to the Agency’s activities. Finally, the director can participate in the executive board 




The FRA is an independent Agency that carries out its tasks in complete independence (See 
independent Regulatory Agencies). 
The members of its bodies (Management Board, Executive Board, Scientific Committee, 
Director) are called to act in the public interest. Therefore, they formalized this commitment 
through a statement of interests to be published on the Agency’s website. They draft the 
statement when they take their office and revise it in case their interests were changed.   
Concerning the Agency’s activities, they are covered by the principles of transparency and 
openness under the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 
May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents52. After the 
launch of the Agency, the Management Board had six months for implementing these princi-
ples by adopting specific rules, which include: the openness of meetings, the publication of the 
work of the Agency, including the work of the scientific committee, and arrangements to im-
plement the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 
2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents53. With regards 
to the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 and according to art. 195 and art. 230 TEC, when the 
Agency is acting under art. 8 it is possible to lodge a complaint with Ombudsman or to appeal 
to the European Court of Justice against the Agency 54.  
The Agency’s activity is also covered by the Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Par-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council. 
53 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents. 
54 Article 8 of the regulation entitled “Processing of confirmatory applications” states 
1. A confirmatory application shall be handled promptly. Within 15 working days from registration of such 
application, the institution shall either grant access to the document requested and provide access in accordance 
with Article 10 within that period or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal. In the 
event of a total or partial refusal, the institution shall inform the applicant of the remedies open to him or her, 
namely instituting court proceedings against the institution and/or making a complaint to the Ombudsman, un-
der the conditions laid down in Articles 230 and 195 of the EC Treaty, respectively. 
2. In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a very long document or to a 
very large number of documents, the time limit provided for in paragraph 1 may be extended by 15 working 
days, provided that the applicant is notified in advance and that detailed reasons are given. 
3. Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time limit shall be considered as a negative reply 
and entitles the applicant to institute court proceedings against the institution and/or make a complaint to the 
Ombudsman, under the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty. 
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liament and the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. 
 Finally, according to art. 195 TEU, the Ombudsman supervises the administrative activi-
ties of the Agency. Since its establishment in 2007, the Agency has been lodged with the Om-
budsman eight times and the Ombudsmen closed three cases involving claims against the 
FRA concerning Administration and Staff Regulations and Institutional and policy matters55. 
 
 
Budget and staff 
The Agency every year draws up estimates of all of its revenue and expenditure, which are in-
cluded in its budget. According to art. 20 (2) of the Founding Regulation, the budget shall dis-
play a balance between the revenue and the expenditure of the Agency. The Agency’s revenue 
includes a subsidy from the Community recorded in the general budget of the European Un-
ion (Commission Section) but it can also consider other resources. According to the legislative 
financial statement, included in the Commission proposal 2005, the financial planning envis-
aged a subsidy amounting to approximately € 16 million for the year 2007 that would have 
gradually been increased until 2013 to the amount of € 29 million56. However, although the 
Agency was established in 2007, it was not fully operational until 2008. According to the gen-
eral budget of the European Union for the financial year 200857 - within the section devoted 
to the European Commission – the Agency commences its mandate counting on a subsidy 
amounting of € 15 million58.  
When the Agency draws up its annual budgetary record, the revenue may have in addition 
the account of the payments received for services rendered in the framework of the imple-
mentations of the Agency’s tasks (art.4) and a financial contribution from international organ-
izations, the candidate countries and the Member States (articles 8, 9 and 28); while the Agen-
cy’s expenditure has to include staff remuneration, administrative and infrastructure costs and 
operating expenses.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55Decision of the European Ombudsman on complaint 2209/2007/VIK against the European Union Agen-
cy for Fundamental Rights, 20/05/2008; Decision of the European Ombudsman concerning complaint 
1933/2011/DK against the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 25/01/2012; Decision of the Eu-
ropean Ombudsman closing the inquiry into complaint 565/2012/ER against the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, 02/04/2014. Available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu. 
56 Indicative financial planning should have been as follows: Budget 2007: €16 million; 2008: €20 million; 
2009: €21 million; 2010: €23 million; 2011: €26 million; 2012: €28 million; 2013: €29 million. 
57 Final adoption of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2008 (2008/165/EC, 
Euratom), http://eur-lex.europa.eu. See also Statement of revenue and expenditure of the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights for the financial year 2008, http://fra.europa.eu. 
58 The current amount of the FRA’s subsidy for the year 2014 is € 21 million.  
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Each year the Director is responsible to draw up a draft that the Management Board 
should take as a point of reference in order to output an estimate of revenue and expenditure 
for the Agency for the following financial year. Then, the Management Board delivers the es-
timate to the Commission by the 31st of March at the latest. The Commission transmits the 
estimate to the European Parliament and to the EU Council with a first draft budget of the 
European Union (art. 272 TEC). In fact, the Commission consolidates in a first draft of the 
general budget of the Union, the estimates it has received from each EU institution and as-
sesses those considered relevant for the establishment plan and the amount of the subsidy to 
be charged to the general budget.  Finally, it is the EU Council and the Parliament, as budget-
ary authorities that approve the appropriation of the subsidy and adopt the Agency’s estab-
lishment plan.  
At this stage of the process, the Management Board shall adopt the Agency’s budget that 
becomes final after the adoption of the general budget of the European Union. It also shall 
report to the Parliament and the EU Council together – as much as it shall inform the Com-
mission - its intention to implement projects, which can be relevant for the funding of the 
Agency’s budget (i.e. projects involving the rental or the purchase of buildings). In this case, 
the budgetary authority can deliver an opinion to the Management Board within six weeks 
from the date of notification of the project. 
The director is accountable for implementing the Agency’s budget. The Agency has an ac-
counting officer who, by the 1st of March of each financial year, will report to the Commis-
sion’s accounting officer the provisional accounts of the FRA along with a report on the 
budgetary and financial management for the year. The provisional accounts will be consolidat-
ed by the Commission’s accounting Officer along with other provisional accounts supplied by 
the EU institutions (art. 128 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/200259). By 31st 
of March following each financial year, the provisional accounts of the Agency, along with a 
report on the budgetary and financial management for that financial year, are transmitted by 
the Commission’s accounting Officer to the Court of Auditors. The report must be also 
transmitted to the EU Council and to the Parliament. After having received the Court of Au-
ditor’s observation (art. 129 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002), it is the 
Director who is in charge of drafting the final accounts under his own responsibility and send-
ing them to the Management Board for its opinion. The Director will then deliver the final ac-
counts along with the Management Board’s opinion to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Commission and the Court of Auditors by the 1st of July of each financial year. The final 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable 
to the general budget of the European Communities.  
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accounts are then published. The Director also must reply to the Court of Auditors observa-
tions - by the 30th of September - and to the Management Board. At request of the European 
Parliament, the Director has to provide any information in order to facilitate the application of 
the discharge procedure for the financial year in question (art. 146 (3) of Council Regulation 
(EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002). Finally, on recommendation of the EU Council acting by a 
qualified majority, the EU Parliament – before the 30th of April of year N+2, gives discharge 
to the Director with regards to the implementation of the budget for year N. The Manage-
ment Board adopts the financial rules applicable to the Agency after having consulted the 
Commission60.  
The financial management of the Agency is supervised by the European Anti-Fraud Office 
under the Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning in-
vestigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)61. In order to be aligned with the 
public financial interests of the Union, the Agency has also to accede to the Inter-institutional 
Agreement of 25 May 199962 and has to communicate to the OLAF the provisions set up in 
order to implement the agreement and apply it to the entire staff. In order to guarantee the ef-
fectiveness of this financial control mechanism, each decision involving funding and the im-
plementing agreements and instruments resulting from them, must specify that in the event it 
is necessary, the Court of Auditors and OLAF may investigate on the recipients of the Agen-
cy’s funding and the staff responsible for allocating it63.  
The Agency has a legal personality enjoying the legal capacity that each of the Member 
State provide under their law. The Agency is represented by its Director and it legally succeeds 
the EUMC honouring the employment contracts concluded before the adoption of the Regu-
lation and maintaining as its headquarters the location of the Centre (Vienna).  
The Agency’s staff and its Director are subjected to the rules set up in the Staff Regulations 
of officials of the European Communities, in the Conditions of Employment of other serv-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The Management Board must consult and obtain the Commission’s consent also in the event they depart 
from the Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 only if necessary for the Agency’s operation (art. 21(11) 
Founding Regulation). 
61 Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concern-
ing investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 
62 Inter-institutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union and the Commission of the European Communities concerning internal investigations by the Euro-
pean Anti-fraud Office (OLAF). 
63 Interestingly, on 24 July 2014 the European Ombudsman Emily O’Reilly (pictured) has asked the Europe-
an Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to explain to a whistle blower why it closed its investigation into alleged irregulari-
ties in a EU Agency. OLAF opened an investigation, but then closed the case and refused to tell the whistle 
blower the reasons. The Ombudsman has asked OLAF to reply to her recommendation by 28 February 2014. 
O’Reilly said: “OLAF may well have good reasons for closing its investigation, but it should explain its decision 
to the whistle blower. All EU institutions should encourage and support people who help them to identify and 
tackle problems that could weaken citizens’ trust in the EU. OLAF’s position in this case is discouraging for 
whistle blowers”. See http://www.eureporter.co; http://www.neurope.eu. 
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ants of the European Communities and to the rules adopted jointly by the European Com-
munity institutions for the purpose of applying these staff Regulations and Conditions of Em-
ployment64. It is indeed the Management Board, according to the European Commission, that 
is responsible to adopt the necessary implementing measures by referring to article 110 of the 
Staff regulation of officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of other servants 
of the European Communities. It can also adopt measures with the purpose to employ national 
experts on secondment from Member States65 at the Agency. 
Regarding language arrangements, the Agency is subjected to the provisions of the Regula-
tion No 1 of 15 April 195866. In the final FRA’s Regulation is also inserted a new paragraph 
empowering the Management Board to decide the internal language arrangements for the 
Agency. Furthermore, as for the other EU Bodies, the Agency uses the translation services 
provided by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union. The Agency is also 
subject to the Protocol on the privileges and Immunities of the European Communities.  
The European Court of Justice has the jurisdiction in disputes concerning contractual liability 
of the Agency only if the contracts in question include an arbitration clause providing it. Fur-
thermore, the Court has jurisdiction in the case of non-contractual liability of the Agency, by 
finding the right compensation for individuals or Member States victims of damages on behalf 
of FRA. Finally, the legality of the Agency’s acts is subjected to the judicial review of the EU 
Court of Justice under article 230 TEC as well as it is possible to bring action before the Court of 
Justice for establishing an infringement of the Treaties by the EU institutions under art. 232 TEC.  
 
 
General and Final Provisions 
Among the general provisions, art. 28 of the FRA’s founding regulation deals with the “Partic-
ipation and scope in respect of candidate countries and countries with which a Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement has been concluded”.  It is worth noting that, in the Council regu-
lation 2007, the role of the Agency concerning the participation of the candidate countries is 
softened and restricted. A first evidence of this is provided in the title of the article. In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf. 
65 According to the Commission proposal the previous EUMC had a staff of 31 persons and the Agency 
should have commenced its mandate in 2007 by extending this number to 52 members. It was provided that the 
number of the Agency’s staff should have increased every year according to the following schedule and corre-
spondingly to the financial planning until the number of 100 staff member was reached for the year 2013. Cur-
rently, the Agency has 90 members of staff and it started its mandate in 2007 with 46 members. 
66 The Regulation has been amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 920/2005 of 13 June 2005 amending 
Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 determining the language to be used by the European Economic Community, 
and Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 determining the language to be used by the European Atomic Energy 
Community and introducing temporary derogation measures from those Regulations. 
	   81 
Commission proposal 2005 the article is entitled as follows: “Participation of candidate or po-
tential candidate countries”. In the final version the expression “participation and scope in re-
spect of…” is inserted. Therefore, considering the wording of the title of art. 28, it can be no-
ticed an emphasis on the scope of the Agency’s work that was not there in the proposal. A se-
cond evidence of this restrictive approach is also detected in the wording of paragraph 1. If in 
the Commission proposal 2005 the role of the Agency with respect to candidate countries was 
clearly linked to the accession negotiations, in the final version of paragraph 1 it is just stated 
“The Agency shall be open to the participation of candidate countries as observers”67. Para-
graph 2 specifies that the relevant Association Council has to determine whether or not a 
country can participate and the modalities of participation to the Agency. In accordance with 
the wording of the final regulation 2007, the Association Council has to define how the candi-
date countries will participate in the Agency’s work in Recital of articles 4 and 5 of the regula-
tion, and of the provisions concerning the participation in initiatives commenced by the 
Agency, the financial contribution and the staff. Compared to the Commission proposal 2005, 
the final regulation no longer mentions the fact that the Association Council, among other 
things, should “specify the expertise and assistance to be offered to the country in question”68. 
The paragraph is mainly focused on the modalities of participation of the candidate countries 
to the Agency rather than the contribution that the Agency may offer to them. This wording is 
a consequence of the final version of articles 4 and 5. As already seen, these articles no longer 
include a reference to article 7 TEU and to the possible field of activities of the Agency in this 
area. Therefore, the relationship between the Agency and the candidate countries is strongly 
limited to a mere participation of the latter to the Agency’s activities leaving apart the idea that 
the Agency may be a fundamental instrument at the service of the EU enlargement. In fact, 
the relevant Association Council has to indicate that the candidate country can appoint an in-
dependent person as observer to the Management Board without a right to vote69. At the 
same time, the Agency is called to deal with fundamental rights in a respective country within 
the scope of article 3(1), in other words “within the competences of the Community as laid 
down in the Treaty establishing the European community”70. This means that the Agency 
cannot extend its monitoring activities to areas outside the first pillar competences making it 
difficult a complete assessment of the human rights performance in those countries. Finally, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Art. 28(1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Un-
ion Agency for Fundamental Rights. 
68 Art. 27(2) of the Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamen-
tal Rights COM(2005) 280 final.  
69 To this purpose, the Association Council appointing an independent person of a candidate country to the 
Agency’s management board shall be conformed to art 12(1)(a) of the founding regulation. 
70 FRA Founding Regulation Art. 3(1). 
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art. 28 provides a new paragraph according to which countries which have concluded a Stabi-
lisation and Association Agreement with the European Community, can participate in the 
Agency as observers by unanimous decision of the EU Council delivered after a proposal of 
the European Commission.  
It is clear, then, why art. 28 of the Commission proposal 2005 is omitted in the final ver-
sion of the regulation. The article provides the Agency to be empowered by the Council to ex-
tend its activities to the areas covered by Title VI of the Treaty of the European Union (for-
mer Third Pillar), a broad mandate that the final regulation was not able to achieve.  
The last part of the Council Regulation 2007 lays down the final provisions. At a first 
glance, the article devoted to specify “Transitional arrangements” is more detailed then the re-
spective article as drafted in the Commission proposal 2005 and also presents some notewor-
thy differences. First of all, the end of the term of office of the members of the Management 
Board of the EUMC is postponed to 28 February 200771. As a consequence, the new Man-
agement Board was not able to start its office on 1 January 2007 as it was in the intentions of 
the Commission Proposal 2005. The current transitional arrangements provide detailed provi-
sions with regard to the appointment of the Management Board after the entry into force of 
the Council regulation. The Commission is to be the supervisor of the appointing procedure. 
Consequently, when the regulation becomes legally binding, the Commission has to receive, 
within four months, from the Member States the names of their independent persons quali-
fied to be members of the Management Board. Once the Management Board is formed, it will 
start the procedure to appoint the Director of the Agency. In case the Management Board is 
still not formed, the Commission can appoint an interim Management Board whose members 
are members of the EUMC Management Board appointed by Member States, the Council of 
Europe and the European Commission. Finally, the Agency shall carry out its activities con-
cerning the area of racism and xenophobia until the adoption of the MAF.  
Another interesting passage of the final previsions is art. 30 of the Agency’s founding regu-
lation. The article provides that “not later than 31 December 201172, the Agency shall com-
mission an independent external evaluation of its achievements during the first five years of 
operations on the basis of terms of reference issued by the Management Board in agreement 
with the Commission”. The evaluation has to consider not only the tasks, the practices, the 
financial implications and the synergy aspects of the Agency, but also the possibility to modify 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 In the Commission Proposal 2005 the end of the office of the members of the Management Board of the 
EUMC was 31 December 2006. The new Management Board should have started its term of office on 1 January 
2007. 
72 Also in this case the data is postponed. In the commission proposal 2005 provided that the external evalua-
tion should have been commissioned not later then December 2009.  
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its scope and activities and structure taking also into account the assessments of the stake-
holders at national and Community level. The external evaluation report was indeed commis-
sioned to the Ramboll Management Consulting and presented in November 201273. After the 
presentation of the conclusions of the report, the Management Board is called to assess them 
and to deliver recommendations to the Commission that will send the evaluation report and 
those recommendations to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions and divulge them. After the evaluation report 




At the end of this analysis of the Agency’s Founding Regulation, some conclusions might tak-
en on each of its elements, such as its legal basis or its budgetary planning. However, this is 
not the intention. Rather, in light of the comparison that has been conducted between the 
Commission proposal and the current regulation, an outline of which are the most relevant 
changes that the Funding Regulations presents will be given.  
The first relevant difference is related to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. As point-
ed out, the role of the Charter in the final regulation is softened. Since in 2007 the Charter was 
in a “limbo” status, it could not be an effective instrument for shaping Agency’s regulation 
with respect to its scope and activities. Therefore, the non-legally binding status of the Charter 
was one of the difficulties that this regulation had to tackle.  
The second difference is the absence of any reference to Title VI of the Treaty of the Eu-
ropean Union (former Third Pillar). The FRA is one of the former First Pillar Agencies estab-
lished under art. 308 TEC. As a consequence, the Agency cannot carry out its activities in po-
lice and judicial cooperation areas in criminal matters, since such matters were contained in a 
separate intergovernmental "Third Pillar" in the Treaty on European Union. 
Finally, it has been omitted the provision for the EU Council to request the Agency’s tech-
nical expertise “in the context of proceedings commenced under article 7 of the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union”.  
In summary, the most significant changes presented in the final regulation are related to the 
Agency’s foundational and internal competences, which are strongly restricted and limited. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ramboll (2012), External evaluation of the European Union Agency for fundamental rights. Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-external_evaluation-final-report.pdf. 
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However, it will be seen in the next chapter that this restricted mandate is now challenged by 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter. 
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CHAPTER III 
Theory into Practice: an analysis of the Fundamental Rights 
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After having outlined the origins of the FRA’s establishment and the complexity of its 
founding regulation, the present chapter will analyse the activities, which it has carried out 
from 2007 until now. The goal of this inquiry is to point out whether the FRA has been 
working within the limits of its scope as specified in its statute and in the MAF or whether 
it has been acting outside of its competences. As we have pointed out in the previous chap-
ter, when the founding regulation deals with the scope of the FRA’s action, it uses the 
same wording as art. 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. This re-
semblance means on the one hand that the Charter had a certain impact on the drafting of 
the FRA’s statute even though at that time it was not legally binding, and, on the other 
hand, that the Agency’s scope was shaped according to the same spirit of subsidiarity of 
art. 51 of the Charter. Yet, according to the explanations relating to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights the meaning of art. 51 must be interpreted in accordance with ECJ ju-
risprudence. However, as we will see, the ECJ’s case law as highlighted by the Charter’s of-
ficial explanations, and also by the jurisprudence developed after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the Charter, shows that the contours of the field of application of EU 
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fundamental rights are quite rocking. Therefore, even though there is no direct impact of 
the ECJ case law on the Agency’s scope, our inquiry will take account of the Agency’s ac-
tivities in light of the clear similarity between art. 51 of the Charter and art. 3 of the FRA’s 
statute. After having observed the Agency’s scope in practice, it will be argued that its lim-
its are subject to the same rocking that characterized the field of application of art. 51 of 
the Charter.  
 
 
The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union, the subsidiarity principle, 
and European Union human rights law: between European Union competences and 
the scope of application of fundamental rights 
Before analysing its activities, the relationship between the FRA and the principle of sub-
sidiarity will be briefly sketched. This principle can be considered in a wide sense as “a 
preference for governance at the most local level consistent with achieving government’s 
stated purposes”1 and also in a more narrow sense as laid down according to the EU con-
stitutional framework. We can thereby look at the FRA through both these lenses.  
As regards its narrow sense, the EC Treaty2 has defined the principle of subsidiarity in 
its art. 5(2) (now 5(3) TEU): 
“In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community”3. 
According to this provision the principle of subsidiarity plays a significant role within the 
distribution of powers between the Member States and the European Community. Indeed, 
where the Community does not exercise its exclusive competences, this principle should 
provide a dynamic structure to the exercise of powers by the Community in relation to the 
Member States. However, despite this strict distribution of competences, the Community is 
equipped with another instrument, the Flexibility Clause as per art. 308 TEC (now art. 352 
TFEU), which enables the Community to take action beyond the limit of its competence if 
the objective pursued so requires. This provision thereby offers to the Community consid-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 G.A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, (1994) 
94/2 C.L. Review, 332. 
2 The formulation of art 5(1), 5(2) TEU essentially resemble the wording of art 5(2)  
3 Art. 5.2 EC (now Art. 5(3) TEU). 
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erable room for manoeuvre4 so as to “creatively” interpret and its powers in a number of 
fields. So, for example, the Community has allocated to itself powers in relation to the con-
clusion of international agreements, the granting of emergency food aid to third countries, 
and the creation of new institutions – something that has been criticized as a power grab5.   
In the previous chapter it has been showed that like most other EU agencies which 
were set up at that time of its establishment, the FRA was created on the basis of art. 308 
TEC (now Article 352 TFEU) according to the following requirements: 
“If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, 
take the appropriate measures.”6 
Notwithstanding this, the EJC in its Opinion 2/94 has clarified that whereas art. 308 has a 
broad scope it  
“cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Community powers beyond the 
general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole and, in particu-
lar, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the Community. On any view, 
Article 235 cannot be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose effect 
would, in substance, be to amend the Treaty without following the procedure which it 
provides for that purpose”7. 
The framework of art. 308 TEC clearly limits the field of action of such agencies to the EC 
competences. This means that they are not generally allowed to carry out their activities be-
yond the limits of the first pillar. However, with regards to the FRA, as the Committee on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A complete analysis of article 308 TEC and its implications are provided in European Scrutiny Commit-
tee, Article 308 of the EC Treaty (HC 2008-2009). Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk. 
5 “In a variety of fields, including, for example, conclusion of international agreements, the granting of 
emergency food aid to third countries, and creation of new institutions, the Community made use of Article 
235 in a manner that was simply not consistent with the narrow interpretation of the Article as a codification 
of implied powers doctrine in its instrumental sense. Only a truly radical and "creative" reading of the Article 
could explain and justify its usage as, for example, the legal basis for granting emergency food aid to non-
associated states. But this wide reading, in which all political institutions partook, meant that it would become 
virtually impossible to find an activity which could not be brought within the "objectives of the Treaty." This 
constituted the climax of the process of mutation and is the basis for my claim not merely that no core activi-
ty of state function could be seen any longer as still constitutionally immune from Community action (which 
really goes to the issue of absorption), but also that no sphere of the material competence could be excluded 
from the Community acting under Article 235”. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, (1991) 100 
Y.L.J., 2403.   
6 Art. 308 TEC (now Article 352 TFEU).  
7 Opinion 2/94, 28 March 1996. 
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Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Council of Europe clearly pointed out,8 , it was not 
so clear to what extent fundamental rights were parts of the EC objectives9. 
In connection with the issues concerning article 308, we also have seen that in its 2005 
proposal for the Agency’s founding regulation, the Commission found that the FRA com-
plied with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. But we have already seen that 
those reasons were not found fully satisfactory. Indeed, D. Geradin, N. Petit argues, “in a 
system characterized by subsidiarity in the field of non-exclusive competences, the creation of 
an European Agency must be justified by the fact that (i) the matter in question cannot be sat-
isfactorily addressed at the national level and (ii) the goals can be better achieved by action at 
the EC level (i.e. through the creation of a European Agency)”10.  
For this set of reasons, the creation of a new Agency has been seen by the Member 
States as increasing the Community’s central bureaucracy at the expense of subsidiarity: 
“The creation of EC agencies (this is particularly true in the field of network indus-
tries) has been seen by many as a movement towards deeper centralization, as well as a 
risk of increasing bureaucracy. Member States have therefore often opposed the crea-
tion of European regulatory agencies”11. 
Through the lens of a wide understanding of the principle of subsidiarity, we can identify an 
initial connection between this principle and the fundamental rights realm in the context of the 
EU in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The principle of subsidiarity is not simply men-
tioned in the Charter’s Preamble but it is instanced and articulated in its art. 51. It provides that 
the fundamental rights included in the Charter “are addressed to the institutions and bodies of 
the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when 
they are implementing Union law”12. Interestingly the ECJ “has never annulled any act on the 
basis of disregarding the principle of subsidiarity, nor has it established any test that would 
specify steps to be taken by the ECJ when examining observance of the principle in ques-
tion”13.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 PACE Doc. 10894 on11 April 2006. 
9 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, supra note 5.   
10 D. Geradin, N. Petit, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals 
for Reform, Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/04.  
11 ibid. 
12 Art. 51(1) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
13 J. Jira ́sek, Application of the Principle of Subsidiarity on Decision Making of the ECJ in the Area of Fundamental 
Rights Protection, Dny pra ́va – 2009 – Days of Law: the Conference Proceedings, 1, Brno: Masaryk University, 
2009. 
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However some scholars14 argue that when analysing the ECJ’s case law concerning fun-
damental rights certain aspects of this subsidiarity principle come into light. Indeed it is not 
a coincidence that the Court relies on the constitutional traditions of the Member States 
when determining the content of fundamental rights. Yet the Court’s judicial review seems 
to be severer when it reviews acts of the EU institutions than when it reviews acts of 
Member States implementing the European law or derogating from the treaties' obliga-
tions15. Carozza explains the ECJ’s attitude as follows: “There are two ways that subsidiari-
ty could be regarded as tacitly present in the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
One has to do with the sources of law that ECJ uses in reaching decisions on the content 
of EU fundamental rights, and the other involves the scope of that law’s application to the 
action of the member states”16. 
According to this wide understanding of subsidiarity, we can view the Agency’s activities 
as inspired by the principle of subsidiarity even though they have neither legal nor political 
effect. Furthermore, it is important to consider the resemblance between the formulations 
of art. 51(1) of the Charter and art. 3(3) of the FRA’s Founding Regulation: such coherence 
seems to highlight the particular view that the Agency should adopt when carrying out its 
activities in relation to Member States. Indeed, as we will see, art. 3(3) retraces in an even 
stricter way the Charter’s attitude toward Member States as enshrined in art 51(1). In other 
words, while the Agency cannot form legally binding acts, it is nonetheless the case that 
“the monitoring of the situation of fundamental rights in the Member States is indispensa-
ble for an informed exercise by the Union of its competences in the field of fundamental 




The scope of the Agency’s work and art. 51  
of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights: an inevitable analogy 
The scope of application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is determined by art. 
51. This provides that the fundamental rights included in the Charter are addressed to the 
institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 P. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a structural principle of international human rights law, (2003) 97/38, A.J.I.L., 38.  
15 D. Geradin, N. Petit, supra note 10. 
16 P. Carozza, supra note 14.  
17 O. De Schutter, V. Van Goethem, The Monitoring of Fundamental Rights in the Union as a Contribu-
tion to the European Legal Space (I): The added value of a systematic and regular monitoring of the situation 
of fundamental rights in the Member States for the evaluation of the implementation of Union laws and poli-
cies, Working paper series : REFGOV-FR-5, 2006.  
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also to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. Some authors18 ar-
gued that unlike the US federal bill of rights, which has an extensive field of application19 
irrespective of the subject matter at issues, art. 51 and its spirit of subsidiarity preclude a 
federal evolution of the Charter. Indeed, the ECJ lacks the power to review the compatibil-
ity of the national rules, which are outside the scope of the Union Law, with the EU Fun-
damental Rights. Therefore, via the wording of art. 51 the Charter is integrated in a supra-
national system entailing a multilevel system of protection of fundamental rights. The 
rights included in the Charter result from  
“the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member 
States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social 
Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case-law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the European Court of 
Human Rights”20.  
The idea to create a monitoring Agency in the field of fundamental rights and the idea to 
draft a Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union arose approximately in the 
same period. Indeed, the Charter influences in several ways the Agency’s activities and 
scope. In addition, it is worthy to note that when the Agency was effectively established in 
2007, the Charter was not yet legally binding and it had a merely declarative value. Not-
withstanding its non-legally binding status, in the same year of the Agency’s establishment 
the Charter was proclaimed for the second time and the Lisbon Treaty was signed. There-
fore, despite the fact that the Charter could not play a role as legal source for the Agency’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 X. Groussot, L. Pech, G. T. Petursson, The Scope of Application of Fundamental Rights on Member States’ Ac-
tion: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication, Eric Stein Working Paper No 1/2011. Available at 
http//ssrn.com/abstract=1936473. See also K. Lanaert, Respect for Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional Principle 
of the European Union (2000) 6/1 C.J.E.L., 21. Lord Goldsmith, The Charter of Rights – a brake not an accelerator, 
(2004) 5 E.H.R.L.R., 473. 
19 The evolution of the scope of application of the US bill of rights is synthetically explained by Grussot, 
Pech, Petursson as follows: “…in the first half of the 20th century, the US Supreme Court decided, on its own 
initiative, to incorporate the federal Bill of Rights through an expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution. … in 1925 case of Gitlow v. New York, the US Supreme Court finally 
decided that through the Fourteen Amendment, a plaintiff is entitled to rely on the right to free speech pro-
tected by the first Amendment to challenge the constitutionality of a state law which made it a crime to advo-
cate the violent overthrow of government. This came as a relative surprise as the Supreme Court initially held 
the Bill of Rights to apply only to the Federal Government, which mean that the Federal courts could not 
prevent enforcement of state laws restricting the rights guaranteed in the bill of Rights. … since Gitlow, the 
Supreme Court has allowed, on the basis of the fourteen Amendment, for the progressive expansion of the 
Federal bill of Rights’ scope of application to all states norms even when the states act within their own 
sphere of competence. Thanks to this arguably radical reinterpretation of the federal constitutional text, the 
US Supreme Court has built a unified constitutional order as regards respect for fundamental rights”. ibid. 
See also S. de Vries, U. Bernitz, S. Weatheri (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After Lisbon 
(Hart Publishing 2013). 
20 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Preamble.  
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mandate in the field of Fundamental Rights, its influence has been far from marginal. In 
particular, it is precisely with regard to the FRA’s objectives and scope that there is a rele-
vant analogy with the Charter. Art. 2 of the FRA’s founding regulation states:  
“The objective of the Agency shall be to provide the relevant institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Community and its Member States when implementing 
Community law with assistance and expertise relating to fundamental rights in order 
to support them when they take measures or formulate courses of action within their 
respective spheres of competence to fully respect fundamental rights”21. 
Yet, art. 3(3) of the Regulation provides that:  
“The Agency shall deal with fundamental-rights issues in the European Union and 
in its Member States when implementing Community law”22. 
The formulations, which are used in the FRA’s founding regulation to determine the Agen-
cy’s objectives and scope, resemble the art. 51 formulation:  
“The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the 
Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only 
when they are implementing Union law”23. 
To put it differently, the Agency has neither a legally binding power nor a decision-making 
power; given its data gathering and informative function with regard to EU fundamental 
rights, it is called to carry out its tasks in light of the same spirit of art. 51 of the Charter.  
However, as we will see, the interpretation of art. 51(1) and in particular, the meaning of 
the expression “only when they are implementing Union Law”, is not as clear. The expla-
nations relating to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are one example of this lack of a 
straightforward interpretation of this provision. In the beginning of the paragraph devoted 
to the explanation of art. 51, it is stated that “as regards the Member States, the require-
ment to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on 
the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law”. This part of the paragraph refers to 
a range of case law of the ECJ, which also include law cases of Member States’s derogation 
from EU law, under the scope of Union. However, the second part of the explanations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Council Regulation (EC) 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ L 53/14. 
22 ibid. 
23 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 51(1). 
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the paragraph concludes by quoting the Karlsson’s case, that follows a narrower interpreta-
tion of the scope of the Charter’s provisions: “it should be remembered that the require-
ments flowing from the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order are 
also binding on Member States when they implement Community rules”24 25. 
In light of the foregoing it is important to consider whether the expression “when they 
are implementing Union Law” any implications on the formulation of art. 2 and art. 3(3) of 
the FRA’s founding regulations? Compared to art. 51 of the Charter, the scope of the 
Agency’s activities is narrower for two reasons. First, the Charter has its function within 
the scope of EU law, while the Agency has to carry out its activities within the scope of EC 
law. In other words the Agency cannot deal with matters concerning the third pillar. Sec-
ondly, as Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere has commented upon, the focus of art 3(3) of 
the FRA Founding Regulation on the notion of implementation rather then on “the broader 
formulation within the scope of application of Community law seems deliberate it authorizes the exclu-
sion of cases where Member States derogate from Union law”26.  Therefore, it seems that in 
the case of the Agency, the formulation of art. 3(3) of the founding regulation not only re-
sembles the wording of art. 51 of the Charter but narrows it by using the concept of im-
plementation.  
Yet, as Dutheil de la Rochere again notes, more recent case law of the Court of Justice 
has expanded the concept of “implementation”. In the next paragraph the relevant case law 
of the Court of Justice will be examined in order to highlight this jurisprudential evolution. 
This overview will be helpful to our inquiry into the Agency’s activities, bearing in mind 
that the FRA does not deal with the compatibility of national measures implementing EU 
law with EU Fundamental Rights27 - it instead offers comparative and reliable data and in-
formation on the implementation of fundamental rights standards by the relevant EU insti-
tutions and EU Member States28.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Case C-292/97 Karlsson [2000] ECR I-2737. 
25 Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02). 
26 J. Dutheil de la Rochere, Challenges for the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU at the Time of the Entry 
into Force of the Lisbon Treaty, Fordham Int’I L. J. (2011) 33/6, 1776. 
27 See art. 4(2) FRA Founding Regulation: “The conclusions, opinions and reports… shall not deal with 
the legality of acts within the meaning of Article 230 of the Treaty or with the question of whether a Member 
State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty within the meaning of Article 226 of the Treaty”. 
28 See FRA Founding Regulation, Fourth Recital, Preamble. 
	   93 
The rocking concept of “implementation”: a glance at the Court of Justice of the 
European Union jurisprudence prior and post the Agency establishment 
The EU Court of Justice has devoted attention to the interpretation of the concept of im-
plementation in several decisions. However, its case law does not result in a simple, linear 
analysis but in an interpretation swinging over and back between a strict and a functional 
hermeneutic.29  In other words, when the ECJ’s adjudication of fundamental rights involves 
the scope of its judicial review of Member States’ acts allegedly violating Community fun-
damental rights, “the case law of the Court shows in practice a sort of sliding scale of re-
view for compliance with norms of Community fundamental rights”30 which some com-
mentators see as “consistent with the requirements of subsidiarity”31.  
The ECJ had started to shape the contours of the concept of implementation even be-
fore the entry into force of the Charter. Since the very beginning the Court has resorted to 
the concept of scope of Union law with the purpose to make clearer when national author-
ities are bound by EU fundamental rights standards. A series of decisions settled that 
Member States are bound by EU fundamental Rights standards when acting as agents of 
EU law or when derogating from EU law on public policy or other grounds as provided 
for by EU law itself32. In the following sections we will offer a short overview of the case 
law of the ECJ. To this end we do not analyse the case law using the classical distinction 
between pre-Lisbon decisions and post-Lisbon decisions, but, given that the scope of our 
present inquiry it is to reflect on the analogy between the concept of implementation as in-
terpreted by the ECJ and as applied by the FRA according to its Founding Regulation, we 
will consider the ECJ judgments before and after the Agency’s establishment.  
 
 
1. Pre Agency establishment 
Before the Agency’s establishment, the ECJ delivered a number of crucial judgments that 
attempted to clarify the contours of the scope of fundamental rights protection within the 
European Community. After having affirmed that fundamental rights were “enshrined in 
the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court”,33 the Court started 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See P. Yowell, The Justiciability of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Domestic Law of Member States in 
P.M. Huber and K. Ziegler (eds), The EU and National Constitutional Law (Richard Boorberg Verlag, 2012), 
107, 123. P. Craig. The Lisbon Treaty Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP 2011), 206, 214. 
30 P. Carozza, supra note 14. 
31 ibid.  
32 X. Groussot, L. Pech, G. T. Petursson, supra note 18. 
33 Case C-29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419. 
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to habitually review acts of the Community’s institutions in light of fundamental rights. It is 
within the dialectical relationship between supranational and national protection of funda-
mental rights, that demarking the extension of its judicial review has revealed certain chal-
lenges. In other words, the Court found it difficult to “clarify when national authorities are 
bound by EU fundamental rights standards and had recourse to the concept of scope (or 
field) of Union law”34.  The Court did not developed a unidirectional interpretation of the-
se situations but its case law swings between different tendencies: one in favour of a nar-
row interpretation of the scope of application of the EC fundamental rights standards con-
nected with the expression “when implementing EU law” (the leading case being Wa-
chauf35), and the other one referring to the formulation “within the scope of EU law” that 
is more open to a functional interpretation of it (the leading case being ERT36). Here we do 
not intend to extensively analyse the ECJ’s case law concerning fundamental rights imple-
mentation by the national authorities but only to offer a sketch so as to show the fluid na-
ture of the concept of “implementation” itself. 
In 1989 the ECJ (third section) through the Wachauf decision ruled that its review pow-
ers extended to the acts of Member States to the extent that they fall within areas of Com-
munity law. The case concerned national legislation implementing several EU regulations 
as regards the organization of the milk market, and which was considered to violate the 
plaintiff’s rights under the German Constitution. The ECJ was called to tackle several is-
sues, in particular whether Member States shall respect fundamental rights as general prin-
ciples of EU law when they are implementing Community rules. The Advocate General Ja-
cobs addressed this question by stating that “… it appears to me self-evident that when 
acting in pursuance of powers granted under Community law, Member States must be sub-
ject to the same constraints, in any event in relation to the principle of respect for funda-
mental rights, as the Community legislator”.37 The Court followed the position of the Ad-
vocate General Jacobs and stated that the requirements of the protection of fundamental 
rights in the Community legal order “are also binding on the Member States when they are 
implementing Community rules, the Member States must, as far as possible, apply those rules in 
accordance with those requirements”38. Throughout its arguments the Court took the op-
portunity to clarify that Member States must conform to general principles of human rights 
when implementing Community law (in this specific case when they are implementing reg-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 X. Groussot, L. Pech, G. T. Petursson, supra note 18. 
35 Case C-5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609. 
36 Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. 
37 Case C-5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, Opinion of AG Jacobs. 
38 Case C-5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, par. 19. 
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ulations) thus restricting the scope of application of EC fundamental rights to a narrow 
concept of implementation.  
Two years after the Wachauf case, in 1991 the ECJ was called to decide a case concern-
ing the legality of a grant of a monopoly by Greece to a public radio and television compa-
ny, Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorasi (ERT). On this occasion the Court extended its power of 
review of the state measures not only in such cases where the national authorities are im-
plementing Community law, but also where they are derogating from its provision or justi-
fying a restriction on community rules in the interest of some conflicting national policy. 
According to the Court such national action, which Member States perform on the basis of 
one of the express derogation clauses contained in the EC Treaty or for reasons of public 
interest, must be compatible with EU fundamental rights. In other words, where national 
rules  
“fall within the scope of Community law, and reference is made to the Court for a pre-
liminary ruling, it must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national 
court to determine whether those rules are compatible with the fundamental rights the 
observance of which the Court ensures and which derive in particular from the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights”39.  
Therefore, as a Member state  
“relies on the combined provisions of Articles 56 and 66 TEC in order to justify 
rules which are likely to obstruct the exercise of the freedom to provide services, such 
justification, provided for by Community law, must be interpreted in light of the gen-
eral principles of law and in particular of fundamental rights. Thus the national rules 
in question can fall under the exceptions provided for by the combined provisions of 
Articles 56 and 66 only if they are compatible with the fundamental rights the ob-
servance of which is ensured by the Court”40. 
The ERT case significantly expanded the scope of EU law to include national derogations 
from EU law among those acts under possible review of the ECJ and thus it allowed “for 
the direct effect of fundamental rights in all those situations, which have an ever unclear 
link with the EU law”41. From this moment onward, Wachauf and ERT would become two 
points of reference influencing the ECJ’s decisions. They became two polarities between 
which the ECJ’s case law moves in a pendulum-like fashion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, par. 42 
40 ibid, par. 43. 
41 X. Groussot, L. Pech, G. T. Petursson, supra note 18. 
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In 1994, through the Bostock42 case, the Court again adopted a narrow approach in an-
other case involving milk quota. With reference to Wachauf, the Court reaffirmed that 
“Member states shall respect fundamental rights when they are implementing EU law, in 
other words they must, as far as possible, apply those rules in accordance with those re-
quirements”43. Similarly, the ERT approach was confirmed in 1997 with the Familiapress44 
case. There the Court held that EU Member States may invoke the need to protect funda-
mental rights as general principles of law not only when they are implementing EC law but 
also when they derogate from EC law by relying upon a range of public interest justifica-
tions or mandatory requirements developed through the case law of the Court. In 2002, 
with the Caballero45 case, the Court restated that fundamental rights form an integral part 
of “the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures and that the re-
quirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order are al-
so binding on Member States when they implement EU rules”46. However, in the same 
year a spouse of a British citizen – a Mrs Carpenter - who was a national of the Philippines 
and applied for a permit to stay in the UK was unable to benefit from a right to reside in 
the UK based on Directive 73/148, and a deportation order was issued. The Court, re-
calling the ERT and Familiapress cases, stated: “A Member State may invoke reasons of 
public interest to justify a national measure which is likely to obstruct the exercise of the 
freedom to provide services only if that measure is compatible with the fundamental rights 
whose observance the Court ensures”47. 
These cases are only a sketch of the ECJ’s decisions prior to the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the Agency. However this short and cursory over-
view suffices to show clearly that the ECJ uses both a narrow interpretation of the concept 
of implementation and a broader and evaluative interpretation characterizing the line of 
cases that flow from ERT. According to Grissout, Pech and Petursson, “this state of affairs 
reflects the casuistic nature of the scope of EU law and has arguably contributed to the 
lack of certainty surrounding this concept”.48 It will be questioned whether the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty and of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights will change the 
scenario. Will the pendulum of the ECJ’s review mechanism stop swinging?  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-0000. 
43 ibid. 
44 Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689. 
45 Case C-442/00 Caballero [2002] ECR I–11915. 
46 ibid. 
47 Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279.  
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2. Post Agency establishment: the entry into force of the Charter and the Lisbon Treaty 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights be-
came legally binding. The Charter has the same legal value of a Treaty and it has enshrined 
within it human rights provisions. These are contained in international human rights trea-
ties, in the case law of the ECJ, and in fundamental rights and principles pertaining to the 
Constitutional traditions of the EU Member States. However, the Charter does not em-
power the ECJ to review the compatibility of EU and Member States legislation with fun-
damental rights. The Charter was equipped with art. 51 provision preventing the Court 
from reviewing Member States’ acts which fall outside the scope of the Union law and was 
drafted with the purpose to codify the pre-Lisbon case law which has been cursorily 
sketched above. Art. 51 appears even more narrow than the pre-Lisbon case law of the 
ECJ as it clearly states that Member States must respect the fundamental rights enshrined 
in the Charter only when they are implementing Union Law (excluding situations where the na-
tional authorities derogate from EU law, i.e. ERT style cases). However, if we look at the 
Charter’s official explanations, it should be noticed that as regards art. 51 they offer a com-
bination of formulas used in the alternating jurisprudence of the ECJ. So, while in the first 
part of the Charter’s official explanations a broad formulation is employed through refer-
ences to both the Wachauf and ERT cases (“the requirement to respect fundamental rights 
defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the Member States when they act in 
the scope of Union law”), in the second part it is restated that “the requirements flowing 
from the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order are also binding 
on Member States when they implement Community rules.”49 Furthermore, as De Burca50 
explains, during the drafting of the Charter, it was decided to adopt the formulation “only 
when they are implementing EU law”, in favour of a narrow interpretation of the scope of 
the application of the charter. In light of these points, we will choose another group of ECJ 
cases which follow the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in order to determine if the 
concept of “implementation” is still subject to the same alternating interpretations as when 
the Charter was not legally binding.  
The first significant ECJ decision to be considered in this context is the DEB case51 
(2010) wherein a German national regulations, which prevented a legal person from avail-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-0000. 
50 G. De Búrca, The drafting of the European Charter of fundamental rights, (2001) 26 E.L.R. 136,137. 
51 Case C‑279/09 DEB [2010] ECR I-13849.  
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ing themselves of legal aid, were considered incompatible with the principle of effective ju-
dicial protection as enshrined in the Charter (art. 47). In this case the German procedural 
regulations were not adopted with the purpose of implementing European acts. However, 
the Court, by extending the interpretation of the principle of effectiveness, took the oppor-
tunity to broaden the field of application of fundamental rights guarantees by going beyond 
the Wachauf style approach. As Safjan explains:  
“The connection between European law and the national regulation is explained 
here not in the category of formal execution of a European act by the national law-
maker, but by the assessment of effects which may result from the application of cer-
tain regulations, falling within the sphere of autonomic competences of the national 
lawmaker which operate beyond the prerogatives of the European lawmaker”52.  
With the McCarthy53 and Dereci54 cases (2011) the Court decided to adopt a more formal 
approach in favour of the Member State’s margin of discretion. The Dereci case involved 
applicants having their applications for residency permits rejected by the Austrian Bun-
desministerium für Inneres, which refused to apply provisions under Directive 
2004/38/EC for family members of EU citizens on the grounds that the Union citizen 
concerned had not exercised a right to freedom of movement. On this occasion the Court 
took the opportunity to remark as follows: 
“However, it must be borne in mind that the provisions of the Charter are, accord-
ing to Article 51(1) thereof, addressed to the Member States only when they are im-
plementing European Union law. Under Article 51(2), the Charter does not extend 
the field of application of European Union law beyond the powers of the Union, and 
it does not establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks 
as defined in the Treaties. Accordingly, the Court is called upon to interpret, in the 
light of the Charter, the law of the European Union within the limits of the powers 
conferred on it”55.  
In N.S. and Others56 the Court once again used a functional interpretation of art. 51(1). 
The decision concerns the operation of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003, better 
known as the “Dublin II” Regulation, in a case where an Afghan national claimed asylum 
to UK.  The Court recognized that “the discretionary power conferred on the Member 
States by Art. 3(2) of the Regulation No 343/2003 forms part of the mechanisms for de-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 M. Safjan, Areas of Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Fields 
of Conflict?, EUI Working Paper LAW 2012/22. 
53 Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375. 
54 Case C-256/11 Dereci [2011] ECR I-11315. 
55 ibid. 
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termining the Member State responsible for an asylum application provided for under that 
regulation and, therefore, is merely an element of the Common European Asylum Sys-
tem”57. Therefore, when a Member State exercises that discretionary power, it must be con-
sidered as “implementing European Union Law within the meaning of art 51(1) of the 
Charter”58. 
One of the most relevant decisions of the Court is without doubt the recent judgment 
Åkerberg Fransson59 concerning the interpretation of the right not to be convicted twice 
for the same action as protected by Article 50 of the Charter. Mr Frasson was a fisherman 
who had infringed Swedish tax law by submitting a false tax assessment. The Skatterverket 
imposed a fine, part of which related to the VAT losses incurred by the State. Subsequent-
ly, criminal proceedings were also initiated against Mr Åkerberg Fransson by the Haparan-
da tingsrätt on the grounds of serious tax offences. The Court considered the case to fall 
within the scope of the Charter even though, as the Advocate General submitted,60 there is 
a weak connection between the domestic law governing the taxation system and EU law. 
Constructing a link between three sources of EU law (VAT Council Directives 77/388 and 
2006/11, art 4(3) TEU and art 325 TFEU), the Court concluded that both the tax sur-
charges imposed on Mr Fransson and the criminal proceedings brought against him consti-
tuted an implementation of EU law for the purposes of art 51(1) of the Charter.  
According to Hancox this decision “demonstrates a desire to move beyond the language 
of implementing in the provision, looking beyond this to the description of scope in the Ex-
planations and in the pre-Charter case law. Notably, the ECJ introduces different terminol-
ogy, for example, when a situation is governed by EU law, or where EU law is applicable”61. 
The Fransson approach thus finally moves beyond the previous dualism between the idea 
of “falling within the scope of Union law” (contained within the cases involving derogation 
from EU law) and the strict interpretation of the notion of  “implementing”. Through this 
decision the expression “when implementing Union Law” no longer belongs to the realm 
of the narrow interpretation of art 51(1); rather the notion of implementation included in 
art. 51(1) has a broader meaning such that it involves “all situations governed by EU law”62. 
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61 Emily Hancox, The meaning of “implementing” EU law under Article 51(1) of the Charter: Åkerberg Fransson, 
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With the Fransson case, the ECJ seems to take a new direction. So while the above-cited 
cases indicate the same indeterminate and alternating attitude of the Court we identified as 
existing prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, now we see a gradual merging  of the notion of “im-
plementation” with the notion “within the scope of EU law” which climaxes in Fransson. 
In his Opinion the Advocate General believes  
“that it would be helpful to view the different formulations used as expressions 
which are not qualitatively different. It is clear that nuances may be identified between 
them. However, the boundaries are always blurred. In particular, as I understand it, 
the two formulations concerned point to a situation where, since there is always a dis-
cretion on the part of the Member States, meaning that any infringement of a right 
cannot correctly be attributed to the Union, the presence of Union law in the scenario 
concerned is sufficiently strong to warrant an assessment of the scenario in the light 
of Union law, and therefore by the Court of Justice”63. 
 Therefore, through its judgment it appears that the Court intends to attribute to the Char-
ter a wider scope of application.  
In light of this scenario the Agency certainly must deal with a concept of implementa-
tion, which is rather nuanced and under-determined. However, must recall that its activities 
and its research are conducted within a limited remit as drawn by its Founding Regulation, 
and in particular by its MAF. Therefore, before taking into account the FRA’s activities it is 
necessary to focus briefly on its MAF.  
 
 
The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union’s room for manoeuvre:  
the first and second Multiannual Framework 
As it has been anticipated in the previous chapters, the scope of the Agency’s activities is 
determined not only according art. 3 of its Founding Regulation but also through another 
legal instrument: the MAF. The MAF defines the thematic areas, which are subject to the 
FRA’s analysis. Until recently the FRA had two MAFs. The first MAF was adopted by the 
EU Council on the 28th February 200864 and established that the Agency should work on 
nine thematic areas:  
1. racism, xenophobia and related intolerance; 
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2. discrimination based on sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation and against persons belonging to minorities and any 
combination of these grounds (multiple discrimination); 
3. compensation of victims; 
4. the rights of the child, including the protection of children; 
5. asylum, immigration and integration of migrants; 
6. visa and border control; 
7. participation of the EU citizens in the Union's democratic functioning; 
8. information society and, in particular, respect for private life and protection of 
personal data; 
9. access to efficient and independent justice. 
 
However, the Agency in accordance with Article 5(3)65 of its founding regulation can work 
outside these thematic areas upon a request of the European Parliament, the Council or the 
Commission.  
In 2013, this time in the context of a new EU constitutional framework as the Lisbon 
Treaty was already entered into force, a second MAF66 was adopted. The main thematic ar-
eas covered by the Agency’s activities were reconfirmed with some alterations: three new 
thematic areas including the previews “compensation to victims”, “roma integration” and 
“judicial cooperation except criminal matters” were introduced, while “asylum, immigration 
and integration of migrants” and “visa and border control” were merged in one thematic 
area, Finally, the area concerning participation of the EU citizens in the Union's democratic 
functioning disappeared from the purview of the FRA. The Management Board of the 
Agency delivered an opinion on the proposal for the MAF 2013-2017 for the Agency67. 
According to Art. 5 (1) of the Founding Regulation, the Commission shall consult the 
Management Board of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights when proposing a new 
Multi-annual Framework for the FRA. The opinion also includes the results of the consul-
tation that was open to the Fundamental Rights Platform from 20 July 2011 to 16 Septem-
ber 2011 as requested by the European Commission.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 “The Agency shall carry out its tasks within the thematic areas determined by the Multiannual Frame-
work. This shall be without prejudice to the responses of the Agency to requests from the European Parlia-
ment, the Council or the Commission under Article 4(1)(c) and (d) outside these thematic areas, provided its 
financial and human resources so permit”. Art. 5(3) FRA Founding Regulation. 
66 Council Decision 252/2013/EU establishing a Multiannual Framework for 2013-2017 for the Europe-
an Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Available at http://fra.europa.eu.  
67 Opinion of the Management Board of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the European 
Commission's proposal for a new Multi-annual Framework (2013-2017) for the Agency. Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu. 
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It has to be considered that, on the 2nd December 2010, the European Commission 
had already submitted a proposal for amending the first MAF. In light of the changes gen-
erated by the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission asked for an extension of the MAF’s the-
matic areas to the areas covered by the former third pillar (cooperation in criminal matters 
and police cooperation). With this aim in mind, the Commission did not consider it neces-
sary to amend the Agency’s founding regulation since art. 325 TFEU (former art. 308 
TEC) now “applies to all matters falling under the scope of this Treaty”68. Instead is was 
considered necessary to amend the MAF “in order to enable the Agency to carry out its 
tasks in these areas”69. Furthermore, the Commission supported its proposal by referring to 
the results of the public consultation of 2005 involving the proposal for the Agency’s 
founding regulation. It was remarked how at that time “consulted stakeholders had ex-
pressed a strong wish for the areas of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation to be included in the scope of the Agency's activities”70. 
Therefore, with regards to the MB’s opinion on the MAF 2013 - 2017, the FRA’s MB, 
in line with the Commission’s proposal and given the developments generated by the Lis-
bon Treaty, proposed to add judicial and police cooperation to the other thematic areas 
covering, in this way, the former third pillar area. In particular, in the explanatory memo-
randum accompanying the Opinion of the Management Board of the EU Agency for Fun-
damental Rights on a new Multi-Annual Framework (2013–2017) for the agency, the 
FRA’s Management Board considers:  
“the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon; the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union becoming legally binding and having an equal status to that of 
the treaties (primary law); the relevant sections of the Stockholm Programme; the im-
plementation measures taken by the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament in 
relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights; the implications for the work of the 
FRA with the accession of the EU to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, notably in relation to Article 33 (2); and non-discrimination and 
equality between men and women including gender equality as a horizontal require-
ment; the need to enhance the cooperation with the Council of Europe, in particular 
in the perspective of the accession of the EU to the ECHR”71.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Proposal Council Decision amending Decision (2008/203/EC) of 28 February 2008 implementing 
Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 as regards the adoption of a Multi-annual Framework for the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights for 2007-2012, COM(2010) 708 final. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid. 
71 See the Explanatory Memorandum annexed to the Opinion of the Management Board of the EU 
Agency for Fundamental Rights on the European Commission’s proposal for a new multi-annual framework 
(2013– 2017) for the agency. Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
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The Management Board proposed the introduction of a new area in the Framework 
2013–2017 related to Article 33 (2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, in light of the expected role of the Agency in a future “framework [...] to pro-
mote, protect and monitor implementation” of the Convention. Furthermore, the Man-
agement Board also defended the importance of maintaining the thematic area of “partici-
pation of the citizens of the Union in the Union’s democratic functioning” by citing the 
relevance of the right of political participation as enshrined in the Charter. It also proposed 
to include in the MAF a new area devoted to social rights72 “which would also include so-
cial security, with a special focus on poverty reduction and social exclusion and the protec-
tion of employees and consumers…This would ensure a balance of coverage of the rights 
listed in the Charter, which take up almost a quarter of this instrument and are of particular 
relevance to everyone”73.  
Unfortunately the MAF 2013-2017 adopted by the EU Council did not include the 
amendments proposed by the FRA’s Management Board and the EU Commission. The 
MAF thereby limits the FRA activities to areas covered by the former first pillar. Hence 
FRA can gather data and information and carry out projects on fundamental rights protec-
tion in relation to policies and legislation of the relevant EU institutions and the Member 
States when implementing EU law but only within a limited remit. However, as we will see, 
it is with regards to its cooperation with relevant EU institutions that the Agency can go 
beyond its limited scope.  
 
 
The Agency’s activities from 2007 to today 
Before beginning our analysis of the FRA’s activities with the purpose of determining 
whether or not they are carried out within the scope of the Agency’s work as defined in art. 
3 of its founding regulation, it is necessary to offer some initial remarks. The following 
analysis will focus mainly on the FRA’s reports and opinions. The restriction of our analy-
sis to certain FRA’s activities is due to the fact that the Agency’s research projects and sur-
veys are consistent with the limitations determined in the MAF and they offer reliable data 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Notably the European Parliament in the motion for a resolution on an EU Homelessness Strategy B7-
0475/2011 14 September 2011 stated that it “urges the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) to work 
more on the implications of extreme poverty and social exclusion in terms of access to and enjoyment of 
fundamental rights, bearing in mind that the fulfilment of the right to housing is critical for the enjoyment of 
a full range of other rights, including political and social rights”. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu. 
73 See Opinion of the Management Board of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the European 
Commission’s proposal for a new multi-annual framework (2013– 2017) for the agency. Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu. 
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for the assessments conducted in the Opinions, Reports and Handbooks. From a quantita-
tive perspective, up to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the FRA concluded 12 re-
search projects (5 in the area of racism, xenophobia and related intolerance, 4 in the area of 
asylum, immigration and integration of migrants, 2 in the area of discrimination based on 
sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation and against 
persons belonging to minorities and any combination of these grounds ), and 1 in the area 
of information society and, in particular, respect for private life and protection of personal 
data. It also concluded 2 surveys (in the areas of racism, xenophobia and related intolerance 
and discrimination). After the Lisbon Treaty became legally binding it carried out 17 re-
search projects (1 addressing the need to support the implementation of fundamental rights 
at the local and regional level with concrete tools and good practice examples, 6 focusing 
on the area of discrimination, 1 on the area of access to justice, 3 on the area of victims of 
crime, 3 on the area of immigration and integration of migrants, visa and border control 
and asylum, 1 on the area of Roma integration, and 2 on the area of information society);  
as well as 4 surveys (1 on Roma integration, 1 on victims of crime, and 2 on discrimination 
and racism). Currently the FRA has 13 on-going projects: 4 in the area of access to justice, 
2 in the area of asylum, migration and border, 4 in discrimination and racism areas (2 on 
person with disabilities, 1 on racism and relating intolerance, 1 on Roma discrimination), 
and 2 on information society, privacy and data protection. At first glance this data illus-
trates the preventive nature of the Agency’s work. By collecting data and information, the 
Agency offers to the EU institutions, as well as to the Member States and stakeholders, a 
comprehensive instrument for assessing the state of affairs of EU policies and of their im-
plementation by the Member States within the limit of its mandate.  However, it has to be 
clear if the introduction of the Charter as a legally binding instrument and the collapse of 
the three pillars system, brought any transformation to the Agency’s activities, especially 




1. The Agency’s activities prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty  
The first task that will be taken into account is - according to art 4(d) of the founding regu-
lation – “[to] formulate and publish conclusions and opinions on specific thematic topics, 
for the Union institutions and the Member States when implementing Community law, ei-
ther on its own initiative or at the request of the European Parliament, the Council or the 
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Commission”74. Since the FRA has been established it has issued 13 opinions (4 before the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and 9 after the treaty became legally binding). As 
regards the four opinions issued before the entry into force of the Treaty, they were not 
focused on proposals for directives or regulations but rather on framework decisions and 
on the draft of the Stockholm Programme. This means both that from the very beginning 
the FRA analysis was dedicated to assess EU policies and legislative acts designed to har-
monize specific areas of protection of fundamental rights and, also, that the EU institu-
tions immediately requested the FRA to work in the former third pillar area. 
The first FRA opinion was issued on the 1st April 2007 and concerned “the Framework 
Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia”.75 It was requested by the European 
Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs on the occasion of the Euro-
pean Parliament’s Public hearing "The Framework Decision on Combating Racism and 
Xenophobia", held on 19th March 2007. The FRA in accordance with the previous EUMC 
encouraged the European Council of Minister to adopt the Framework Decision (COM 
2001/664) proposed by the European Commission in November 2001 on defining a 
common criminal law approach to racism and xenophobia in the EU. The idea was to in-
troduce a common framework for effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penal-
ties. Through this opinion the FRA served its mandate to continue the work of the EUMC 
on racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance76. This is a clear example of a FRA 
advisory contribution made possible by a specific request from a relevant EU institution 
involving matters that fall outside its mandate because covered by the former third pillar.  
In the field of non-discrimination, on the 20th November 2007 the FRA made a contri-
bution following a request by the European Parliament's Committee on Employment and 
Social Affairs to the Public Hearing "Progress made in equal opportunities and non-
discrimination in the European Union"77. On this occasion, and in light of the MAF, the 
FRA summarized relevant data and information testifying to the existence of ethnic dis-
crimination in employment in the EU, and gave an overview of measures to combat em-
ployment discrimination and diversity management practices by employers and trade union 
activities.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 FRA Founding Regulation, art. 4(d). 
75 FRA Opinion on the Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia (01/04/2007). 
Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
76 “As the Agency is to be built upon the existing European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenopho-
bia, the work of the Agency should continue to cover the phenomena of racism, xenophobia and anti-
Semitism, the protection of rights of persons belonging to minorities, as well as gender equality, as essential 
elements for the protection of fundamental rights”. FRA Founding Regulation,Tenth Recital, Preamble. 
77 FRA Opinion Progress made in equal opportunities and non-discrimination in the European Union 
(20/11/2007). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
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The FRA’s opinion (28/10/2008) on the Commission's proposal (COM (2007) 654) for 
a Council framework decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data is also 
relevant in this context:  
“The proposal aims to harmonize Member State's provisions on obligations for air 
carriers operating flights to or from the territory of at least one Member State regard-
ing the transmission of PNR data to the competent authorities for the purpose of 
preventing and fighting terrorist offences and organized crime. All processing of PNR 
data under the proposal will be governed by the Council Framework Decision (xx/xx) 
on the Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Framework of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters”78. 
This opinion is another case in which one of the EU Institutions - the French Presidency 
of the EU Council - in accordance with the Agency’s Founding Regulation, requests the 
FRA’s advisory support in matters, which fall outside its remit. Another significant Opin-
ion79 was requested by the Swedish Presidency on the "draft of the Stockholm Pro-
gramme"80, which was subsequently adopted at the EU summit in December 2009. The 
Agency in its Opinion suggested to better mainstream fundamental rights protection 
throughout the whole Program: “Only a strong common reading of fundamental rights 
protection, especially in the area of procedural safeguards in criminal law, will allow for a 
sustainable level of sufficient mutual trust between the different national systems, and in-
deed trust in the Union”81. In line with this Opinion, when the Commission presented its 
proposal (COM (2009) 262 final) the FRA reacted by drafting the opinion paper "FRA 
Comments on the Presidency Draft Stockholm Programme" (29/07/2009).82 The Opinion 
included a series of possible amendments to the proposal. This is an interesting example of 
the FRA’s role as guardian of fundamental rights integration within the EU policies.  In-
deed, FRA is seen as an important tool for monitoring the process of fundamental rights 
integration into the work of the relevant EU institutions83. However, the strong limitations 
inherent within its Founding Regulation and in its MAF restrain its powers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 FRA Opinion on proposal for a Council Framework decision on the use of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data for law enforcement purposes, (28/10/2008). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
79 FRA Opinion on the Stockholm Programme (29/07/2009). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
80 See Communication “An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen”, COM (2009) 262/4, 
10 June 2009. 
81 FRA Opinion on the Stockholm Programme, supra note 80. 
82 FRA Comments on the Presidency Draft Stockholm Programme (03/11/2009). Available at http://-
fra.europa.eu. 
83 See O. De Shutter, The Implementation of the Charter by the Institutions of the European Union, CRIDHO 
Working Paper 2013/1. 
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From the foregoing, it is now possible to draw a few considerations. The FRA can only 
deliver opinions that fall within its remit, with the exception of those opinions that are re-
quested by the EU relevant institutions, in accordance with its Founding Regulation. The 
primary function of these opinions is to assess the drafting proposals and to promote a 
better implementation of fundamental rights within the EU policies. Indeed, it is not a co-
incidence that the FRA is called to deliver opinions on matters that are included in limited 
areas, where the EU holds the authority to create policy and legislation on specific funda-
mental rights issues, such as discrimination or data protection. 
The second issue that we now turn to is the publication of reports on fundamental-
rights issues (see art. 4(e)(f)(g) of the FRA’s founding regulation). The FRA prepares three 
different types of reports: thematic reports, comparative reports and annual reports. It also 
produces a fourth type of report that deals with specific issues. Even before the Charter 
was legally binding, the thematic reports were mainly focused on the thematic areas of the 
MAF and were related to a title of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Agency 
published only one thematic report in 2008. It focused on “Community Cohesion at local 
level: Addressing the needs of Muslim Communities”84, which is included within the the-
matic area of non-discrimination and is related to the Equality Charter’s title. The report 
assessed the implementation of policies by using political and social analysis rather then le-
gal analysis. As its introduction explains: 
“This publication provides a number of examples of good practice or initiatives at 
the local level from across European cities. They illustrate models of mainstreaming 
anti-discrimination and social cohesion. They highlight that some municipalities and 
regions target their integration policies/strategies toward Muslim communities, while 
others apply generic integration policies/strategies towards ethnic minorities. There 
are valuable lessons to be learned and shared with municipalities and regions across 
Europe”85. 
The report aims to offer an assessment of good practices and bad practices within the EU. 
It compares good policies and bad policies through indicators defined by the Agency’s 
group of experts thus pointing out the best performing and worst performing Member 
State86.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 FRA thematic report, Community Cohesion at local level: Addressing the needs of Muslim Communi-
ties, (March 2008). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
85 ibid. 
86 An interesting criticism to the Agency’s work is provided by B. Sokhi‐Bulley, Government (ality) by 
Experts: Human Rights as Governance, (2011) 22/3 Law Critique, 251. See also B. Sokhi‐Bulley, The Funda-
mental Rights Agency of the European Union: A New Panopticism, (2011) 11/4 H.R.L.R., 683. 
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Alternatively, the comparative reports offer a comprehensive review of specific issues. 
In June 2007, before the Charter was legally binding, the European Parliament requested 
the FRA to draft a comparative report on homophobia and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation in the Member States of the European Union. The aim of this report was to as-
sist the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parlia-
ment in discussing the need for a Directive covering all grounds of discrimination listed in 
Article 13 of the EC Treaty for all sectors referred to in the Racial Equality Directive 
2000/43/EC. The report is composed of two parts: the first part is the previous publica-
tion, which contains a comprehensive comparative legal analysis of the situation in the Eu-
ropean Union Member States drafted by Professor Olivier De Schutter, as well as conclu-
sions and opinions for which the Agency is responsible; the second part consists in a com-
prehensive sociological analysis, based on both available secondary sources and interviews 
with key actors. Interestingly, the report begins by stating that  
“the objective of the Agency is to provide assistance and expertise to relevant insti-
tutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Community and its Member States, when 
implementing Community law relating to fundamental rights. In this context the Eu-
ropean Parliament asked in June 2007 the Fundamental Rights Agency to launch a 
comprehensive report on homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation 
in the Member States of the European Union”87.  
Here the notion of implementation is understood strictu sensu in accordance with the formu-
lation included in the FRA founding regulation. The same understanding is evident in the 
other comparative reports prior to the Lisbon Treaty.  
In July 2007, the European Commission asked the FRA to develop indicators to meas-
ure how the rights of the child are implemented, protected, respected and promoted in the 
EU Member States. Subsequently, the European Commission requested that the Agency 
start collecting data on the basis of these indicators88. It was then determined that the 
FRA's first thematic study on the rights of the child would focus on child trafficking. 
In December 2007 the European Commission asked the FRA to develop a comparative 
report on the situation of Roma and Travellers across the European Union. In response, 
the FRA decided to focus on the housing situation after consultation with relevant actors, 
including the European Commission and the Council of Europe. In October 2009 the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 FRA comparative report, Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation in the 
EU Member States Part I – Legal Analysis, (June 2008). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
88 FRA comparative report, Child Trafficking in the EU - Challenges, perspectives and good practices, 
(July 2009). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
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Agency published “Housing conditions of Roma and Travellers in the European Union”. 
In the report is further clarified that the Charter of Fundamental Rights confirms that  
“the EU recognizes a right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a de-
cent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources. However, the charter ad-
dresses the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. Rights like 
the one at stake have to be read in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law 
and national laws and practices. Throughout the Member States there are different 
approaches to the right to housing in their domestic legal orders”89. 
As a result of the joint action on freedom of movement and migration of Roma initiated in 
2008 by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights (CommHR), the OSCE Office for Democratic Institu-
tions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Mi-
norities (HCNM), the Agency published two comparative reports in November 2009: “the 
situation of Roma EU citizens moving to and settling in other EU Member States” and 
“Selected positive initiatives - The situation of Roma EU citizens moving to and settling in 
other EU Member States”90. 
The FRA’s comparative reports extensively cite the Charter, although it only has a polit-
ical value, either as a general point of reference concerning the EU fundamental rights, or 
with reference to its specific provisions. This approach is explained by the fact that the re-
ports take into account the Charter, in light of its imminent entry into force in the after-
math of the Lisbon Treaty, and the favourable EU accession to the ECHR. In terms of an 
understanding of “implementation”, it is important to note that the report adopts a strict 
interpretation of the concept. 
Among the fruits of the Agency’s work the annual reports are the most interesting for 
the purpose of our inquiry. The annual reports deal with the full spectrum of fundamental 
rights in accordance with its legal basis (MAF and Founding Regulation). Before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty the annual reports were strongly focused on discrimination 
issues and on the analysis of the level of implementation of relevant non-discrimination 
principles. The first annual report published in 200891 explored the following themes and 
issues through highlighting examples of good practice: legal and institutional initiatives 
against racism and discrimination; racist violence and crime; racism and discrimination and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 FRA comparative report, Housing conditions of Roma and Travellers in the European Union, (Octo-
ber 2009). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
90 FRA comparative report, The situation of Roma EU citizens moving to and settling in other EU Mem-
ber States, (November 2009). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
91 FRA Annual Report 2008, (June 2008). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
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preventive initiatives in employment, education, housing and health care; and develop-
ments in EU policy and legislation relevant to combating racism and xenophobia. In the 
report there is no mention of the implementation of fundamental rights except as regards 
the principle of discrimination; the Charter is not mentioned at all. In 2009 a new annual 
report was published92. Whereas it still mainly focused on discrimination and equality is-
sues, one part of it is devoted to the thematic areas included in the MAF. The report began 
to contain references of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, the case law of the 
ECJ, which was cited within the report, remained primarily focused on the principle of 




2. The Agency’s activities post the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Agency started to issue opinions on the 
Commission’s proposals for EU legislative acts such as directives and regulations.  
The first post-Lisbon opinion from the Agency concerned the issue of body scanners93 
and was originally drafted on the occasion of a Public Consultation on the matter launched 
by the European Commission at the turn of 2008–2009. On 15th June 2010 the Commis-
sion published its Communication on the use of security scanners at EU airports COM 
(2010) 311 which included references to the reservations expressed by the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, and the 
FRA. After the Commission had sent the Communication to the Council and the Europe-
an Parliament, the FRA issued its contribution to the public consultation on 27th July 2010 
(which it originally delivered to the Commission in February 2009).  
It is worthy to note that even though the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the Agency’s 
legal framework, and therefore its remit, was not amended. Therefore, on matters concern-
ing the former third pillar and upon request of the European Parliament, the FRA issued 
an opinion on the draft directive regarding the European Investigation Order (EIO) in 
criminal matters (14 February 2011). The draft directive was conceived with the purpose to 
replace an existing fragmented regime with a more comprehensive legislative instrument 
providing a mutual recognition of warrants for both existing and new evidence. The same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 FRA Annual Report 2009, (June 2009). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
93 FRA Opinion on The use of body scanners: 10 questions and answers (27/07/2010). Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu. 
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year the Parliament requested from the Agency another opinion,94 this time dealing with 
the Proposal for a Directive on the use of PNR data for the prevention, detection, investi-
gation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime and its compliance with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union95. The FRA was thus requested to 
follow up96 on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for the prevention, detec-
tion, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. On 5th Septem-
ber 2012, the Parliament also requested from the FRA an analysis of the fundamental rights 
issues associated with the proposed EU data protection reform package. The FRA opinion 
looked at both the draft regulation and directive as part of one single data protection “re-
form package”97. 
The Parliament, as the main interlocutor of the FRA, requested three other notable 
opinions from the FRA. The first was focused on the Proposal for a regulation on jurisdic-
tion, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the prop-
erty consequences of registered partnerships9899. The request was based on an initiative of 
the Committee responsible for the legislative file, the Committee on legal affairs. The se-
cond concerned the European Commission proposal for a Directive on the freezing and 
confiscation of proceeds of crime in the European Union100. In this case the European Par-
liament requested advice from the FRA on the extent to which confiscation of proceeds of 
crime could be implemented without breaching fundamental rights. The last was the opin-
ion on the proposal to establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) mandated 
to prosecute crimes against the financial interests of the European Union, a proposal that 
raised a number of fundamental rights issues. 
Finally, the FRA delivered two opinions on its own initiative: the opinion on the situa-
tion of equality in the European Union 10 years on from initial implementation of the 
equality directives and an opinion assessing the impact of the Framework Decision on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 FRA Opinion on the proposal for a Passenger Name Record (PNR) Directive (15/06/2011). Available 
at http://fra.europa.eu. 
95 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger Name 
Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious 
crime COM(2011) 32 final. 
96 This was a follow-up request to the opinion of the FRA related to PNR from October 2008. 
97  FRA Opinion on proposed EU data protection reform package (09/10/2012). Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu. 
98 FRA Opinion on proposed EU regulation on property consequences of registered partnerships. Avail-
able at http://fra.europa.eu. 
99 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes COM (2011) 126 final and Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the 
property consequences of registered partnerships COM (2011) 127 final. 
100  FRA Opinion on the confiscation of proceeds of crime, 04/12/2012. Available at http://-
fra.europa.eu. 
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rights of the victims of crimes motivated by hatred and prejudice, including racism and 
xenophobia101. 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the FRA seems to have strengthened its 
relationship with the EU Parliament. Furthermore, the Charter became extensively used as 
standard for the FRA’s assessments. Finally, with regards to the notion of implementation, 
since 2010 the FRA has highlighted in its opinions, the formulations of article 2 and 3 of 
the Founding Regulation “when implementing Community Law”. Therefore, it seems that 
the Agency follows the narrow concept of implementation without moving to the (broad-
er?) notion of “within the scope of Union Law”.  
Between 2010 and 2013 the Agency published five hematic reports and seven compara-
tive reports. In September 2010, two thematic report were published on the thematic area 
“Asylum, migration and borders”: “The duty to inform applicants about asylum proce-
dures: The asylum-seeker perspective” and “Access to effective remedies: The asylum-
seeker perspective”102.  Both the reports refer to Title II “Justice” and Title VI “Freedom” 
of the Charter. Alike the comparative reports, which cited the Charter before it had was le-
gally binding, this is the first time that the Charter’s provisions are explicitly mentioned in a 
thematic report. The report is also one of the products of the research project “The asylum 
seeker perspective: access to information and effective remedies” started in December 
2009.  
In November 2010 the Agency published another thematic report as part of another re-
search project103 in the area of “Asylum, migration and borders”104 and concerning Title II 
“Freedom”, Title III “Equality” and Title VI “Justice”. The report examined law and prac-
tice in the 27 EU Member States on the deprivation of the liberty of irregular migrants 
pending their removal against the backdrop of applicable international human rights law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 FRA Opinion on the situation of equality in the European Union 10 years on from initial implementa-
tion of the equality directives (01/10/2013); FRA Opinion on the Framework Decision on Racism and Xen-
ophobia – with special attention to the rights of victims of crime (15/10/2013). Available at http://-
fra.europa.eu. 
102 FRA Thematic Report, The duty to inform applicants about asylum procedures: The asylum-seeker 
perspective (September 2010), FRA Thematic Report, Access to effective remedies: The asylum-seeker per-
spective (September 2010). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
103 FRA Project “Rights of irregular immigrants in return procedures” (started 1 March 2009). Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu. 
104 Thematic Report, Detention of third country nationals in return procedures (November 2010). Availa-
ble at http://fra.europa.eu. 
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Within the thematic area of “Asylum, migration and borders” but with reference to Title 
I “Dignity” and Title II “Liberty”, the Agency devoted a report (March 2011) to “the situa-
tion of persons crossing the Greek land border in an irregular manner”105. 
Finally, the Agency tackled the effectiveness of responses by public authorities, civil so-
ciety organizations and others to counter racism, discrimination, intolerance and extremism 
in Greece and Hungary with the report “Racism, discrimination, intolerance and extrem-
ism: learning from experiences in Greece and Hungary”106 which referred to Title I Dignity, 
Title II Liberty, Title III Equality, and Title VI Justice of the Charter. 
The last two mentioned reports were not simply focused on a specific thematic area but 
concerned the performance of specific Member States. The Agency used this approach in 
other reports,107 focusing its attention on States from the perspective of level of perfor-
mance in protecting a particular right.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 FRA Thematic Report, Coping with a fundamental rights emergency - The situation of persons cross-
ing the Greek land border in an irregular manner (March 2011). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
106 FRA Thematic Report, Racism, discrimination, intolerance and extremism: learning from experiences 
in Greece and Hungary (December 2013). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
107 Incident Report – Violent Attacks Against Roma in the Ponticelli district of Naples, Italy (August 
2008); EU-MIDIS at a glance - Introduction to the FRA's EU-wide discrimination survey ; Homophobia and 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the EU Member States: Part II - 
The Social Situation ; Housing discrimination against Roma in selected EU Member States - An analysis of 
EU-MIDIS data ; Selected positive initiatives - The situation of Roma EU citizens moving to and settling in 
other EU Member States ; EU-MIDIS Main Results Report (2009) ; Discover the past for the future – The 
role of historical sites and museums in Holocaust education and human rights education in the EU ; Towards 
More Effective Policing, Understanding and preventing discriminatory ethnic profiling: A guide ; Experience 
of discrimination, social marginalisation and violence: A comparative study of Muslim and non-Muslim youth 
in three EU Member States ; Racism, ethnic discrimination and exclusion of migrants and minorities in sport: 
the situation in the European Union ; Developing indicators for the protection, respect and promotion of the 
rights of the child in the European Union (Conference edition) ; The right to political participation of per-
sons with mental health problems and persons with intellectual disabilities ; Excursion to the past - teaching 
for the future: handbook for teachers (2010); Homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation and gender identity in the EU Member States ; Migrants in an irregular situation employed 
in domestic work: Fundamental rights challenges for the European Union and its Member States ; Migrants, 
minorities and employment - Exclusion and discrimination in the 27 Member States of the European Union 
(Update 2003-2008) ; Respect for and protection of persons belonging to minorities 2008-2010 ; Migrants in 
an irregular situation: access to healthcare in 10 European Union Member States ; Human rights education at 
Holocaust memorial sites across the European Union: An overview of practices ; The legal protection of per-
sons with mental health problems under non-discrimination law (2011); The Racial Equality Directive: appli-
cation and challenges ;  The situation of Roma in 11 EU Member States - Survey results at a glance ; Involun-
tary placement and involuntary treatment of persons with mental health problems ; Choice and control: the 
right to independent living ; Making hate crime visible in the European Union: acknowledging victims' rights ; 
Access to justice in cases of discrimination in the EU – Steps to further equality (2012) ; Inequalities and mul-
tiple discrimination in access to and quality of healthcare ; Fundamental rights at Europe’s southern sea bor-
ders ; EU LGBT survey - European Union lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender survey - Results at a glance ; 
Legal capacity of persons with intellectual disabilities and persons with mental health problems ; EU solidarity 
and Frontex: fundamental rights challenges ; Technical report: FRA survey - Discrimination and hate crime 
against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism ; Discrimination and hate 
crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism (2013) ; Roma Pilot 
Survey – Technical report: methodology, sampling and fieldwork ; Access to data protection remedies in EU 
Member States ; Violence against women: an EU-wide survey - Survey methodology, sample and fieldwork. 
Technical report; Violence against women: an EU-wide survey. Main results report; Criminalisation of mi-
grants in an irregular situation and of persons engaging with them ; The right to political participation for 
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Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force the Agency has published seven comparative 
reports. In particular in May 2010 the FRA published four reports108 focused on issues (in-
stitutions and EU legislation) that contribute to the overarching architecture of fundamen-
tal rights in the European Union. The building blocks of this fundamental rights landscape 
are the data protection authorities and national human rights institutions (NHRIs), as well 
as Equality Bodies set up under the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC). The Racial 
Equality directive invites the FRA to contribute to the European Commission's reporting 
on its impact on the ground. Art. 17 of the Directive states:  
“The Commission's report shall take into account, as appropriate, the views of the 
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia [now the EU Fundamental 
Rights Agency], as well as the viewpoints of the social partners and relevant non-
governmental organizations. In accordance with the principle of gender mainstream-
ing, this report shall, inter alia, provide an assessment of the impact of the measures 
taken on women and men. In light of the information received, this report shall in-
clude, if necessary, proposals to revise and update this Directive”109.  
It is in light of this provision that the Agency published the comparative report entitled 
“The impact of the Racial Equality Directive - Views of trade unions and employers in the 
European Union”110. 
In November 2010 upon a request from the European Parliament the FRA updated its 
report on comparative legal analysis of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and gender identity (first published in June 2008)111. Within the December 2010 research 
project “Separated asylum-seeking children: An examination of living conditions, provi-
sions and decision making procedures in selected EU Member States through child centred 
participatory research” the FRA published the report “Separated, asylum-seeking children 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
persons with disabilities: human rights indicators ; EU LGBT survey - European Union lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and transgender survey - Main results ; Fundamental rights at land borders: findings from selected European 
Union border crossing points ; Fundamental rights at airports: border checks at five international airports in 
the European Union ; Being Trans in the EU - Comparative analysis of the EU LGBT survey data (2014) ; 
Victims of crime in the EU: the extent and nature of support for victims (January 2015). Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu. 
108 “The impact of the Racial Equality Directive - Views of trade unions and employers in the European 
Union”, “National Human Rights Institutions in the EU Member States”, “Data Protection in the European 
Union: the role of National Data Protection Authorities” and “EU-MIDIS Data in Focus Report 3: Rights 
Awareness”. Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
109 Art. 17, Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000], OJ L 180. 
110 FRA Comparative Report, The impact of the Racial Equality Directive - Views of trade unions and 
employers in the European Union (May 2010). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
111 FRA Comparative Report, Homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity (Novembre 2010). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
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in European Union Member States”112. In March 2011 it also published “Access to justice 
in Europe: an overview of challenges and opportunities”113 as a product of the research 
project “Accessing efficient and independent justice – legal and sociological analysis”. 
Finally, the comparative report “Fundamental rights of migrants in an irregular situation 
in the European Union” was published in November 2011 within the project “The situa-
tion of migrants in an irregular situation in the European Union”114. In this comparative 
report, the FRA - in the paragraph devoted to EU law - specified its methodology by stat-
ing:   
“When analysing the protection of the rights of migrants in an irregular situation, 
the first issue is to determine whether or not this is an area covered by Union law. The 
answer to this question determines whether the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union applies. According to Article 51, the Charter applies to EU institu-
tions and EU Member States only when they are implementing Union law”115. 
The report further explains the notion of implementation included in art. 51 of the Charter 
by quoting the Kremzow case of the ECJ. According to the Court, Member States must re-
spect fundamental rights wherever “national legislation falls within the field of application of 
Community law”116.  In addition it states,  
“The entry into force of the Charter does not change matters. In all other cases 
outside the scope of Union law, fundamental rights are guaranteed at national level by 
national constitutional systems and by applicable international human rights law and 
labour law provisions”117.  
In the annual reports we find a divergent approach to the notion of implementation. On 
one hand, the reports adopt the notion of implementation as laid down in the Charter but, 
on the other, they side with the account of the ECJ as regards the thematic areas within its 
remit. In the report “Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2011”118, it is ex-
plained: “The CJEU may give its opinion on the interpretation or the validity of EU legisla-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 FRA Comparative Report, Separated, asylum-seeking children in European Union Member States 
(December 2010). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
113 FRA Comparative Report, Access to justice in Europe: an overview of challenges and opportunities 
(March 2011). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
114 FRA Comparative Report, Fundamental rights of migrants in an irregular situation in the European 
Union (November 2011). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
115 FRA Annual Report, Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2010 (November 2011). 
Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
116 Case C-299/95, Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629, par 15. 
117 FRA Annual Report 2010, supra note 112. 
118 FRA Annual Report, Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2011 (June 2012). Available 
at http://fra.europa.eu. 
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tion, thereby enabling the national court to apply the correct interpretation of EU law in a 
specific case. It will also review whether a Member State is complying with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and general principles of EU law when implementing EU law or acting 
within the scope of EU law”119. The Agency’s activity follows the evolution of the case law of 
the ECJ, as well as national and supranational legislation, promoting instruments for a bet-
ter use of the fundamental rights, enshrined in the Charter of the decisions of the national 
Courts and in the measures taken by the national authorities120. In its 2012 Annual Report 
the Agency, refers also to the Dereci and Fransson cases as regards a wider interpretation 
of art. 51(1) of the Charter: “In this sense, the CJEU might look at the fundamental rights 
compliance of national acts that do not explicitly implement or transpose Union law but 
share a specific purpose with a piece of Union law”121. 
At this juncture it should be pointed out that the FRA is a victim of the same difficulties 
related to the concept of implementation that we have met when we tried to identify a line-
arity of understanding among the decisions of the ECJ. Indeed, the FRA understanding of 
what the concept of implementation means is obscure and unsettled: it constantly swings 
between a strict and a broad interpretation. This inconsistency needs to be acknowledged 
and addressed. The Agency’s work has the potential to be a useful tool but it suffers from 
inconsistencies that pose an obstacle to its reception as a credible and coherent body of re-
search. In light of this consideration Gabriel Toggemburg has stated: 
“Since the Agency cannot deliver any legally binding decisions and does not assess 
infringements of the member states, but is merely consultative in nature, it would be 
rather strange if its scope would not extend—in conformity with the case law of the 
court—to all national law falling in the field of application of EC law”122. 
However, at stake here is the FRA’s credibility before the EU Member States. They tend to 
see the FRA more as a surveillance body rather then as an advisory institution (as the res-
ervations which emerged at the EU Council for the approval of the second MAF proved). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 ibid. 
120 “EU law is often the result of difficult compromises achieved after long negotiations, so sometimes it 
is vague or contains broad scope for exceptions or derogation at national level… It would therefore be useful 
to introduce, especially in policy contexts that are sensitive in terms of fundamental rights, explanations that 
can guide national authorities in implementing EU legislation in a way that avoids violating fundamental 
rights”. FRA Annual Report Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2013 (June 2014) available 
at http://fra.europa.eu. 
121 FRA Annual report: Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2012 (June 2013). Available 
at http://fra.europa.eu. 
122 G. Toggemburg, Exploring the Fundament of a New Agent in the Field of Rights Protection: The F(undamental) 
R(ights) A(gency) in Vienna, European Yearbook of Minority Issues Vol 7, 2007/8. 
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The concept of implementation thereby continues to be elusive and needs to be clarified 
and refined. 
 	  
In conclusion: what if the European Union acceded to the  
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?  
The Agency has more then once mentioned in its opinions and reports that its activities are 
carried out, among others things, in light of the future EU accession to the European Con-
vention of Human Rights. In fact the Lisbon Treaty provides an obligation (art. 6(2) TEU) 
for the European Union to accede to the European Convention of Human Rights with the 
consequence of integrating the ECHR into the fundamental rights protection system. In 
other words the EU will be bound to respect the ECHR and its acts will be subjected to 
the external control of the European Court of Human Rights complementing the EU in-
ternal system of fundamental rights protection governed the EU law and the Court of Jus-
tice. In doing so it will partake in a more coherent framework for protecting human rights 
within the European system, a framework which will avoid overlaps between the two 
Courts (the Strasbourg Court and the Luxemburg Court) and which will enable citizens to 
take action against the activities of the EU before the ECtHR. However, this new step has 
significant implications, especially as regards the relations between the two Courts123. What 
is relevant for our investigation into Agency’s work is the role that the Charter will play in 
relation to the ECHR124. The Charter, often confused with the ECHR,, enshrines not only 
rights derived from the ECHR and other international instruments but also rights from the 
Constitutional tradition of the European Member States. Therefore, alongside the tradi-
tional individual human rights, it incorporates social rights and political rights. Whereas 
both the Charter and the ECHR include overlapping human rights provisions, they operate 
within separate legal frameworks: the Charter is part of EU law and ultimately subject to 
interpretation by the ECJ, whereas the ECHR is an instrument of the Council of Europe in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 See T. Lock, The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship between the Two European Courts (2009) 8 Law 
& Prac Int'l Cts & Tribunals, 375. J. R. Wetzel, Improving Fundamental Rights Protection in the European Union: Re-
solving the Conflict and Confusion Between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, (2013) 71/6 F.L.R., 2823. M. Kuijer, 
The accession of the European Union to the ECHR: a gift for the ECHR’s 6oth anniversary or an unwel-
come intruder at the party? (2011) 3/4 Amsterdam Law Forum, 17-32. Available at http://amsterdamla-
wforum.org/article/view/240. V. Kosta, N. Skoutaris, V. Tzevelekos, The EU accession to the ECHR (Hart 
Publishing, 2014).  
124 See F. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, in The Future of the European Judicial System in a Comparative Perspective (Nomos Verlag, 2006), 
291. 
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Strasbourg, and is interpreted by the ECtHR125. Furthermore, whilst the EU accession to 
the ECHR may be seen as a new opportunity to transform the EU supranational system 
into a federal system equipped with its own bill of rights, the Charter through its horizontal 
provisions – art. 51 and art 52 – prevents this possibility by strongly limiting the applicabil-
ity of its rights to EU Member States’ domestic laws. However, the ECJ case law indicates 
that the Luxemburg Court may be keen to broaden the field of applicability of the Charter. 
In this context what is the role to be played by the Agency? May the EU accession to the 
ECHR be an opportunity to broaden the scope of the FRA’s work and to clarify the extent 
of its activities especially with regard to the Member States?  
The FRA cooperates with the Council of Europe by virtue of a cooperation agreement 
adopted on 15th July 2008126. The agreement was drafted with the purpose of preventing a 
duplication of the activities in the field of human rights on behalf of the Agency and to 
promote complementarity and cooperation between the Council of Europe and the FRA. 
It provides for the appointment of a contact person between the two institutions, the ap-
pointment of an independent person of the Council of Europe as a member of the Agen-
cy’s Management Board, and the invitation of the Council of Europe secretariat representa-
tives to the meetings of the FRA’s Management Board. Further, representatives of the 
Agency can be invited to attend as observers in meetings of those Council of Europe inter-
governmental committees in which the Agency has expressed an interest. The cooperation 
between the two institutions covers the whole range of the Agency's activities, both present 
and future. In particular, the Agency and the Council of Europe are called to participate in 
regular consultations with the aim of coordinating the Agency's activities, such as the prep-
aration of the annual work program, and the Agency's Annual Report on fundamental 
rights issues, that covers the Agency's activity and operation with civil society. In the 
course of the consultations, the Agency and the Council of Europe may decide to conduct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 “There is, moreover, no doubt that within the EU, as compared with the present legal position, the ac-
cession of the EU to the ECHR will also strengthen Member States’ ties to the ECHR. As mentioned above, 
on the EU’s accession, the ECHR will be an integral part of the EU legal order and, in accordance with Arti-
cle 216(2) TFEU, the primacy of EU law over national laws will extend to it. “In most cases this should have 
virtually no practical effect, since, irrespective of the EU’s accession to the ECHR (Article 6(2) TEU), nu-
merous fundamental rights offering at least an equal, if not higher, level of protection than those of the 
ECHR are guaranteed under EU law, either in the framework of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 
6(1) TEU) or in the form of general legal principles (Article 6(3) TEU). All Member States are in any event 
bound, without restriction, to respect these fundamental rights of the EU when implementing EU law, as 
provided for in Article 51(1) of the Charter, regardless of whether or not they have, as contracting parties to 
the ECHR, made reservations under international law in respect of comparable provisions of the ECHR or 
the additional protocols thereto” Opinion 2/13 of the Court 18 December 2014, Opinion AG Kokott, par. 
266, 267. 
126 Agreement between the European Community and the Council of Europe on cooperation between 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Council of Europe (L 186/7) 15.7.2008 availa-
ble at http://fra.europa.eu. 
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joint and/or complementary activities on subjects of common interest, such as the organi-
sation of conferences or workshops, data collection and analysis, or the setting up of 
shared information sources or products. Between 2011 and 2014 the FRA and the Council 
of Europe jointly prepared 5 handbooks focused on non-discrimination, the establishment 
and accreditation of National Human Rights Institutions in the European Union, data pro-
tection law, European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration, and Guardianship 
for children deprived of parental care127. The handbook on non-discrimination states in its 
introduction:  
“With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union became legally binding. Furthermore, the Lisbon Trea-
ty provides for EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. In this 
context, increased knowledge of common principles developed by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights is not only desira-
ble but in fact essential for the proper national implementation of a key aspect of Eu-
ropean human rights law: the standards on non-discrimination”128. 
In the Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration it also stat-
ed: “improving the understanding of common principles developed in the case law of the 
two European courts, and in EU regulations and directives is essential for the proper im-
plementation of relevant standards, thereby ensuring the full respect of fundamental rights 
at national level”129. Since the very beginning and due to the fears clearly expressed by the 
Council of Europe on the eve of the Agency’s establishment, the FRA developed a system-
atic cooperation with the Council of Europe. This fostered complementarity between the 
two institutions and prevented duplications of their activities. The occurrence of the EU 
access to the ECHR may be a further opportunity for the Agency to clarify its borders and 
strengthen its role in the European context. The Agency may be a real instrument of har-
monization within the renewed framework of human rights protection. It could cooperate 
with the Council of Europe by offering reliable data and information concerning funda-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Handbook on European non-discrimination law (March 2011), Handbook on the establishment and 
accreditation of National Human Rights Institutions in the European Union (October 2012), Handbook on 
European data protection law (June 2014), Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and im-
migration (June 2014), Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration (June 2014). 
Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
128 Handbook on European non-discrimination law (March 2011). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
129 Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration (June 2014). Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu. 
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mental rights protection at EU level, while it could also be an instrument of awareness as 
regards the applicability of the Charter in light of its relation with the ECHR130.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See S. Peers, The Contribution of the EU Agency to Civil and Political Rights, in P. Alston , O. De Shutter 
(eds), Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU: The Contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency (Hart 
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At the end of our itinerary, it is necessary briefly to retrace the main stages of our inquiry in 
order to draw conclusions. The FRA is a strategic tool in the field of human rights. Indeed, 
it is one of the reforms suggested by Joseph Weiler and Philip Alston in the report pre-
pared for the Comité des Sages, which was responsible for “Leading by example: A Human 
Rights Agenda for the European Union for the Year 2000”. In this report, the Agency was 
indicated as “an indispensable element in any human rights strategy”1.  
As it has been explained in the first Chapter, the idea of creating a monitoring Agency in 
the field of fundamental rights within the European Union emerged as one of the possible 
remedies to some deficits in the Union. First of all, an increasing of the ECJ case law con-
cerning fundamental rights was not counterbalanced by an adequate and consistent system 
of fundamental rights policies at EU level. Secondly, there is the need to strengthen the 
fundamental rights strategy to make the Union closer to its citizens in the era of EU en-
largement. Thirdly, is the need to spread a common awareness of fundamental rights be-
tween the Member States and the institutions of the EU. As it has been delineated in the 
first Chapter, the process to establish the FRA was triggered by the Vienna crisis and it cer-
tainly was not a coincidence that the Agency was later placed and structured on the basis of 
the EU Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia, based in Vienna. Furthermore, 
with the first proclamation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in view of the 
upcoming Constitutional Treaty, the Agency was conceived as an essential tool within the 
new constitutional framework. The intention to create an EU Agency committed in the 
field of fundamental rights did not disappear when the project of an EU Constitution 
failed. The second part of Chapter 1 attempts to retrace the phases that characterized the 
Agency’s establishment.  The creation of the FRA was not generally welcomed. Indeed, if 
the European Commission and the European Parliament welcomed this initiative, it is also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J. Weiler, P. Alston, An 'Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy, (1998) 9 EJZL, 658. 
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true that one of its strongest opponents was the Council of Europe. As a consequence, the 
Agency came into light only in 2007 when its founding regulation was finally adopted. The 
Agency’s founding regulation is thereby the result of a compromise achieved among the 
EU relevant institutions and the Council of Europe.  
Chapter 2 analyses the current FRA’s founding regulation in the light of the original pro-
posal issued by the European Commission. The first part of the chapter is devoted to de-
termine the objectives, the scope and the tasks of the FRA while the second part is focused 
on its structure, internal organization, financial arrangements and cooperation with other 
institutions. From this analysis, the final statute is quite narrow: the Agency, in carrying out 
its activities, cannot deal with matters concerning the former third pillar and its involve-
ment within the mechanism of art.7 TEU is excluded. Furthermore, since its establishment 
precedes the entry into force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the visibility of the 
Charter within the FRA’s Founding Regulation appears quite restrained. However, it has 
been pointed out that the Charter has an important influence on the scope of the Agency’s 
activities. Art. 3(3) of the Founding Regulation with regards to the Member States, recalls 
the same concept of implementation found in art. 51(1) of the Charter. Notably, the con-
cept of implementation as laid down in art. 51(1) of the Charter is even narrower than the 
scope of the Agency’s activities. This is due to the fact that the Agency shall carry out its 
monitoring activities concerning the Member States “when they are implementing Com-
munity Law” rather than “when they are implementing Union Law”. Such wording is likely 
the consequence of the pre-Lisbon foundation of the FRA that is conceived within the 
former system of competences. At the same time, this strict formulation is also the fruit of 
the fears expressed by some Member States and the Council of Europe concerning the 
scope of its monitoring activities. 
 Finally, Chapter 3, through a focus on the undetermined nature of concept of imple-
mentation as laid down in the Charter and in its explanations and as interpreted in the case 
law of the ECJ, analyses some of the main products of the Agency’s activities such as its 
reports and opinions. Furthermore, to the purpose of our inquiry concerning the scope of 
the FRA’s activities, it has been taken into account another important element of the 
Agency’s internal legal framework such as the MAF. When the Agency is not exercising its 
tasks upon request of the EU institutions, it carries out its activities within the limits of the 
thematic areas laid down in the MAF. Therefore, the concept of implementation as ex-
pressed in art 3(3) of the Founding Regulation has to be tackled in light of these elements. 
The findings of such analysis show the increasing of FRA’s activities since the entry into 
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force of the Lisbon Treaty and a reinforced cooperation with the EU institutions, particu-
larly with the EU Parliament. Indeed, after the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was le-
gally binding, the FRA’s activities have found a renewed impulse and its advisory assistance 
considerably more requested.  However, regarding the concept of implementation, its con-
tours, as they emerged from the Agency’s reports and opinions, seem to be uncertain ac-
cording to the attitude of the ECJ. The chapter concludes its itinerary considering the 
Agency’s activities and scope in lights of the EU access to the ECHR. After analysing the 
handbooks as fruit of the joint cooperation between the Council of Europe and the Agen-
cy, it is argued that the EU access to the ECHR could offer the opportunity to the Agency 
to better define the contours of its scope of activity, and to play an important role of coor-
dination of data and information gathering between the ECHR and the EU in the field of 
fundamental rights.  
After having retraced the itinerary of the present research some conclusive reflections 
will now be drawn.  
 
 
An Untapped Resource 
In the conclusions of the external evaluation of the FRA published in 2012, the Agency is 
positively assessed. It is indeed stated: 
“It can be concluded that the FRA has clearly fulfilled its mandate in addressing 
the needs for full respect of fundamental rights in the framework of European Union 
law, in relation to relevant institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Community. 
The evaluation findings show that the Agency is considered by European stakeholders 
to be a vital point of reference in the fundamental rights architecture in Europe, 
where it is seen as a unique provider of comparative, EU-wide reports and data in the 
field of fundamental rights, covering a need for objective and reliable information 
which was previously not catered for. The work of the FRA has contributed to a 
greater knowledge-base regarding fundamental rights issues among policy-/decision-
makers and stakeholders in the European Union. The work of the FRA is found to be 
highly relevant and suitable to the information needs of stakeholders, in particular at 
the EU level and to some extent, among civil society. The FRA mainly works in fields 
where there are data gaps, in particular in terms of comparative information among 
Member States. The perceived objectivity of the FRA is appreciated by the stakehold-
ers, and their role as an EU institution gives their work additional backing, for exam-
ple compared to the work carried out by civil society or other actors in the field of 
fundamental rights”2. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ramboll (2012), External evaluation of the European Union Agency for fundamental rights. Available at 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-external_evaluation-final-report.pdf. 
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The external evaluation report recognizes the essential role of the FRA within the EU fun-
damental rights architecture as a data and information gathering body, with a coordinating 
network able to assist the EU relevant institutions and the Member States when imple-
menting Community law. However, the Agency is also considered “an untapped resource”3 
as its full potentialities remain partially unexpressed. This is due to a series of reasons, 
which have to be seriously tackled.  
First, the FRA exercises an essential advisory function within the framework of the 
MAF. Despite the case in which it is called upon by the EU relevant institutions to deliver 
an opinion or to draft a report, the FRA conducts its investigations within the limits of the 
thematic areas of the MAF. As the debate prior to the FRA’s establishment has shown, the 
FRA cannot deal of its own initiative with matters covered by the former third pillar, as the 
MAF does not include any thematic areas concerning Police and Judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Initially, this limitation of the FRA’s mandate was likely due to the organ-
ization of competences prior of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, as the 
FRA was an agency created on the basis of the flexibility clause, art. 308 TEC (now 352 
TFEU), it possessed itself under the EC Treaty and it was able to operate under the limits 
of competence of the treaty, which did not include the former third pillar. Notably, after 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, that caused the collapse of the three pillars sys-
tem and provided the legally binding status the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
Agency’s scope did not change. This is certainly seen “as inconsistent from the European 
citizens’ perspective, as this means that not all the fundamental rights included in the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights are covered by the mandate of the FRA, with potential is-
sues such as detention, extraditions and situation of vulnerable groups high on the agen-
da”4.  
Secondly, some commentators have considered the phrasing of the MAF as “unsystem-
atic”5 and having a “hybrid nature” 6. As it has been already pointed out, some thematic ar-
eas of the MAF are a mix of specific fundamental rights and others general policy areas. 
The Charter does not find its full expression within the MAF and thus such selection of 
the thematic areas could give the impression that the MAF considers some Charter’s rights 
and not others. This approach can be explained by the fact that the Charter was only a po-
litical instrument before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, leaving to the EU insti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ibid. 
4 External evaluation, supra note 2 
5 G. Toggenburg, Fundamental Rights and the European Union: how does and how should the EU Agency for Funda-
mental Rights relate to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?, EUI working papers, LAW 2013/13. 
6 ibid. 
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tutions, in particular to the European Council, the autonomy to set up the structure of the 
MAF in accordance with the priorities of the EC. However, once again, after the Charter 
was legally binding the MAF was not subject to any particular change. In this context, the 
MAF could be considered as anachronistic7 and as preventing the Agency to achieve its 
role as a full Charter body.  
Thirdly, as the “independent external evaluation report” has pointed out, the Agency is 
an “untapped resources” with regards to the EU legislative process: 
“It was generally thought that the Agency is an untapped resource to this end, 
which could significantly contribute to safeguarding fundamental rights in the legisla-
tive process at European level. There were also several opinions regarding the inde-
pendence of the FRA, which is seen as limited due to its dependency of the European 
Commission and restricted mandate in terms of issuing at its own initiative FRA opin-
ions regarding legislation”8. 
Indeed, according to art. 4(2) of the Agency founding regulation, the FRA can only deal 
with EU legislative drafts upon request of the EU institutions. Whereas FRA’s opinions on 
legislative proposals are drafted in complete independence, it is also true that such opinions 
can be delivered only when they are requested by the EU’s relevant institution thus strong-
ly limiting the role of the Agency as a body scrutinizing the upcoming legislation. 
Fourthly, certainly a possible solution to the difficulties mentioned above could be 
amending both the FRA’s Founding Regulation and the MAF. However, since both these 
legal documents are based on art. 352 TFEU (ex. Art. 308 TEC), the adoption of every 
amendment of little account would request the unanimity of votes at the European Coun-
cil. This state of affairs leads to the fact that the FRA cannot be easily emendable and thus 
is subjected to the strict limitation of its internal legal framework.  
Finally, another constraint to the FRA activity is the exclusion from the current found-
ing regulation of the provision9 providing the FRA’s advisory expertise in cases of serious 
breach of the EU values (art.7 TEU), upon request from the European Council. Certainly, 
the Agency indirectly contributes to a preventive monitoring of the Member States’ per-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 ibid. 
8 External evaluation, supra note 2. 
9 “The Agency shall make its technical expertise available to the Council, where the Council, pursuant to 
Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, calls on independent persons to submit a report on the situa-
tion in a Member State or where it receives a proposal pursuant to Article 7(2), and where the Council, acting 
in accordance with the procedure set out in these respective paragraphs of Article 7 of the Treaty on Europe-
an Union, has requested such technical expertise from the Agency”. Proposal for A Council Regulation estab-
lishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Proposal for a Council Decision empowering 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights to pursue its activities in areas referred to in Title VI of 
the Treaty on European Union COM(2005) 280 final. 
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formance through the publication of its annual reports, which are useful tools in the hand 
of the relevant EU institutions. However, the FRA could undoubtedly play an important 
role offering its expertise within the warning procedure of art. 710.  
Filling these gaps, which are not only the results of the strong debate developed in occa-
sion of the drafting of the Agency’s founding regulation but also of its birth, that occurred 
between the failure of the project of a European Constitution and the Treaty of Lisbon, 




Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union’s potentialities  
In light of the FRA’s fragilities underlined above, it is now possible to draw some final re-
flections. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights plays an important role within the FRA’s 
architecture. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter started to be in-
creasingly used as a point of reference in FRA’s opinions and reports. However, a refer-
ence to the Charter is always made through the lens of the thematic areas included in the 
MAF and in accordance with the limited mandate of the Founding Regulation. This state 
of affairs can lead to a twisted perception regarding the scope of the FRA’s activities. In 
order to avoid such misunderstanding, Gabriel Toggenburg suggests it would be necessary 
a “lisbonisation”11 of the Agency’s Founding Regulation and MAF. It is thereby important, 
especially given the new legally binding status of the Charter, to make the FRA more visi-
ble as a EU fundamental rights body that uses the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a 
main point of reference in its work. This would require rethinking the thematic areas of the 
MAF and considering their integration in areas devoted to social and political rights, as it 
was suggested by the FRA’s Management Board in its opinion on the European Commis-
sion’s proposal for a new multi-annual framework (2013-2017) for the Agency12.  
Furthermore, in light of the renewed post-Lisbon distribution of competences, judicial 
cooperation in political and criminal matters “has become part of the law of the Union and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See C. Closa, D. Kochenov, J.H.H. Weiler, Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, EUI 
Working Paper RSCAS 2014/25.  
11 G. N. Toggenburg, Fundamental Rights and the European Union: how does and how should the EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights relate to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights? (December 2013). EUI Department of Law 
Research Paper No. 13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368194 or http://dx.doi.org/-
10.2139/ssrn.2368194. 
12 Opinion of the Management Board of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the European 
Commission’s Proposal for a New Multi-Annual Framework (2013– 2017) for the Agency. See also Proposal 
for a Council Decision establishing a Multiannual Framework for the European Union Agency for Funda-
mental Rights for 2013-2017COM(2011) 880 final.  
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are therefore covered by the scope of the tasks of the Agency”13. In particular, since the ar-
ea of judicial cooperation in political and criminal matters involves a number of relevant 
issues concerning fundamental rights, it would be considered inconsistent to exclude theses 
areas from the scope of the FRA’s work. Therefore, the MAF should be integrated with 
thematic areas concerning matters covered by the former third pillar.  
The exclusion of matters covered by the former third pillar from the scope of activity of 
the FRA, is also related to the issue concerning the FRA’s “independence” that was men-
tioned above. As it is known, the Agency can deliver opinions on issues concerning judicial 
cooperation in criminal and political matters only upon request from the main EU institu-
tions. Furthermore, it was also outlined that the MAF is the result of a European Council 
decision, thus, as far as the Agency carries out its activities in complete independence, it is 
also true that with regards to the determination of the MAF and the possibility to deliver 
opinions on matters concerning the former third pillar, its margin of manoeuvre is strictly de-
fined by the EU institutions. Interestingly, in order to find a solution to these restrictions, 
Gabriel Toggenburg suggests that 
“The list of FRA priority areas should neither be decided by the European Com-
mission (as proposed by the Commission in 2005), nor by the Council (as is laid down 
in the current regulation), nor by the European Parliament (as proposed in a Parlia-
ment committee in 2006). It should rather be the agency itself which establishes – in 
close cooperation with the three EU institutions – a multiannual programme provid-
ing the necessary degree of prioritization”14. 
This proposal would allow the FRA to work within a broader scope, in light of the new 
EU constitutional framework and objectives and with a certain degree of independence. 
Unfortunately, this proposal is destined to meet the difficulties that art. 352 TEU (ex art. 
308 TEC) arises, given that it requires the unanimity of votes at the European Council to 
amend the MAF. In this respect, only amending the treaty and thus establishing the Agency 
on the basis of a new treaty provision would allow this step to be taken.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Recommendation on the draft Council decision establishing a Multiannual Framework for 2013-2017 
for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (10449/2012 – C7-0169/2012 – 2011/0431(APP)). 
14 G. N. Toggenburg, supra note 11. 
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A new perspective 
Notwithstanding the set of limitations that delimitate the FRA’s field of activity, the EU’s 
institutions increasingly begin to recognize its potential and to envisage future outcomes. A 
special opportunity for it was offered by the adoption of the new Hungarian Fundamental 
Law by the Hungarian Parliament on April 18th, 2011. The new Hungarian Constitution 
raised several concerns over its conformity with the rule of law and the democratic princi-
ple, and triggered a series of reactions on behalf of different institutional actors15. It also 
originated an important reflection on the EU’s values that reaches its climax in 2013 with a 
series of proposals and ideas expressed by the European Commission, the European Par-
liament, ministers and other institutional actors. Notably, the FRA was considered as play-
ing an important role in this context. In fact, as the European commission explained, the 
principle of rule of law includes the principle of “legality, legal certainty, prohibition of ar-
bitrariness of the executive powers, independent and impartial courts, effective judicial re-
view including respect for fundamental rights, and equality before the law, within the principle of 
rule of law”16.  
On the 3rd of July 2013, the European Parliament, in its Resolution17 on the situation of 
fundamental rights with regards to the Hungary’s constitutional reform, called on the Eu-
ropean Council, the European Commission and national parliaments to take action in or-
der to protect the values of Article 2. Interestingly, among a series of recommendations 
addressed to these institutions, the European Parliament proposes also to rethink the man-
date of the FRA with the purpose of entrusting the Agency to regularly monitor the com-
pliance of Member States with art 2 TEU: 
“the setting up of such a mechanism could involve a rethinking of the mandate of the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, which should be enhanced to include regular moni-
toring of Member States' compliance with Article 2 TEU; recommends that such a 
‘Copenhagen high-level group’ or any such mechanism should build on and cooperate 
with existing mechanisms and structures; recalls the role of the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights, which could bring together the highly valuable work 
of the various existing Council of Europe monitoring bodies and the Agency's own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See B. Bugaric ̌, Protecting Democracy and the Rule of Law in the European Union: The Hungarian Chal-
lenge,(2014) 79 L.E.Q.S., 1. See also FOCUS - An EU internal strategic framework for fundamental rights: 
joining forces to achieve better results in Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2013 - Annual 
report 2013 (June 2014). Available at http://fra.europa.eu. 
16 Communication from the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council on a new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law Brussels, 19.3.2014 COM(2014) 158 final/2. 
17 European Parliament resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and 
practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012) 
(2012/2130(INI)).  
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data and analysis in order to carry out independent, comparative and regular assess-
ments of the EU Member States' compliance with Article 2 TEU”. 
The Parliament then restates once more its intention to strengthen the FRA’s mandate. In 
particular, the extension of the FRA’s mandate would be additional and subsidiary to a new 
mechanism - setting up alongside the mechanism of art. 7 - to ensure compliance by all 
Member States with the common values as enshrined in art. 2 TEU and the continuity with 
the “Copenhagen criteria”. 
“a form of ‘Copenhagen Commission’ or high-level group, a ‘group of wise men’ 
or an Article 70 TFEU evaluation, and build up on the reforming and strengthening of the 
mandate of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and on the framework of a 
strengthened Commission-Council-European Parliament-Member States dialogue on 
measures to be taken”18. 
The same proposal was reiterated one year later in another Resolution of the European 
Parliament of 3 July 2013. According to the text of the Resolution, the European Parlia-
ment calls for the creation of a commission of experts  – “Copenhagen commission” – en-
trusted to ensure the compliance by all member States with the common values enshrined 
in art. 2 TEU and with the Copenhagen criteria. In addition, the commission should also 
advise and report to the Parliament concerning the field of fundamental rights “pending 
the amendment the FRA Regulation to allow the Agency to have stronger powers and a 
wider remit, including monitoring individual Member States in the field of fundamental 
rights” .19 
According to the European Parliament’s resolutions, the debate concerning a new 
mechanism for the respect of the rule of law within the EU, offered the opportunity to put 
the spotlight on the possibility to amend the FRA’s mandate. It is a clear evidence of what 
Vivien Reding, former Vice-President of the European Commission, declared at the Centre 
for European Policy studies:  
“Member States could also be called upon to give the EU legislator greater powers 
as regards the mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency. As you know, the FRA 
currently can only analyse fundamental rights issues at EU level and is barred from 
analysing national situations. The Council has even refused to amend the mandate of 
the FRA to include the justice and home affairs policies, as would be logical now that 
the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force. The unanimity rule for the mandate of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 ibid. 
19 European Parliament, Resolution of 3 July 2013 on the situation of fundamental rights: Standards and 
practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012), par. 64. 
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FRA is thus certainly not helpful. Those who ask for a stronger role of the FRA – and 
I am among them – should therefore call for a Treaty amendment that puts the legal 
basis of the FRA into the ordinary legislative procedure”20. 
Interestingly, in addition to her proposal related to the FRA's mandate, she also called up-
on another treaty reform that she defined “ambitious”, such as to abolish art. 51 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, “so as to make all fundamental rights directly applicable in 
the Member States, including the right to effective judicial review (Article 47 of the Char-
ter). This would open up the possibility for the Commission to bring infringement actions 
for violations of fundamental rights by Member States even if they are not acting in the 
implementation of EU law”.21 
Has the Hungary case opened the Pandora Box or has it just been a scarecrow?  
The Hungary case certainly has raised once again the need to strengthen common fun-
damental values of the European Union and to respect them. In particular, with regards to 
the principle of the rule of law, the recently Commission stated:  
“Mutual trust among EU Member States and their respective legal systems is the 
foundation of the Union. The way the rule of law is implemented at national level 
plays a key role in this respect. The confidence of all EU citizens and national authori-
ties in the functioning of the rule of law is particularly vital for the further develop-
ment of the EU into "an area of freedom, security and justice without internal fron-
tiers”22. 
In this context, the FRA could be called to finally fulfill its potential in the field of fun-
damental rights. However, with regards to the Charter, Vivian Reding’s approach appears 
quite radical. We are far from a “federalizing step” and the analogy between article 51 of 
the Charter and art. 3(3) of the Founding Regulation should be rather seen as a check to 
this evolution, in light of the principle of subsidiarity.  
On 13 March 2014, the European Commission adopts a new EU Framework to 
strengthen the Rule of Law where it envisages a three-stage process for the mechanism. 
According to the Framework, the FRA can be called to offer its expertise on particular is-
sues relating to the rule of law in Member States within the mechanism set up by the Eu-
ropean Commission. This new rule of law framework brings light on how the European 
Commission will deal with situations where a EU Member State runs the risk of violating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 V. Reding, (2013), ‘The EU and the rule of law: What next?’, speech given at CEPS on 4 September 
2013, http://europa. eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-677_de.htm. 
21 ibid. 
22 Communication from the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council on a new EU 
Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law Brussels, 19.3.2014 COM(2014) 158 final/2. 
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the Article 2 values. At the same time, it inaugurates a new period concerning the protec-
tion of fundamental rights, given the strong interdependence between rule of law and fun-
damental rights. This could be certainly the occasion for the FRA to finally fulfil its poten-
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